Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TEGUCIGALPA1938
2005-09-21 17:27:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:  

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)

Tags:  ASEC HO KSAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 TEGUCIGALPA 001938 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/WHA, S/CT, AND WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2015
TAGS: ASEC HO KSAC
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)

REF: A. SECSTATE 162859


B. 04 TEGUCIGALPA 02777

C. TEGUCIGALPA 00557

D. TEGUCIGALPA 767

E. TEGUCIGALPA 1859

F. TEGUCIGALPA 1775

G. TEGUCIGALPA 2673

H. TEGUCIGALPA 2491

Classified By: CDA JAMES WILLIARD Reason 1.4 (C) and (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 TEGUCIGALPA 001938

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/WHA, S/CT, AND WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2015
TAGS: ASEC HO KSAC
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)

REF: A. SECSTATE 162859


B. 04 TEGUCIGALPA 02777

C. TEGUCIGALPA 00557

D. TEGUCIGALPA 767

E. TEGUCIGALPA 1859

F. TEGUCIGALPA 1775

G. TEGUCIGALPA 2673

H. TEGUCIGALPA 2491

Classified By: CDA JAMES WILLIARD Reason 1.4 (C) and (D).


1. (U) The following responses are keyed to the Security
Environment Profile Questionnaire (ref A).

--------------
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
--------------


1. (SBU) Demonstrations:

(1-A.) Yes. Additionally, there are a number of
organizations and groups under the loose collective
leadership of (and affiliated with) the Bloque Popular that
have been carrying out demonstrations against U.S. foreign
policy, as well as demonstrations targeting local issues.
The following organizations have been involved in
anti-American political activities to varying degrees. They
are listed in alphabetical order, utilizing Spanish acronyms
where applicable. Post notes that the majority of those
organizations are left-leaning NGOs or unions, many of whom
maintain good relations with the Embassy. (List updated
September 2005):

- ARTISTAS DE LA UNAH

Artists of the National Autonomous University of Honduras
(A-UNAH)

- BLOQUE POPULAR
Popular Block

- COCOH
Farmers' Cooperatives Union

- CODECOH
Honduran Consumer Protection Committee

- CODEH
Honduran Committee for Human Rights

- COFADEH
Honduran Committee of Family Members of the Detained and
Disappeared

- COHAPAZ
Honduran Committee for Action for Peace

- COLPROSUMAH
Honduran Professional Teachers College (a teachers' union)

- COMPA-H
People of the Americas Convergence Movement (COMPA)-Honduras

- COPEMH
Honduran Association of Secondary School Teachers

- COPINH
Civic Council of Popular Organizations and Indigenous Groups
of Honduras (also appears as COPIN)

- COPRUMH
Honduran Professional Association Teachers' Union

- CGT
General Workers Central (the largest of Honduras' three
national labor confederations)

- CTH
Confederation of Honduran Workers (arguably, the strongest of
the three national labor confederations)


- CUTH
United Confederation of Honduran Workers (the most left of
the three national labor confederations)

- FPR
Popular Revolution Forces, a shadowy alleged revolutionary
group.

- FUTH
United Federation of Honduran Workers (the largest component
of CUTH, above)
- FSM
Feminist Movement (details needed)
- FUR
University Revolutionary Front

- GRUPO LOS NECIOS DE LA UNAH
UNAH Fools Group - Activist group in UNAH that "cheerleads"
and motivates demos

- MEH
Honduran Student Movement

- PARTIDO DE LOS TRABAJADORES DE LA FACULTAD DE PEDAGOGIA DE
LA UNAH
Teaching Faculty Workers' Party of UNAH

- RADIO GUALCHO
Leftist/Activist radio station (1510Mhz) that works closely
with Bloque Popular and is actively involved in most
demonstrations

- REPRESENTANTE DE FRENTE Y REFORMA DE LA UNAH
Reform Front Representative of UNAH

- SERUNAH
New UNAH coalition group, like Bloque Popular (but not as
prominent)

- SITRAINFOP
National Institute of Professional Formation Workers' Union

- SITRAINA
National Agrarian Institute Workers' Union

- SITRAIHSS
Institute of Social Security Workers' Union

- SITRAUNAH
UNAH Workers' Union

- SITRAUPEN
A Workers' Union (details needed)

- STIBYS
Beverage and Associated Industries Workers' Union (plays a
key organizing and logistics role for many demos)- Leader of
STIBYS is also the leader of the Popular Block.

- SITRAPANI
Child Welfare Association Workers' Union

- UD
Democratic Unification Party (remnants of the Communist Party
of Honduras and other former Marxist parties; represented in
the National Congress)

- UNAH
National Autonomous University of Honduras

- URP
Revolutionary People's Union

NOTE: The most fervent anti-U.S. groups are: MEH, URP, UD,
Bloque Popular, STIBYS, COPINH, and COMPA-H. The following
groups have committed and participated in acts of political
vandalism (against the Honduran Government and other
entities) that resulted in the destruction of public and
private property: Bloque Popular, COPINH, Democratic
Unification Party (UD),and The Revolutionary People's Union
(URP).

(1-B.) Yes. There have been 40 demonstrations in Tegucigalpa
since August 2004, including nine demonstrations either held
outside or near the U.S. Embassy. While not all
demonstrations are directed against the U.S. Government, many
are convoked to protest against U.S. foreign policy
initiators, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom or the Central
American Free Trade Agreement. On December 13, 2004, there
was a demonstration that resulted in local police using tear
gas outside of the National Congress against the
demonstrators, consisting mainly of local university students
and administrators (reftel B). On March 8, several groups
protested against the CAFTA resolution which was passed by
the Honduran Congress on March 3 (reftel C). On April 8, the
Honduran public sector unions protested against alleged back
pay, and the Honduran police used water and tear gas to break
up the crowd (reftel D). On May 11, approximately 150 people
from the Consejo Civico de Organizaciones Populares e
Inigenas de Honduras (COPINH) and the Bloque Popular again
protested against CAFTA. And most recently, on September 7
and 8, protesters comprised of mainly public transportation
(taxi) drivers blocked streets in protest against an increase
in gasoline and other basic products. Access and egress from
the main airport in Tegucigalpa were shut-off for
approximately 14 hours (reftel E).

(1-C.) About half of the demonstrations noted above have
taken place near U.S. Mission facilities.

(1-D.) The size of demonstrations at the Embassy varies from
twenty to over three hundred participants. The larger demos
usually consist of supporters from six to more than twelve
different organizations, which operate as a loosely
structured coalition under the guidance of Bloque Popular.

(1-E.) While there are demonstrations based on local issues,
such as civil service salaries, privatization, gasoline
prices, and IMF requirements, the current focus has been on
U.S. actions in Iraq, the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA),as well as previous U.S. involvement in
Venezuela and Haiti. The following statements, demands, and
gestures have been made repeatedly during past demos at the
Embassy: No to war in Iraq, No to war, Stop Plan Colombia,
Pro-Human rights, World Peace, Stop Central American Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA),U.S. Forces out of Honduras (Soto
Cano AB),U.S. Military out of Cuba, U.S. destroy your WMD,
Stop intervention in Venezuela, Stop Standard Fruit from
exploiting the indigenous people, Opposition to CAFTA, No to
privatization, Stop intervention in Haiti.

(1-F.) Generally peaceful, but demonstrators have burned
U.S. flags, thrown rocks, painted slogans on Mission outer
perimeter walls, and utilized homemade mortars to detonate
large fireworks charges that are propelled high into the air
before exploding.

(1-G.) N/A.

(1-H.) N/A.

(1-I.) Yes.

(1-J.) Yes. Occasionally they will pass by the Embassy.

(1-K.) The size varies from a few hundred to approximately
five thousand people.

(1-L.) Generally peaceful, but fences, grillwork, and
windows have been destroyed near the National Congress, as
well as many tires burned. At times, suspected plain-clothes
police have been held and beaten by hard-core protesters
within the demonstrations.

On occasions, small groups of thug-like cadre have
initiated/instigated violence against static police guards by
attempting to strike them in the lower leg areas, which are
not protected by riot shields with heavy placard poles with
large nails embedded in the ends. Several police officials
have been injured in unsuccessful attempts to get the police
to use force.

(1-M.) N/A.

-------------- --------------

2. (SBU) Macro Conflict Conditions:
-------------- --------------

(2-A.) No.

(2-B.) N/A.
(2-C.) N/A.
(2-D.) N/A.

--------------

3. (SBU) Host Country Capabilities:
--------------

(3-A.) No.

Police are somewhat mediocre in professionalism and training;
they are also somewhat apathetic toward post residential
security requirements, including response to alarms and
investigation of incidents in Mission neighborhoods; they
have definite resource/manpower limitations that inhibit
their deterrence or response effectiveness.

The National Preventive Police and Criminal Investigations
Directorate General (DGIC). Both departments suffer from a
lack of manpower, training, equipment, low pay, and
motivation. Honduras has the lowest per capita ratio of
police in Latin America. They lack the capital to purchase
and maintain vehicles (including gas) and radio equipment.
There is no standard service weapon. Despite numerous
training programs and efforts by many nations, including the
U.S., the DGIC is lacking in morale, leadership, and
resources. In numerous traffic accidents involving Mission
personnel, the response time has exceeded several hours by
the transit police. The courts, prosecutors, and police are
extremely susceptible to bribery and influence, causing
reversals in judgments against the Embassy. In one incident
involving a Mission employee and a Mission dependent, where
guns were pointed into their backs and faces and they were
significantly terrorized, the police never showed up, even
after repeated calls. Terminations have been numerous for
both political as well as criminal reasons and extend beyond
positions normally considered political appointees. In other
cases, certain high-ranking police cannot be terminated for
technical reason. Morale and integrity in the DGIC is seen
as low. The problem is exacerbated by continued fighting
between the Minister of Public Security, the Attorney
General's office, prosecutors, and judges.

(3-B.) Yes. Training by U.S. Border Patrol Tactical
(BorTac) teams is good, but GOH security infrastructure needs
major improvements.

(3-C.) Yes. Although not directly tied to a law
enforcement agency, significant corruption was recently
uncovered within Honduran Immigration, namely from the former
Immigration Director Ramon Romero. The Honduran Immigration
scandal continues to dominate press headlines. The Special
Prosecutor for Organized Crime is appealing the August 18
release of Romero, who was jailed for four months (reftel F).


(3-D.) No. However, GOH intelligence units have an
institutional awareness of and a modest capability of
penetrating indigenous radical groups.

(3-E.) Yes.

(3-F.) No. (They have almost no capability to detect or
disrupt international terrorist activities).

(3-G.) Yes.

(3-H.) Poor. There is widespread corruption within
immigration and customs and a measurable lack of security
coordination within the airport. Physical security is also
inadequate, as the perimeter lacks effective fencing, vehicle
barriers, and lighting.

(3-I.) Ineffective. Corrupt officials are easily bribed,
and therefore pose a real threat to U.S security interests.
Honduran passports, for example, have been fraudulently
obtained through immigration and customs officials for use by
subjects not legitimately entitled to them.

(3-J.) Average/Ineffective. A unit within the Ministry of
Public Security called the Frontier Police handles border
patrol duties. The unit is making positive steps towards
border control, but lack of funding and manpower are limiting
the effectiveness of the unit.

-------------- -

4. (SBU) Indigenous Terrorism-Anti American Terrorist Groups:
-------------- -


(4-A.) No.

(4-B.) N/A.

(4-C.) N/A.

(4-D.) N/A.

(4-E.) N/A.

(4-F.) N/A.

(4-G.) N/A.

(4-H.) N/A.

-------------- -

5. (SBU) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups:
-------------- -


(5-A.) No.

(5-B.) N/A.

(5-C.) N/A.

(5-D.) N/A.

(5-E.) N/A.

-------------- ---

6. (S/NF) Transnational Terrorism-Transnational Terrorist
Indicators:
-------------- ---

(6-A.) No. However, there are rumors that in the past there
have been Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA),IRA, and
Chiapas (Zapatistas) sympathizers in Honduras who could be
involved in advising indigenous groups. Some Hondurans are
studying in Cuba and also conceivably could be receiving
training in subversion and terrorism, although it is more
likely they are being indoctrinated as agents of influence.
As this Cuban program for Hondurans is in its infancy, there
have been no indications that such training is taking place.

Additionally, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) has a notorious presence in Honduras, especially in
the northern coastal areas, where they routinely trade drugs
for arms.

There were two further incidents of note:

Incident 1 - In November 2004, a Lebanese-flagged merchant
vessel, Abdul Rahman, was discovered carrying large
quantities of explosives. The explosives had not been
reported to port officials when the ship arrived. The vessel
is on watch list for possible terrorist links based on
information indicating its owner Wael OZOR was an al-Qaida
sympathizer and had connections to Hizballah (reftel G).

Incident 2 - On September 19, 2004, two Jordanians were
detained in Costa Rica for using fake passports. They were
deported back to Amman, Jordan, and interviewed by Jordanian
authorities. They stated that they were in Central America
looking for work. They did not mention receiving assistance
from anyone or why they traveled to four Central American
countries. RSO has been able to obtain documentation that,
while in Honduras, the two were assisted by a third party who
paid for their hotel, food, and a plane ticket to facilitate
travel. Subsequently, RSO Tegucigalpa, working with other
sections, has found a possible link between the telephone
number called by Abdel Rahman Nassar and the two Jordanian
subjects with known alien smuggling groups within Central
America and Hizbollah terror group in the Middle East (reftel
H).

(6-B.) N/A.
(6-C.) N/A.

(6-D.) N/A and No.
(6-E.) N/A.
(6-F.) The only known hostile intelligence presence of note
is Cuban. While the Cuban mission appears to have extensive
contacts with leftists and indigenous groups, there is no
indication they are planning or supporting terrorism.
Likewise, while there is concern over alleged Venezuelan
contact with and possible funding of Leftist organizations,
there is no indication that they are planning or supporting
terrorism.

(6-G.) There is no shortage of weapons in Honduras. It
would also not be difficult for hostile terrorist elements to
import weapons and/or explosives from neighboring countries.
Williard