EU MISSIONS IN TAIWAN ENCOURAGING MODERATE STANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003018

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/WASHINGTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC TW
SUBJECT: EU MISSIONS IN TAIWAN ENCOURAGING MODERATE STANCE
ON ARMS EMBARGO

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Representatives of EU member states in Taipei
have begun to coordinate their efforts to convince EU and
home country officials that Europe must look beyond economics
in its ties with the PRC, particularly with regards to the
arms embargo. Beginning in 2004, EU missions in Taipei set a
precedent of drafting common policy messages to capitals that
went beyond trade and highlighted cross-Strait ties, regional
security, and aimed to moderate the EU's Beijing
centric-policies. EU representatives say they were compelled
to take coordinated action because individually they had
little impact on EU policy making. European representatives
also argued that EU priorities were too focused on EU-PRC
trade and that EU officials had little understanding of
Taiwan or the regional security implications behind Beijing's
growing military prowess. The representatives assert that
their policy messages give EU foreign policy officials an
alternative to Europe's prevailing pro-PRC policies and,
combined with Washington's lobbying campaign and Beijing's
Anti-Secession Law (ASL),played a role in the June decision
not to lift the arms embargo. The representatives also noted
that Taiwan itself was largely absent in the EU's decision to
maintain the embargo and contend that Taipei lacks an
effective EU foreign policy. End summary.

A Bold Step by EU Missions
--------------


2. (C) With most European governments predominantly focused
on economic ties with Beijing, Dutch Representative Menno
Goedhart told AIT that he and his EU colleagues in Taipei
decided to take coordinated action early last year because EU
missions in Taipei were being ignored. Goedhart said that in
contrast, EU missions in Beijing enjoyed increasing influence
on policies being formulated in Europe. He said that the
EU's East Asian policies showed that Europe had little
institutional knowledge of Taiwan or of Taipei's relationship
with Beijing. In agreement with Goedhart, Political Officer
Den Moore from the UK's office added that most EU offices in
Taipei have traditionally focused on economic and commercial
policy because EU nations typically assigned economic
officers to serve in Taiwan. Moore also pointed out that
most EU East Asia policy makers had served in the PRC, but
few had visited Taiwan, were knowledgeable about cross-Strait
ties, or understood the importance of regional security in
Asia.


3. (C) Under Goedhart's leadership, the EU missions in Taipei
held their first meeting in the Spring of 2004 to discuss the
impact Taiwan's 2004 presidential election controversy could
have on the PRC and cross-Strait stability. Goedhart said
initially some of the EU offices were reluctant to
participate in the meeting, but in the end they all agreed to
attend. He also told AIT that at first the policy messages
were ignored by EU ministries because the messages went
against conventional EU-PRC policies. However, Goedhart
explained that the process evolved quickly into a forum for
Taipei-based missions to provide EU capitals with reliable
information and noted that the messages became bolder and are
now distributed among foreign ministries throughout Europe.
He characterized this as a break-through because an
alternative point of view is now included in EU policy
discussions concerning the PRC. Hungary's Representative,
Sandor Matyus, added that the Taiwan EU messages have an
impact because they offer a broader view of Asia and
highlight the importance of political and security policy in
the region.

Influencing the Arms Embargo Debate
--------------


4. (C) As the common messages evolved, the EU missions
increasingly addressed issues such as balance of power,
cross-Strait ties and in early 2005, turned to the EU arms
embargo debate. Goedhart acknowledged that there were many
factors in the June decision to maintain the embargo, but he
contends that the policy messages from EU representatives in
Taipei played a role in the debate. Goedhart explained that
the representatives hoped to convince Brussels and EU
capitals that the security balance in Asia cannot be altered
without consequences, and that increased tensions in the
Taiwan Strait can affect security around the world. The
messages advised the EU to play a more active role in
cross-Strait issues and encouraged the EU not to lift the
embargo solely for the sake of trade without at least
requiring cross-Strait dialogue or other conditions from
Beijing first.


5. (C) Goedhart noted that in comparison to one year ago,
Taiwan is more relevant in EU-PRC policy discussions and that
cross-Strait issues are considered to be intertwined with PRC
policy. Czech Republic Representative Michal Kral told AIT
that the common messages have highlighted how Taiwan will
impact EU relations with the PRC, which helped Europe realize
that the issues and problems related to Taiwan and the PRC
are more complicated and significant than they realized.
Kral asserted that the messages also helped the EU understand
that Europe was not getting human rights concessions or real
tangible trade benefits from Beijing that would warrant
lifting the embargo.

US Lobbying and ASL Also Important
--------------


6. (C) The representatives acknowledged other factors were
important in the decision to maintain the embargo including
Washington's lobbying efforts and Beijing's ASL. Hungary's
Matyus said that Washington's efforts, which began in earnest
earlier this year, have made Europe aware of the USG's
security interests in Asia. Goedhart argued that American
pressure was instrumental in the EU's delay in lifting the
embargo. He said the pressure from the Bush administration
and Congress's threat of sanctions surprised European
leaders. Goedhart argued that America's lobbying campaign
combined with the efforts of EU offices in Taipei to moderate
Europe's PRC policies have been very effective. The EU's
Economic and Trade Office Director in Taipei, Brian McDonald,
offered a similar assessment, but he did tell AIT that while
the EU's decision to maintain the embargo was a complex
matter, USG intervention was the most crucial factor.


7. (C) Sweden's Representative, Henrik Bystrom, said the
PRC's passage of the ASL also played a vital role in
derailing momentum to lift the embargo and he characterized
the ASL as Beijing "shooting itself in the foot and providing
a gift for Taiwan." Bystrom maintained that the ASL has drawn
considerable global attention to Taiwan's plight and
highlighted cross-Strait issues including concerns about
Asia's balance of power. Italy's Deputy Representative, Dino
Sorrentino, told AIT that with the March passage of the ASL,
it appeared that the PRC was playing on many international
tables because the PRC does not seem to care if the EU lifts
the embargo. The Czech Republic's Kral added that the ASL
did not make any sense because until this year, momentum had
been gaining to lift the arms embargo.

Taiwan's Ineffective EU Foreign Policy
--------------


8. (C) Despite the EU's decision to maintain the embargo, EU
diplomats in Taipei noted that Taiwan itself did very little
to influence the decision. According to the EU's McDonald,
most EU nations are reluctant to deal with Taiwan and as a
result, Taipei is unable to get its message across as it
should since Taipei has considerable sympathy in EU
Parliaments. Sweden's Bystrom added that Taiwan often
focuses too many of its limited resources on initiatives that
have little chance of success such as Taipei's bid to join
the UN. He also remarked that Taiwan lacks a real strategy
and typically relies on the USG for its European foreign
policy. While Bystrom suggested this may work in the short
term, he opined that Taipei needs a viable long term strategy
to deal with the EU. Finally, the UK's Moore described
Taiwan's lobbying as "unsophisticated" and lamented that
Taiwan officials had as yet been unable to offer him a
compelling argument that the embargo should not be lifted.

Comment: Setting a Precedent
--------------


9. (C) While there were certainly many factors in the EU's
June decision to maintain the arms embargo, the willingness
of EU missions in Taipei to seek an alternative and proactive
means of influencing EU East Asian policies to ensure their
voice is heard in Brussels and in other EU capitals is
precedent setting. The initial effort was primarily driven
by Goedhart, but each of the EU representatives AIT met with
were unanimous in their praise for the common messages and
their belief that the monthly EU meetings will continue after
Goedhart departs Taipei.


10. (C) More troubling for Taiwan, however, is the EU
representatives' assessment of Taipei's EU foreign policy
strategy. Taipei appears to have gotten lucky over the
recent EU decision on arms sales. However, Taiwan cannot
afford to always rely on sympathetic European diplomats and
USG intervention to effectively advance its interests in the
EU.
PAAL