TAIWAN TAKES LOW-KEY RESPONSE OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000685

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV JA CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN TAKES LOW-KEY RESPONSE OVER
DIAOYUTAI/SENKAKU DISPUTE


Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: The Chen administration is trying to reduce
local reaction over the February 9 Japanese government
decision to take direct control of a lighthouse on the
disputed island of Diaoyutai/Senkaku. Taipei gently chided
Japan for its move in public, reminding Tokyo of the
"Republic of China's" claim to the islands. Privately,
Taipei also urged that Japan not exacerbate the incident by
sending more personnel to the area. Chen administration
officials see the issue primarily as a PRC-Japanese dispute
that Taiwan should avoid getting in the middle of. There is
also concern that tensions between Beijing and Tokyo over the
islands could spill over into the domestic political arena in
Taiwan. End Summary.

New Year Surprise
--------------


2. (C) Chen administration officials tell AIT they were
surprised by the February 9 decision by the Japanese
government to take possession of a lighthouse built by a
Japanese rightist organization in 1986. The Taiwan Foreign
Ministry issued a mild public protest over the move on
February 10. However, the MOFA Spokesman who delivered the
statement also told reporters that the GOJ's action had a
positive side, since it opened the door to government-level
consultations on the territorial dispute. National Security
Council (NSC) Senior Advisor for Asian Affairs Lin Cheng-wei
also tried to put the episode in a positive light. Lin
asserted that, from the Chen administration's perspective,
the main substantive interest for Taiwan is to protect
fishing rights in the area. Since the Japanese government
assured Taipei through private channels that its February 9
move will not affect Taiwan's current access to the area's
fishing grounds or future right to explore for natural
resources, Lin said Taiwan did not feel directly threatened
by the move.


3. (C) Nevertheless, Lin told AIT that Taipei did convey
concern to Tokyo over the timing of the move and warned the
GOJ against taking further actions, such as dispatching
military personnel to the island. Lin said that Japanese
officials claimed that the decision to take possession of the
island was intended to reduce chances for a clash between
Japanese and Chinese nationalist groups. While Taipei
accepted this explanation, it did express displeasure that
the Diaoyutai action came the same week as Tokyo Governor
Ishihara Shintaro revealed plans to build a power generator
on the disputed Okinotori island. While the two moves were
likely coincidental, Lin said, the Taiwan and Chinese media
lumped them together to suggest that Tokyo was making a
coordinated push to expand its claims in the area.

Taiwan's Dilemma
--------------


4. (C) Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration
officials say that Taiwan finds itself in a bind over the
Diaoyutai dispute. On the one hand, they claim that Taiwan
needs to maintain its formal claims on the area in order to
minimize criticism from the opposition in the Legislative
Yuan (LY). DPP International Affairs Department Deputy
Director Hsieh Huai-huei told AIT that the Diaoyutai issue is
linked closely to ethnic politics in Taiwan. "Older DPP
supporters and followers of Lee Teng-hui feel strongly that
the islands are Japanese and they do not want the government
to help China over the dispute," she commented. Hsieh added,
however, that many leading ethnic Mainlander politicians,
including Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou, got their start in
politics as activists on Diaoyutai and are likely to strongly
attack the government if it failed to stand up over the issue.


5. (C) At the same time, the NSC's Lin said that the Chen
administration also wants to avoid being seen as siding with
Beijing against Tokyo. Lin noted that Taiwan's stock is on
the rise within the same political and bureaucratic circles
in Tokyo that are most exercised about issues like
Diaoyutai/Senkaku. Thus, Lin said Taipei needed to be
particularly careful not to offend them on the issue.
National Taiwan University (NTU) Professor Philip Yang
assessed that Taipei will likely try to leverage its low-key
response to gain future concessions from Tokyo. However,
Japan Interchange Association Economic Section Chief Sugita
Masahiko told AIT that Tokyo fully expected Taiwan's
restrained response and would not feel obliged to give
anything in return.

Next Steps
--------------


6. (C) The NSC's Lin said that the Foreign Minister will
likely be called upon to restate Taiwan's position when the
LY reconvenes on February 25, but stated that no other
actions are under consideration. The Interchange
Association's Sugita told AIT that Tokyo does not plan any
immediate steps, but noted that his office received
information that Taiwan pro-unification activists may join
like-minded groups from the PRC and Hong Kong in an attempt
to land on Diaoyutai in May. Sugita said that if these
reports were confirmed, the Japanese Coast Guard might send
additional personnel to the island to prevent a landing.

Comment: A Peripheral Issue
--------------


7. (C) The Diaoyutai dispute is clearly no longer the
hot-button political issue it once was in Taiwan. While
extremists on both ends of the domestic spectrum may get
animated over the conflicting claims, the government in
Taipei views the issue as a problem for Beijing and Tokyo to
work out. Taipei's relative silence is certain to be
appreciated by Tokyo, but it is unlikely to win Taiwan any
new points with the Japanese government. There might be a
greater risk if Taiwan were to raise the ire of Chinese
nationalists by tilting too far towards Japan on the issue.
Thus far, fear of inviting opposition censure has driven
Taiwan towards a cautious central course on the issue. As
long as frictions do not develop further between Tokyo and
Beijing, Taipei is likely to continue on its low-key course.
PAAL