MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT CHARTER FLIGHTS,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000192

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD -
ROBERT PALLADINO
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT CHARTER FLIGHTS,
U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS


1. Cross-Strait Charter Flights

A) "[We] Sincerely Hope that Cross-Strait Two-way
Charter Flights for the Chinese New Year Will Fly
through Clouds and Open a New Page for Win-win
Situations for Both Sides [of the Taiwan Strait]"

The conservative, pro-unification "United Daily News"
editorialized (1/16):

". The cross-Strait charter flight plan for the Chinese
New Year, which concerns the transportation rights of
more than 300,000 Taiwan businessmen who want to return
from China to Taiwan, is just a small step in the
interactions between two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Everyone is watching closely the long-term effects of
this chess move, hoping that it will not disappear
quickly like a beautiful fireworks show. Starting from
the charter flights for the Chinese New Year, the cross-
Strait policies that the government needs to deal with
are trade issues such as the three links, financial
controls, and the protection of investments across the
Taiwan Strait. With these issues as a foundation, the
other political `keynote' issues that need to be dealt
with include Taiwan's constitutional design, national
identity, and Taiwan's role and status in the region.
The charter flight plans for the Chinese New Year may
seem like a small matter, but if rumors that `the
United States and Japan also had a hand in pushing for
the charter flight plans behind the scene' did appear,
it also showed that regional security is an issue of
common concern for the international community. If
President Chen Shui-bian could realize that he should
act proactively in seeking to play a role in the
peaceful development of cross-Strait ties rather than
waiting until being forced by international pressure,
he could then be regarded as a wise leader. ."

B) "A-Bian and Hu [Jintao] Each Make Concessions,
Starting a New Opportunity for Cross-Strait Situations"

Journalist Wang Ming-yi noted in the centrist, pro-
status quo "China Times" (1/16):

". The two-way charter flights across the Taiwan Strait
have indeed created an improved atmosphere in the
Taiwan Strait and an opportunity for both sides of the
Taiwan Strait to resume talks. But while both sides
are acting under the concept of `strategic clarity,'
the populist atmosphere triggered by [Taiwan's]
`referendum law' and [Beijing's] `anti-secession law'
is still the shadow that keeps haunting the Taiwan
Strait. The flexible communication model demonstrated
by the talks between Taipei and Beijing over the
charter flights will be a whole new political effort
for Hu Jinato and Chen Shui-bian, who are eager to
create a new situation across the Taiwan Strait."

C) "Is a Model for Air Links at Hand?"

The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times"
commented in an editorial (1/16):

". Actually, the two sides gradually and tactfully
reached consensus about the substantive model of the
air links before yesterday's talks. The significance
of the talks in Macau were [sic] not only to make the
deal official, but also in the model of negotiation
established. Many believe that this latest model of
negotiations may very well be the model used for talks
on more permanent cross-strait direct links.

"Indeed, this model is the bottom line beyond which the
Taiwan government must not go. Any further concessions
risk reducing cross-strait talks to negotiations over
`domestic affairs.' While the government officials
involved in negotiations went in `unofficial'
capacities, they were government officials nonetheless.
These aviation talks, practically speaking, cannot
proceed without officials' involvement to begin with,
since none of the issues being discussed can possibly
be decided by members of the private sector. This
demonstrates that cross-strait links are in reality
international links and not domestic links. As for the
flight routes agreed on yesterday, they are in fact
international air routes from Chinese cities to Hong
Kong and then from Hong Kong to Taiwan. In this
regard, the Taiwan government has not compromised the
public interest. .

"While both the Chinese and Taiwan government claim
that the charter flights are isolated cases tailored to
serve Taiwanese businessmen, the question on everyone's
mind is nevertheless this: Will cross-strait direct
links be made official soon? However, the question
that the Taiwan Government should really ask itself is
this: Is it ready to face up and deal with the
potential problems of such official direct links?"
D) "Air Pact Marks Step to Official Talks"

The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News"
said in an editorial (1/18):

". If the charter flights proceed smoothly, they may
provide a favorable basis for future interaction, but
it would be nave to expect that solutions to political
differences between Taiwan and the PRC can be realized
so long as inherent political obstacles continue to
exist, such as Beijing's insistence on acceptance of
its `one China principle' as a precondition for talks.

"Nevertheless, the talks show that Beijing can no
longer avoid the involvement of the two governments in
consultations and that a significant step toward the
resumption of officially authorized consultations
between Taipei and Beijing has been taken."


2. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations

A) "Getting to Know China Again on a Global Scale"

Professor Chu Yun-han of National Taiwan University's
Department of Political Science said in the centrist,
pro-status quo "China Times" (1/17):

". Even though Washington tried to persuade [them
otherwise] by all means [possible], the major members
in the European Union reached a consensus that they
will withdraw the arms ban on China this year. The
policy shift will put another scar on the relationship
between the United States and her European traditional
allies after the chasm caused by the war in Iraq, and
the strategic meaning goes even beyond the former one.
This means that there will be structural slack in the
unipolar security dominated by the United States in the
`post-Cold War era.' . [W]hat matters is apparently
the different judgment, incrementally formed, [that the
E.U. takes] on the critical question whether the rise
of China constitutes strategic chance or threat.

"More surprisingly, China started to shake the U.S.
exclusive position in the sphere of ideology. The
`Foreign Policy Center' established under the
leadership of British Prime Minister Tony Blaire,
published a book entitled `Beijing Consensus' written
by Goldman Sachs senior consultant Joshua Ramo in 2004.
The book has [had many repercussions]. The contrast of
the `Beijing Consensus' is the `Washington Consensus,'
which is an important symbol of the `post-Cold War era'
and the core content is the neo-liberalism centered by
capitals and markets. For more than the past decade,
the United States has promoted this policy prescription
all around the world wholeheartedly, and several
developing countries proactively (or were forced to)
conducted reform under the neo-liberalism. The
globalization led by the United States is almost
equivalent to the spread of the `Washington Consensus.'
In recent years, several countries started to re-think
about the `Washington Consensus,' and they received
different implications from the experience of the
development of China. For several policy elites in the
Third World, the `China model' indicates that it is
possible to remain autonomous development during the
process of getting involved in globalization. China
adopts the pragmatic philosophy of `touching stones in
order to pass a river' in its development policy, and
is willing to try every innovative system. China,
however, does not blindly believe in economics
textbooks or wholly adopts the western model, but
starts from the practical situation of itself. The
essence of the `Beijing consensus' is the co-existence
of multiple models, and the re-evaluation of the
experiences of the development of China means that the
thinking of one `paradigm' has started to fade away.

"Currently, the cross-Strait relationship is at the
turning point in history, and [Taiwan's] policy toward
China is on the eve of change. During the process of
figuring out a new thinking in the policy, Taiwan's
political figures and press should not understand the
change by a `Taiwan-centered' perspective, otherwise
Taiwan will get deeper and deeper in deadlock. It is
necessary to start learning how to measure China again
by a global scale, think again about the challenges,
opportunities, and alternatives that Taiwan will face."

B) "Why Can't [Taiwan] Change Its National Name?"

The pro-independence "Liberty Times" editorialized
(1/15):

"Former Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing-
wen days ago pointed out at a think tank in the United
States that the status quo of Taiwan is that it is
independent, and there is no need to declare
independence again. Moreover, even if Taiwan changes
its name in the process of amending the constitution,
it has nothing to do with a change in the status quo. .

"The Taiwan people amended the R.O.C. constitution in
1991 and explicitly distinguished the cross-Strait
relationship as being of one country on each side of
the Taiwan Strait. Ever since, democratic reform,
including the overall elections in the congress and
direct presidential elections regulated that Taiwan's
authority will be elected by Taiwan people through
democratic procedures, and will have nothing to do with
the 1.3 billion people on the other side of the Taiwan
Strait. Some call the process 'peaceful revolution,'
and some call it 'peaceful nation-building.' No matter
what [it is called], the process explains that although
we keep on using the Republic of China as the name of
the country, the R.O.C. after 1991 is quite different
from the R.O.C. of the past, especially the R.O.C.
after 1945. Under these circumstances, there are even
fewer connections between Taiwan and China.

"The population of People's Republic of China consists
of 1.3 billion people on that side of the Taiwan
Strait, while there are 23 million people in Taiwan on
this side; China is a sovereign independent country,
and so is Taiwan. This is the status quo in the Taiwan
Strait. Under the domestic principle of 'sovereignty
should be owned by the people' and the international
principle of 'self-determination,' 2.3 million Taiwan
people are the masters of Taiwan and are, thus, sources
of the legitimacy of the R.O.C. Taiwan's political
changes and international participation should respect
the choices made by the 2.3 million people. Therefore,
referendums, revises on the constitution, the plan to
change the country's name, flag, and anthem are the
presentation of Taiwan's internal democracy, which does
not involve in any change in the status quo across the
Taiwan Strait. As long as Taiwan continues on
fulfilling her international obligations, the
international community has no reason refusing to
recognize Taiwan. ."

PAAL