TAIWAN'S APEC DIPLOMACY: ROUND TWO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 004190

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON TW APEC
SUBJECT: TAIWAN'S APEC DIPLOMACY: ROUND TWO

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. For the second time in as many months,
Taiwan launched an APEC initiative that met quick refusal in
Beijing. First, it was President Chen Shui-bian's July 22
announcement that he intended to personally represent Taiwan
at the November APEC leaders' meeting in Pusan, which Beijing
quickly rejected. The second attempt was President Chen's
announcement to the South Koreans on October 12 that he will
send Legislative Yuan (LY) Speaker and Kuomintang Party (KMT)
legislator Wang Jin-pyng to represent Taiwan in Pusan, which
met a similar rejection. The gallant offer of KMT Chairman
Ma Ying-jeou to help facilitate the visit of his rival Wang,
however, ran aground when the KMT learned that Beijing had
privately rejected the Wang overture weeks earlier. This
suggested, at least to the KMT, that Chen's announcement may
have had more to do with painting Beijing as the oppressor
and splitting the opposition KMT than with Taiwan
representation at APEC. End Summary.


2. (C) President Chen personally informed South Korean
special envoy Yun Hai-jung on October 12 of his decision to
appoint Wang to represent Taiwan in Pusan. Presidential
Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun then informed the press that

SIPDIS
Chen had told the envoy he was appointing Wang "to avoid
making things difficult for South Korea." At the same press
conference, Presidential Deputy Secretary General James Huang
said the U.S. had welcomed the appointment of Wang. Later
the same day, PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan stated
the PRC's strong opposition to Wang's presence at APEC
because of the 1991 APEC MOU which, Kong said, permitted
"Chinese Taipei" only to dispatch the minister in charge of
economic affairs related to APEC to attend APEC summits.

Round One: President Chen to Pusan
--------------


3. (C) Three months earlier, on July 22, President Chen
Shui-bian announced that he wanted to personally attend the
November APEC leaders' meeting in Pusan. The ROK Taiwan
Trade Office Political Chief told AIT at the time that Taiwan
NSC officials had given the ROK Trade Office "a few days"
warning that President Chen might announce his intention to
personally attend the leaders, summit. Meeting with
Presidential Office Deputy Secretary General James Huang, the
Director pointed out that any such initiative to have a
serious chance of success should include prior consultations
with AIT (Huang himself had informed the Director, but only
on Friday afternoon, July 22, just before the press was
informed). Several weeks later, Huang told the Deputy
Director that Taipei had fully realized Beijing would not
accept Chen,s overture and that the real intention had been
to demonstrate to the international community Taiwan's
willingness to engage the PRC and even make concessions, such
as Chen,s announcement that he would accept the nomenclature
of "Taiwan, China."

Round Two: Speaker Wang to Pusan
--------------


4. (C) On September 16, NSC Secretary General Chiou I-jen
informed the Acting Director that if President Chen was not
able to attend the APEC leaders' meeting, he was considering
sending LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng as Taiwan's representative.
Wang, he said, had indicated to Chen his interest in the idea
without making any firm commitment. Chiou asked if the U.S.
would convey this message to Beijing and ascertain Beijing's
view of the idea. The Acting Director noted that Wang could
be problematic, because traditionally the Taiwan
representative has been non-government, whereas Wang is a
senior government official. Chiou acknowledged this problem,
but argued that Beijing would find LY Speaker and KMT leader
Wang "interesting" and would "not get hung up on the issue of
official position."


5. (C) Chiou then informed the Acting Director that Taipei
"requests U.S. help" to prepare the way for the Wang
appointment. When asked if there had been any effort to
float this on any basis with either Beijing or this year's
host, the ROK, Chiou said no. Three days later, the Acting
Director informed Chiou that Washington believed it would be
more appropriate for Taiwan to utilize its own channels to
inform Beijing and Seoul about the Wang proposal.

6. (C) Seoul Taipei Representative Hwang told the Director
on October 14 that just before Ambassador Yun departed Seoul,
he had received a call from Taipei,s representative in Seoul
informing him of Taiwan,s intention to nominate Wang
Jin-pyng. The Korean MFA did not have a chance to review
this issue before Yoon departed, therefore Hwang had to
deliver Seoul,s negative reaction, that it could not support
Wang,s participation, in a separate meeting at Taipei,s
MOFA on October 15.


7. (C) Presidential Office Deputy Secretary General James
Huang told the Director on October 14 that, though unlikely,
Kong Quan may have answered the question in the way he did to
leave the door open for Wang to attend the informal leaders'
meeting while still looking tough on Taiwan. If so, Huang
continued, perhaps the U.S. could pursue this possibility
with Beijing. Meanwhile, Huang told the Director, Taipei is
pursuing its own channels to try to communicate on this
subject with Beijing, details of which he was not now
authorized to share with AIT.

Chairman Ma Deftly Weighs In
--------------


8. (C) Following Beijing's announcement on October 13 that
it would not accept Wang, KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou stepped
in and told Wang that the party fully supported his
appointment and would try to help facilitate Beijing's
approval. According to the local press, Ma telephoned Wang
and expressed the party's support for his trip to Pusan. In
a smart political move, he also offered to utilize the
KMT-CCP party-to-party channel that had been established
following former KMT Chairman Lien Chan's April visit to
Mainland China. Wang, according to press reports, expressed
appreciation for Ma's offer and pledged to meet with Ma in
person once Wang's trip is confirmed. Ma then directed KMT
Research Director Chang Jung-kung to communicate with PRC
officials via the party-to-party mechanism to help facilitate
Wang's participation in the Pusan meeting.


9. (C) Chang Jung-kung told AIT late on October 14 that he
immediately contacted the PRC side to initiate Ma's
directive. The PRC, however, informed Chang that both the
Chen government and Wang himself had separately approached
Beijing "a month ago" to propose the idea of Wang's
appointment. The PRC had rejected both overtures at that
time, the KMT was told, not only because of the publicly
stated reason (inappropriate representation) but also because
Beijing believed Chen intended the Wang appointment to
influence future Taiwan elections and to split the KMT.
(Comment: In fact, Chairman Ma's initial response to the
October 12 announcement of Wang's appointment was very cool,
suspicious and non-supportive.)


10. (C) When KMT leaders learned that Wang himself had been
rejected, Chang explained to AIT, they realized that the
special party-to-party mechanism had been effectively closed
to them before they had even started. Chang indicated that
the KMT does not plan to make further efforts on behalf of a
Wang visit. Noting that Lien Chan himself had arrived in
Beijing yesterday, October 13, and will have dinner with PRC
Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Chun Yunlin, Chang said
there were no plans to request Lien to weigh in on the Wang
issue.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) So why, several weeks after receiving Beijing's
informal rejection of the Wang Jin-pyng proposal, did
President Chen go ahead and make the Wang proposal to
Ambassador Yun and make such a big deal of it to the press?
This appears to fit the pattern of the first Chen proposal
which was offered, not as a viable, realistic possibility,
but to demonstrate once more how the PRC is suppressing
Taiwan and how Beijing rejects every Taiwan goodwill offer.
In the scandal-ridden crisis atmosphere now prevailing in
Taiwan, this may be viewed by Chen as a useful diversionary
tactic. Ma's offer to be helpful may help shelter him from
being lumped with the mainland by President Chen.
PAAL