MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002333

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD -
ROBERT PALLADINO
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN

Summary: As the major Chinese-language Taipei dailies
continued to cover the contentious Law on National
Assembly's Exercise of Power and other issues relating
to local politics May 27, the pro-independence "Liberty
Times," Taiwan's biggest daily, carried a news story on
page four that headlined: "Bian: Both sides [of the
Taiwan Strait] can resume talks as long as Taiwan's
sovereignty is secured." The sub-headline added: "With
regard to the United States' concern about `both sides
of the [Taiwan] Strait, one China,' [Chen] has given
orders to clarify to the international community that
`[Taiwan] is willing to promote cross-Strait dialogue
on the basis on the 1992 [Hong Kong] talks.'" A front-
page news story of the pro-independence "Taiwan Daily"
also said: "Bian broached the new Taiwan-centered
consciousness again," with the sub-headline: "[Bian]
emphasized [the importance of] `protecting Taiwan' and
creating a new situation of cross-Strait and in-house
reconciliation." Commentator Lai I-chung, director for
foreign policy studies of the Taiwan Thinktank, noted
in a commentary (Part One) of the pro-independence
"Taiwan Daily" that the meetings between Chinese
President Hu Jintao and KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP
Chairman James Soong have altered the strategic
equation between Washington, Beijing and Taipei. End
summary.

"The Strategic Equation between Washington, Beijing and
Taipei Is Altered Because of the Meetings between Lien,
Soong and Hu - Part I"

Lai I-chung, Director for Foreign Policy Studies of the
Taiwan Thinktank, commented in the pro-independence
"Taiwan Daily" [circulation: 150,000] (5/27):

"The trips of [KMT Chairman] Lien Chan and [PFP
Chairman] James Soong to return to China, which have
created disturbances [on the island] for nearly a
month, have finally come to an end. This drama of the
absurd jointly performed by [Chinese President] Hu
Jintao, [President] Chen Shui-bian, Lien and Soong,
plus Washington's comments on this issue several times,
which sounded almost like a strategic idiot, have cast
a big shadow over Taiwan's democratic development. As
for the triangular relationship between Washington,
Beijing and Taipei, the United States has lost its
leadership over the current status in the Taiwan
Strait. Hu became the biggest winner, whereas Taiwan
is the biggest loser in the triangular relationship. .

"What is worse is that Lien has no guts, so he dared
not to publicly mention `one China, different
interpretations' in front of Hu, and he even embraced
Beijing's `May 17 statement' issued in 2004. Soong was
even worse; his recklessness drove him to raise
complacently the new interpretation for the `1992
Consensus;' namely, the `both sides of [Taiwan] Strait,
one China' statement. His move has created an effect
that is tantamount to the PFP endorsing Beijing's `new
syllogism toward Taiwan' and its definition of Taiwan's
status.

"Soong attempted to argue irrationally that `both sides
of the Strait, one China' means `both sides of the
[Taiwan] Strait are free to interpret the one China.'
But Hu has set the tune for this statement and
determined that it means the `one China principle,'
which is the same as the second sentence of Beijing's
new syllogism toward Taiwan: `Taiwan and mainland China
[i.e. both sides] belong to one China.' Soong has
turned the ambiguous `1992 Consensus' into `both sides
of the Strait, one China,' and along with his position
that opposes two Chinas, it means that Soong has
acknowledged the connotation of China's new syllogism
toward Taiwan, which claims that `Taiwan is part of
China.'

"The worst part is that such a statement is exactly the
precondition laid down by China's `Anti-Secession Law,'
so it also confirmed some people's criticism against
Soong and the PFP, saying they have endorsed China's
`Anti-Secession Law.'

"In the aftermath of the meetings between Hu, Lien and
Soong, Hu can [now] easily release himself from the
international community's backlashes against China's
`Anti-Secession Law' without costing him anything. All
the more, he has successfully made Taiwan's two major
opposition parties accept China's `May 17 statement'
and substantively acknowledge its `Anti-Secession Law.'
No matter whether Hu wants to talk with the DPP or not,
a political force has taken root in Taiwan that echoes
the Chinese Communist Party's policy toward the island.
Judged by the current situation, what Hu will face in
the future is not the general public view of Taiwan but
the basis of social support for each individual
political party. [In other words,] Hu has achieved his
aim of isolating Chen Shui-bian. ."

PAAL