SCHEDULING EXPORT CONTROL VISITS WITH TAIWAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002509

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W
STATE FOR EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/EP, EB/IFD/OIA AND NP/ECC/MCCELLAN
STATE FOR INR/EC/NKWG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2020
TAGS: ETTC PARM PINR PREL PTER TW
SUBJECT: SCHEDULING EXPORT CONTROL VISITS WITH TAIWAN

REF: A. TAIPEI 2496


B. STATE 104043

C. TAIPEI 2475

D. TAIPEI 1780

E. TAIPEI 1501

F. TAIPEI 543

Classified By: AIT DIRECTOR DOUGLAS H. PAAL, REASON 1.5 (b),(d),(h)


1. (U) Action request in para. 11.


2. (S) Summary. AIT/T Deputy Director met June 8 with Wang
Hsi-tien, Deputy Director General of Taiwan's National
Security Council (NSC),to discuss ongoing cooperation on
export controls. Taiwan is feeling pressure to send a
high-level nonproliferation delegation to Washington and, at
the same time, has been long expecting a U.S. experts
delegation to come to Taipei to help design and implement a
more effective export control regime. While Wang looks
forward to the opportunity to visit Washington and discuss
Taiwan-U.S. cooperation, he believes that it would be most
useful to have the experts group visit Taipei prior to his
visiting Washington. Recent messages from TECRO/W stating
that Wang would be visiting Washington in July are premature
and TECRO/W should be correcting the record in the near
future. AIT/T recommends that Washington Agencies consider
scheduling the U.S. experts visit to Taipei prior to Wang
visiting Washington. End Summary.


3. (S) AIT/T Deputy Director met June 8 with Wang
Hsi-tien, Deputy Director General of Taiwan's National
Security Council (NSC). AIT discussed ongoing cooperation
between the U.S. and Taiwan to enhance Taiwan's export
control regime and delivered the demarche contained in ref B
regarding continued dealings by a Taiwan machine tool company
with Iran, which had been presented to the Board of Foreign
Trade June 7 (ref A).


4. (C) Wang said that he and his government understand that
the U.S. would like to have a high-level delegation from
Taiwan visit the U.S. to discuss export control issues. Wang
said that he would be pleased to lead such a delegation to
the U.S. at any time. However, he also expressed a degree of
frustration over the delay in sending a team of experts from
the U.S. to assist the Board of Foreign Trade (BOFT) to
design and implement an effective export control regime to
handle exports of machine tools to North Korea (DPRK). From
Taiwan's perspective, Wang said it would be most useful to
complete work on the issues discussed during the February 1-2
visit to Taipei by the U.S. delegation and then to have a
follow up senior-level meeting to discuss progress made and
next steps.


5. (C) Wang said that, during the February meetings, Taiwan
had agreed to establish three working groups: one on
exchanging intelligence information, a second on
investigating the Supernote case of counterfeit U.S. currency
and a third one on enhancing Taiwan's export control regime
(ref F). Most of the discussion centered on the export
control working group.


6. (C) Wang noted that cooperation on the Supernote Working
Group is proceeding very well, with a USSS agent already in
Taiwan and working closely with the Taiwan prosecutor in
charge of the investigation. However, he said the export
control working group has been delayed as Taiwan has been
expecting expert input from the U.S. on ways to enhance
sharing of intelligence information and to improve Taiwan's
export control processes. As reported in ref C, BOFT has
developed a proposal to require Taiwan firms to obtain an
export permit before shipping machine tools to the DPRK. On
June 3, BOFT provided its draft proposal to AIT and requested
U.S. comments on the draft.


7. (S) Both Wang and BOFT (refs A and C) expressed a great
deal of interest in sharing intelligence information with the
U.S. They emphasized that Taiwan has little information
about how goods shipped from Taiwan may be rerouted or
forwarded on to destinations of concern. AIT delivered the
talking points contained in ref B to Wang and told him we had
delivered the same points to BOFT the day before. Wang said
the information that Ecoma may be continuing to conduct
business with Iran is a prime example of how the U.S. and
Taiwan can usefully share intelligence information. He also
said that he has directed Taiwan's National Security Bureau
and the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau to monitor
DPRK businessmen who come to Taiwan. In particular, he said
Taiwan is monitoring conversations and dealings that DPRK
visitors have with Taiwan firms. (Comment: The clear
implication from Wang and BOFT was that the U.S. would be
supplying the bulk of the intelligence information. End
Comment.) The Deputy Director noted that the initiatives
Wang had just described could prove very useful. He said
that he was sure that Taiwan would have abundant useful
intelligence information to share with the U.S.
Confused Schedules
--------------

8. (C) Currently, Wang and various agencies in the Taiwan
Government are actively planning a delegation to visit the
U.S. AIT understands that TECRO/W has already informed
Washington Agencies that Wang would lead a delegation to
Washington in July. According to Wang, that message was
delivered prematurely. While we were in his office, Wang
instructed his staff to check with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to check on why the message had already been
delivered to AIT/W and Washington Agencies. Wang said that
he will consult further with MOFA and have TECRO/W deliver a
revised message to Washington Agencies. The revised message
would reflect his view that it makes more sense to have the
experts group from the U.S. visit Taiwan prior to his visit
to Washington.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) There are three distinct visits currently being
contemplated regarding export control policy: 1) Wang's
visit to Washington, 2) a small experts group from Washington
to Taiwan, and 3) the second round of EXBS training. In our
view, these three visits have become somewhat tangled.
Wang's visit has become particularly enmeshed with the U.S.
experts visit to Taiwan. BOFT has been waiting since early
February for the experts visit and, feeling the pressure to
produce an export control plan, has done so without benefit
of U.S. input. Wang, feeling the pressure to demonstrate
Taiwan's commitment to nonproliferation, has set in motion a
visit to Washington. Alongside these events, the first round
of EXBS training went so well that the Taiwan agencies have
been pressing for quickly scheduling the rest of the
training. The contractor for EXBS training has already
advised AIT/T that it wishes to hold the second round of EXBS
training July 12-15.


10. (S) While we do not know scheduling concerns of
Washington Agencies, Wang's analysis seems reasonable that
the most efficient use of resources, both in Taiwan and the
U.S., would be to first schedule the visit by U.S. experts to
assist BOFT to design and implement its export control
regime. Following such a visit, Wang could lead a delegation
to Washington to reciprocate the February visit to Taipei and
talk about future steps. Wang is clearly prepared to come to
Washington in July and deliver assurances of Taiwan's
commitment to nonproliferation and cooperation with the U.S.
His first priority at this point, which we believe the U.S.
should support, is to follow up on the issues discussed at
the February meeting and find ways to enhance quickly
Taiwan's export control regime. End Comment.


11. (C) Action Request: We request direction on how to
respond to Wang's proposal that Washington agencies consider
scheduling an experts group to visit Taiwan to consult with
NSC, NSB and BOFT. End Action request.
PAAL