Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TAIPEI4440
2005-11-02 08:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

CAMPAIGNING ON CROSS-STRAIT TENSIONS

Tags:  PGOV PREL TW CH US 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

020852Z Nov 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 004440 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2030
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW CH US
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGNING ON CROSS-STRAIT TENSIONS


Classified By: AIT Taipei Director Douglas Paal. Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 004440

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2030
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW CH US
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGNING ON CROSS-STRAIT TENSIONS


Classified By: AIT Taipei Director Douglas Paal. Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1.(C) With the Taiwan-wide elections for mayors and county
magistrates a little over a month away, two themes are
dominating the campaign efforts of the DPP and the KMT. The
first is corruption and governance; the second is
cross-Strait relations and defense. The KMT and its new
chairman Ma Ying-jeou have begun attacking the DPP
administration and President Chen over a series of corruption
scandals and the continuing weak state of the Taiwan economy.
They have complemented this with a series of initiatives
designed to show that they are the only party capable of
improving cross-Strait political relations and business
climate. Chen has counter attacked by insisting that the DPP
has actually taken the initiative in fighting corruption and
claiming that the KMT control of the Legislative Yuan has
made it impossible for the DPP administration to govern
effectively. Chen's emphasis on cross-Strait themes has the
potential to increase cross-Strait tensions as his rhetoric
did during the 2004 presidential and legisl
ative elections.

2.(C) In both the 2004 presidential and legislative
elections, Chen and his DPP campaign advisors promised that
their campaign would focus on internal Taiwan concerns and
avoid cross-Strait or Taiwan independence issues. Each time,
Chen subsequently decided that the most effective way to
mobilize the party's core supporters and overcome criticism
of his government's weak record on economic and other
governance issues was to emphasize these same provocative
themes. In this campaign, facing a more effective campaigner,
Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou, leading the opposition, the
pressure on Chen to return to the themes of cross-Strait
relations and Taiwan independence is growing once again.

3.(C) Domestically, Chen has been buffeted by accusations of
corruption and poor governance. Polls and all of our contacts
state unequivocally that Chen and the DPP's support is
eroding rapidly. Long before the official campaign began,
Chen made his initial effort to distract attention from his
domestic political difficulties by announcing publicly in
July that he intended to participate in the APEC leaders
meeting in Korea this November. This was quickly dismissed as
a publicity stunt. In October, Chen announced that he would
instead dispatch the KMT President of the Legislative Yuan
Wang Jin-pyng to APEC. By going public before either South
Korea or China had agreed to the choice, Chen ensured its
failure. For his domestic political agenda, that was the
point: Chen had created another dramatic example of how China
treats Taiwan and its DPP President unfairly. The problem
for Chen so far is that China has wisely not risen to the
bait and given him ugly statements to use domestically.

4.(C) Chen has echoed this same theme of PRC antagonism is
raising obstacles to allowing PRC tourists to begin visiting
Taiwan in large numbers and in blocking the visit of Chen
Yunlin, the Director of the PRC State Council Taiwan Affairs
Office. In the past week the DPP has sought to blame the PRC
for its domestic political woes by claiming that TVBS, which
has produced some of the most damaging evidence of high-level
DPP corruption, is controlled by PRC interests. (This has
already proved counter-productive in Taiwan.) Chen has
criticized the KMT for encouraging PRC initiatives on tourism
and visits to Taiwan that emphasize people-to-people ties
over contacts with the government. Chen and the DPP have also
suggested that the KMT's opposition to the Special Defense
Budget reflects its willingness to encourage ties with China
that might weaken Taiwan's separate status and hopes for
eventual independence.

5.(C) The DPP's domestic political situation will likely
worsen through the remaining weeks of the campaign as
additional questions and allegations of corruption and
mismanagement are raised by the media and the KMT opposition.
Ma Ying-jeou will seek to contrast Chen and the DPP's
failings with his reputation for personal integrity, his
calls for clean government, and his efforts to reform the
KMT. In this environment, it is almost inevitable that Chen
will focus an increasing portion of his campaigning around
strident accusations that the PRC is seeking to isolate and
destabilize Taiwan and the KMT is complicit in their efforts.

6.(C) The challenge will be for the United States and China
to respond to Chen's campaign rhetoric in ways that diminish
his efforts to increase cross-Strait tensions for his
domestic ends. At the same time, cool disdain for such
tactics, expressed from officials in Washington, is most
likely to help control the situation, much as statements from
State and White House helped blunt Chen's tacics in last
year's LY elections.
Keegan