SOONG CONFIDANTE ON UPCOMING PRC VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002004

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: SOONG CONFIDANTE ON UPCOMING PRC VISIT

REF: TAIPEI 01977

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: PFP Chairman James Soong is reportedly under
pressure from Chen Shui-bian's recent "revelations" of their
private conversations and from KMT efforts to portray KMT
Chairman Lien Chan's visit to the PRC as enjoying the backing
of the United States. While Soong is personally comfortable
with the often unpredictable Chen, other Soong confidantes
fear their Chairman is being "duped." One of them requested
the U.S. to temper its public support of Lien and offer
similar gestures of support for Soong before he departs May 5
for the PRC. The PFP reportedly intends to plant a question
with a sympathetic Taiwan reporter at the May 3 State
Department press briefing and hopes the Department Spokesman
will respond positively. End Summary.

PFP Panics, Soong Relaxed
--------------


2. (C) People First Party (PFP) Legislator Daniel Hwang
(Yih-jiau) told AIT that President Chen Shui-bian's May 1
revelation of his recent contacts with PFP Chairman James
Soong has complicated and even marred Soong's impending PRC
visit. Hwang surmised that Chen's unilateral revelation was
probably motivated by fear of being sidelined by the
international and domestic attention on Lien's PRC visit, as
well as a product of Chen's efforts to drive a wedge between
the KMT and PFP and to siphon off Pan-Blue voters from the
PFP in the May 14 National Assembly election. Hwang noted
that Soong had told him of his private telephone conversation
with Chen but did not reveal the substance of that
conversation. Describing the setting of their conversation,
Hwang told AIT that when he accompanied Soong on a trip to
Yunlin County to visit the incarcerated former magistrate
Chang Jung-wei, Soong took a small wooden box out of his
pocket and told Hwang that it contained a tiny note with a
direct hotline phone number to President Chen. Hwang said he
was bemused by Soong's "cuteness."


3. (C) Hwang told AIT that Chen had advised Soong that he
intended to make public their recent conversations, and that
Soong opposed this but did not think he could stop Chen.
Despite Chen's forewarning, Soong was still caught off guard
when the news broke on May 2 and gave instructions for the
PFP to downplay the contacts. Accordingly, PFP Secretary
General Chin Ching-sheng stressed to AIT that the reported
April 20 Chen-Soong meeting was totally unplanned. Chin
explained that he had been in a meeting in the home of
Presidential Office Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun discussing
details of Soong's PRC trip when they came to a question
requiring Chen's decision. Yu telephoned Chen for an answer,
but Chen responded that the issue could best be resolved if
he and Soong met personally at Yu's home.


4. (C) Hwang told AIT that while Soong personally feels
comfortable working with Chen, Hwang and many other PFP
leaders find it nerve wracking, fearing that Soong might be
"duped" by Chen. Given both Chen and Soong's volatile
personalities, Hwang said he feels he is dealing with an
unpredictable situation, like crossing a river blindly
without knowing the depth. For this reason, Hwang is trying
to control media coverage of Soong's PRC trip in order to
avoid having the trip backfire on the PFP.


5. (C) Hwang noted that to the layman Lien Chan's trip to
Mainland China might appear successful, but most professional
observers do not see that Lien achieved anything concrete.
Hwang noted that both he and James Soong assessed Lien's
performance in his Beijing University speech, meeting with Hu
Jintao, and public remarks in Xian as 60 out of 100.

Plea for U.S. Support
--------------


6. (C) On April 25, Hwang requested an urgent meeting with
AIT to protest the KMT leak of the AIT Director's April 21
meeting with Lien Chan, to the KMT's advantage. Hwang
pointed out that the KMT had "spun" a United Daily News story
that intimated the U.S. might publicly criticize Chen
Shui-bian if Chen did not sanction Lien's PRC trip. On the
other hand, Hwang complained, despite enormous media pressure
on Soong and himself to confirm the Director's meeting with
Soong, the PFP had refused comment. Hwang said that the
April 22 China Times story that reported the Director-Soong
meeting ran without PFP's consent, as evidenced by the fact
that the newspaper reported the wrong date for the meeting.


7. (C) Hwang further characterized the State Department
Spokesman's April 18 response to a press question on Lien's
PRC visit as tantamount to U.S support and blessing for Lien.
It is in the USG interest to be more "even-handed" in its
support for Lien and Soong, Hwang argued, asking whether the
USG could gave "similar" support for Soong's May 5-12 PRC
visit.


8. (C) Hwang was truly surprised when AIT pointed out that
the exchange between the journalist and Spokesman was
spontaneous, not orchestrated as he had intimated. He
responded that he had assumed the Department planted the
question in order to raise Lien's profile. Thus, the intent
of his requested meeting with AIT was to ask if the
Department could provide Soong with the same support. "The
question really was spontaneous and coincidental?" he asked
once again. When AIT replied affirmatively, he promised to
relay that to Soong. After a moment of thought, he asked AIT
whether the Spokesman would voice similar support for Soong
if the PFP were to ask a sympathetic journalist to raise a
question about Soong's PRC trip. Without waiting for a
reply, Hwang said that this is just what PFP intended to do
and to please inform the Department to expect such a question
on May 3.

Comment: Pre-Travel Jitters
--------------


9. (C) Despite PFP discomfort over Chen's May 1 claim that he
had entrusted Soong to deliver a "special message" to Hu
Jintao, Soong is unlikely to disclaim any role as quasi-Chen
messenger, particularly given media reports from Beijing
reporting that Hu Jintao would welcome Soong's explanation of
the Chen administration's cross-Strait policy direction.
Regarding a possible PFP media plant at Department press
briefings, AIT recommends the Department maintain its
balanced public formulations in support of dialogue that
facilitates resolution of cross-Strait differences and that
leads to dialogue with representative of the duly elected
leadership in Taiwan.
PAAL