TAIWAN SCHOLARS URGE CAUTION OVER EXPECTATIONS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002213

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN SCHOLARS URGE CAUTION OVER EXPECTATIONS FOR
CROSS-STRAIT BREAKTHROUGH


Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: Taiwan cross-Strait specialists warn that
there could be a domestic backlash in both the PRC and Taiwan
if the two sides do not manage expectations for a
cross-Strait political breakthrough in the wake of recent
opposition visits to the Mainland. During a May 16 closed
door meeting of U.S. and Taiwan cross-Strait scholars, Taiwan
specialists suggested that future cross-Strait interactions
should focus on functional engagement, building on progress
from the Lunar New Year charter flights. Mainland Affairs
Council (MAC) Chairman Joseph Wu told the group that Taipei
is willing to engage Beijing on its recent agricultural and
tourism initiatives using the New Year charter flights model.
Taiwan observers expressed suspicion over PRC motives, and
judged that Beijing offered no substantive concessions over
core principles during recent meetings with Taiwan opposition
leaders. Former MAC Chair Tsai Ing-wen cautioned that both
Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian and PRC President Hu Jintao
have only a limited window for flexibility. If either fails
to justify their policies in the coming months, Tsai warned,
they may both face renewed pressure from respective domestic
hard-line elements to ratchet up tensions. End Summary.

Trading Assessments
--------------


2. (SBU) Taiwan's Foundation on International and
Cross-Strait Studies hosted a small group of U.S. and Taiwan
scholars on May 14 for a closed door discussion on
cross-Strait relations after the Anti-Secession Law. The
Taiwan side was composed of both Blue and Green scholars as
well as several current and former government officials. The
U.S. delegation included Brookings scholars Richard Bush,
Jeffrey Bader, and Huang Jin, Davidson College Professor
Shelly Rigger, CSIS Associate Bonnie Glaser, and Center for
Naval Analysis Director Michael McDevitt. The U.S.
delegation both offered an assessment of USG policy and
conveyed views expressed by PRC scholars during recent
meetings in Shanghai. The Taiwan side focused on the recent
visit of People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong and
expectations over Beijing's next steps in cross-Strait policy.

Diminishing Expectations
--------------


3. (SBU) The Taiwan scholars were nearly unanimous in their
assessment that Beijing did not offer any new political
formulations during the recent visits by the KMT and PFP
leaders. Both Blue and Green scholars characterized Soong's
recent visit in negative terms, alleging that Soong caved in
to PRC demands for fear that Beijing would cancel Soong's
meeting with Hu Jintao. Former MAC Vice Chairman Chen
Ming-tong was particularly scathing over Soong's rejection of
any "two Chinas" model and his offer of a new "two shores,
one China" formulation. Several participants noted that even
the KMT rejected Soong's formulation as tantamount to denying
the existence of the "Republic of China." While (Blue
leaning) National Cheng-chi University Professor Chao
Chien-ming argued that there may be potential flexibility in
some of the language used during the visits to finesse the
"1992" deadlock, both U.S. and Taiwan scholars characterized
Hu Jintao's repeated public linkages of "1992 consensus" and
the "one China principle" as a signal that the PRC is moving
away from ambiguous formulations that would be politically
acceptable to Taiwan.


4. (SBU) Blue leaning Academia Sinica scholar Hsu Szu-chien
characterized the recent KMT/PFP visits as a major boost for
the Hu Jintao government. Hsu said the fact that both the
KMT and PFP agreed to cooperate with the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) to oppose Taiwan independence marked a major
moral victory for Beijing. The potentially most
destabilizing aspect of the agreements between the CCP and
two Pan-Blue parties, he cautioned, was the establishment of
a regular dialogue channel for future contacts. Hsu warned
that if Beijing used these contacts to pursue future
cross-Strait interaction at the expense of an official
dialogue, the Taiwan public would soon grow wary of PRC
motives, and the current positive public view on cross-Strait
interactions could quickly sour. Hsu added that high profile
diplomatic setbacks could combine with disappointment over
PRC actions to create another anti-China backlash in Taiwan.
Tsai: Two Leaders, Same Challenge

SIPDIS
--------------


5. (SBU) Former MAC Chair (and current DPP Legislator) Tsai
Ing-wen offered a similar assessment. She said that both
President Chen and President Hu are likely to enjoy only a
limited window to pursue cross-Strait flexibility. On the
Taiwan side, Tsai said that in addition to seeking his own
legacy in cross-Strait relations, Chen had promised the
business community that he would make progress on economic
and transportation links in his second term. She said that
Chen has been given room to maneuver by the DPP's success in
the May 14 National Assembly (NA) election. However, Tsai
warned that Chen's flexibility could be soon challenged by
two factors -- a refusal by Beijing to engage the Taiwan
government on cross-Strait issues and/or a refusal by the KMT
to cooperate with the DPP on domestic policy. If the PRC and
KMT either together or separately sought to marginalize the
government, Tsai warned that the public, especially Pan-Green
supporters, would lose patience with Chen's reconciliation
policies. Tsai also cautioned that Chen's constitutional
reform agenda is very much unchanged, and has gained new
momentum after the NA election. While denying that Chen
would stray from his May 20, 2004, inaugural promises, Tsai
said that a combination of constitutional revisions and
souring cross-Strait relations could re-ignite tensions.


6. (SBU) Tsai stated that Hu Jintao has a similarly narrow
window to engage Taipei in dialogue. She asserted that the
Anti-Secession Law (ASL) has given Hu temporary breathing
space to pursue a more flexible policy course, but she warned
that in the longer term, the ASL will become a burden for Hu
and his successors. Tsai predicted that once Hu's honeymoon
is over, the PLA and other hard-liners would cite the ASL
when attacking political leaders for any lack of progress in
cross-Strait relations. Tsai said that Hu should quickly
seize this opportunity to open a quiet dialogue with the Chen
government on how to bridge the "1992" deadlock. She
emphasized that any real interaction on the issue must be
kept out of the media, noting that the very public
discussions of "1992" and "one China" surrounding the
Lien/Soong visits has made it more difficult to bridge the
gaps between the two sides.

Focus on the Functional
--------------


7. (SBU) Academia Sinica's Hsu asserted that in order for
both sides to avoid creating unachievable public
expectations, the focus should be on functional contacts
rather than political principles. Hsu stated that the most
useful role for the USG would be to encourage both sides to
talk more about technical issues like transportation links in
order to downplay expectations for a major breakthrough over
"one China." Former MAC Vice Chairman Alexander Huang
offered a similar assessment, and noted that the Lunar New
Year charter flight model offers a ready-made framework for
the two sides to restart functional talks. MAC Chairman
Joseph Wu said that Taiwan was willing to use this model to
engage Beijing on its recent offers over agriculture and
tourism, but expressed concern over PRC Taiwan Affairs Office
(TAO) Deputy Director Wang Zaixi's May 3 reiteration of
problematic PRC formulations, including the demand that
cross-Strait transportation links be classified as "domestic."

Comment: Perfect, the Enemy of the Good?
--------------


8. (C) The domestic squabbling over political formulations
that resulted from the recent Pan-Blue visits suggests that
high-profile attempts to bridge the "one China" gap are only
going to cause further internal divisions within Taiwan and
could even risk undermining recent positive atmospherics
across the Strait. While a private dialogue to explore ways
forward over the "1992" concept would be useful, the real
short-term deliverable appears to be on functional
engagement. Progress using the quasi-official New Year
charter model (increasingly referred to in Taiwan as the
"Macau model") on transportation links, agricultural
cooperation, and tourism would signal momentum in the
relationship and could produce concrete achievements that
would serve the interests of both sides. PRC agreement to
use the Macau model would also reduce the temptation on both
sides to resort to exclusively CCP-KMT party-to-party talks
to move forward on functional issues, a move that would only
fuel Taiwan suspicions over PRC intentions.
PAAL