Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TAIPEI2479
2005-06-07 03:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

TAIWAN STONEWALLS PRC TOURISTS, PANDAS AND FRUIT

Tags:  PGOV PREL TW 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

070335Z Jun 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002479 

SIPDIS

WASHINGTON PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN STONEWALLS PRC TOURISTS, PANDAS AND FRUIT

REF: A. TAIPEI 2076


B. TAIPEI 2243

Classified By: AIT Deputy Director David J. Keegan, Reason 1.4 b

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002479

SIPDIS

WASHINGTON PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN STONEWALLS PRC TOURISTS, PANDAS AND FRUIT

REF: A. TAIPEI 2076


B. TAIPEI 2243

Classified By: AIT Deputy Director David J. Keegan, Reason 1.4 b


1. (C) Summary. Taipei continues to hold at arm's length
Beijing's offers of accommodation conveyed during the Lien
and Soong visits. Taipei officials insist that offers of
tourism, pandas, and fruit be handled via government-to-
government, or even virtual state-to-state (i.e., WTO),
negotiations. President Chen Shui-bian's primary objective,
however, is not these highly unlikely official negotiations,
but rather to neutralize the enthusiasm over the Lien and
Soong trips, cool the accompanying "China fever" in Taiwan,
and restore his own shaken political leadership. Chen's
criticism of Lien and Soong and stonewalling of Beijing
appear to have squelched any cross-Strait momentum the two
visits might have created. These two maneuvers, together
with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) May 14 National
Assembly election victory, have largely restored Chen's
unchallenged leadership of the DPP and control of
cross-Strait relations. Chen has pledged that after the KMT
Chairman change in July, there will again be forward movement
on inter-party conciliation and cross-Strait relations. The
appointment over the weekend of former DPP Secretary General
Chang Chun-hsiung as Chairman of Taiwan's Straits Exchange
Foundation (SEF),however, probably seals the fate of SEF as
a venue for negotiations; though a senior party official,
Chang has little experience with or apparent interest in
cross-Strait relations. Rather, Chen is reportedly still
interested in establishing a cross-Strait peace and
development commission with opposition party representation,
but not leadership. End Summary.


2. (C) In late May, President Chen Shui-bian seized on PRC
opposition to Taiwan's bid for observer status at the World
Health Assembly in Geneva as proof the Lien and Soong visits
achieved nothing and Mainland China continued hostile toward
Taiwan. A few days later, Chen declared Taiwan's opposition
visit-induced "China fever" finished. DPP Deputy SecGen Yan
Wan-chin told AIT that Chen's primary objective was to
counter the opposition trips and to neutralize the
intra-party criticism he confronted in a May 6 DPP meeting

(see Ref A). Only then could Chen recover the positive
trajectory in cross-Strait relations derailed by the PRC
Anti-Secession Law in mid-March.


3. (C) Chen's effort to block cross-Strait exchanges
stemming from the Lien and Soong visits has been reinforced
by the hard line Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the more
conciliatory Premier Frank Hsieh. MAC has repeatedly
intervened to insist on government-to-government talks before
any of PRC proposals can be realized. Hsieh has followed a
more accommodating line, initially welcoming Beijing's
announcements but subsequently hardening his stance to stay
in line with Chen's campaign to negate the opposition party
visits.


4. (C) Taipei has played the recalcitrant suitor to
Beijing's public offers over the past two weeks:

-- Tourists: Premier Hsieh welcomed Beijing's May 20
announcement that it would allow PRC citizens to visit
Taiwan. MAC Chair Joseph Wu (Chao-hsieh),however, quickly
weighed in declaring that government-to-government talks were
necessary before PRC nationals could visit Taiwan. The 2005
Chinese New Year charter flights, he claimed, could not serve
as a model because tourism involves the work of many
government agencies (a claim that DPP Deputy SecGen Yan
disputed; see para 5 below).

-- Pandas: Premier Hsieh similarly welcomed Beijing's June 1
announcement that preparations are underway to send pandas to
Taiwan but added the caveat that Taiwan will handle the panda
issue in accordance with international conservation and
endangered species regulations. Pro-independence hardliner
Gary Tseng (Tien-tzu),Director-General of the Presidential
Office Special Affairs Department, however, told AIT there is
no support in the Presidential Office for allowing pandas,
the national symbol of China, into Taiwan; they would not be
refused outright, he noted, just postponed indefinitely by
regulatory injunctions. Dep SecGen Yan, on the other hand,
told AIT that it is just "deep Green" DPP hardliners who
oppose the pandas.
-- Fruit: MAC Chair Wu rejected Beijing's June 1
announcement of duty-free import of 15 kinds of Taiwan fruit
into Mainland China, insisting there must first be
negotiations either between Taiwan and PRC officials or under
the WTO framework.


5. (C) Over the weekend, President Chen appointed former DPP
SecGen Chang Chun-hsiung as Chairman of Taiwan's Straits
Exchange Foundation (SEF),replacing the inimitable Koo
Chen-fu who led cross-Strait negotiations for Taiwan in the
1990's. Noting that Chang has little experience with or
interest in cross-Strait relations, Deputy SecGen Yan,
himself a former SEF Deputy Director, told AIT that SEF's
"time has passed" and future cross-Strait negotiations must
follow some variation of the 2005 Chinese New Year charter
flight model (direct negotiations between relevant private
organizations with low-level government involvement). Yan
surmised to AIT that, with the opposition cross-Strait
initiative largely sidelined, Chen might resurrect his
earlier idea of an inter-party "cross-Strait peace and
development commission" as a mechanism for developing
inter-party Taiwan consensus on cross-Strait issues.


6. (C) Comment: The Chen administration is currently
obstructing the efforts of both Pan-Blue opposition parties
and Beijing to facilitate cross-Strait exchanges. While Chen
would be more than happy to leverage Beijing's conciliatory
mood into official or government-to-government negotiations,
he has a larger and more immediate goal: to discredit the
Lien and Soong China trips, neutralize the "China fever" in
Taiwan, and restore his own leadership of both DPP and the
cross-Strait process. Chen has made considerable headway on
all three fronts, effectively removing the "China fever"
pressure for cross-Strait progress and giving himself room
for maneuver. He told a small gathering of DPP legislators
on May 25, and Senator Rockefeller on May 31 (reported
septel),that the July change in KMT leadership should
improve the prospects for inter-party cooperation on domestic
and cross-Strait issues. If so, Chen's preferred venue for
negotiation will likely be, not the moribund SEF, but his
idea of an inter-party cross-Strait peace and development
commission.
PAAL