KMT VICE CHAIR CHIANG SEEKS USG HELP IN FORGING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001724

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: KMT VICE CHAIR CHIANG SEEKS USG HELP IN FORGING
CROSS-STRAIT CONSENSUS

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: KMT Vice Chairman P.K. Chiang urged the USG
to intervene in public and private to urge the Chen
administration and KMT leadership to cooperate on
cross-Strait policy. Chiang, who provided the Director a
readout of his recent trip to the Mainland, expressed concern
that mounting domestic political acrimony over the recent
KMT-CCP contacts may undermine prospects for progress in
cross-Strait relations. Chiang said he would urge KMT
Chairman Lien Chan to meet with President Chen Shui-bian
before Lien's upcoming visit to Beijing and asked AIT to
encourage the Chen government to create a positive atmosphere
for such a meeting. Chiang acknowledged the risk of the KMT
facilitating PRC "united front" tactics, but said that if
Lien could travel to Beijing with President Chen's blessing,
his visit could serve as a major boost for Chen, Lien, and,
most importantly, the people of Taiwan. AIT will continue to
reinforce the need for cooperation with leaders on both sides
of the partisan divide. We also concur with Chiang's
suggestion of continued USG public statements to build on the
helpful April 6 HIRC testimony given by EAP DAS Schriver.
End Summary.


2. (C) KMT Vice Chairman P.K. Chiang, accompanied by former
TECRO Washington Rep. Ding Mou-shih, hosted the AIT Director
to lunch April 11 to provide a readout on his late March
visit to Beijing (Septel) and discuss growing domestic
political tensions over the KMT's ongoing contacts with the
PRC. Chiang emphasized that his purpose for leading the KMT
delegation to Beijing was not to usurp the government's
authority to conduct cross-Strait negotiations, but rather to
create a positive atmosphere for officials on the two sides
to move ahead on economic and other exchanges that would
improve the livelihood of the Taiwan people. Chiang said
that it was in this spirit that he personally delivered a
detailed readout of his visit to Premier Frank Hsieh. Chiang
added that it would be tragic if the partisan bickering that
grew out of his March visit ended up undermining prospects
for improved cross-Strait relations.

Chen-Lien Meeting Critical
--------------


3. (C) Chiang said he was fully aware of the sophistication
of Beijing's "united front" tactics, and stated that it was
not in the KMT's interests to fall into their trap. Chiang
said that a domestic consensus, with support from the
government, was a precondition for any real progress in
cross-Strait relations. In this context, Chiang said he
would encourage KMT Chairman Lien Chan to meet with President
Chen Shui-bian before traveling to Beijing later in the year.
Chiang asserted that without the President's support, Lien's
visit would be largely meaningless. However, if Lien could
talk to Beijing with the President's blessing, Chiang said
the visit could achieve a "win-win-win" for Lien, Chen, and,
most importantly, the Taiwan people. Chiang added that a
Chen-Lien meeting should not only be limited to discussing
Lien's Beijing trip, but should also provide a forum for the
two leaders to discuss the range of issues, including
economic policy and Legislative Yuan (LY) action on the
special defense procurement budget. Chiang cautioned that
without a Chen-Lien meeting, passage of any major legislation
in the current LY session may be difficult.

Fear and Loathing in Taipei
--------------


4. (C) Chiang noted, however, that prospects for a Chen-Lien
summit are complicated by the deep level of mutual distrust
and increasingly strident rhetoric emanating from both camps.
Chiang bemoaned the negative language Chen employed in his
April 9 speech inviting Lien to meet (Note: on April 9, Chen
offered to meet with Lien and even endorse his Beijing visit,
but in the next breath he accused Lien of only caring about
China, not Taiwan. End Note). Chiang acknowledged that his
own party has its hard-liners as well. He added that many of
Lien's advisors are urging him not to respond to Chen's offer
to meet, recalling the negative experience of Lien's last
meeting with Chen in 2001 over the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant.

U.S. Can Play a Critical Role
--------------

5. (C) In this context, Chiang urged the USG to employ a mix
of public and private messages to encourage Taiwan's
political leaders to work towards a consensus. Ambassador
Ding commented that while the April 6 testimony by EAP DAS
Schriver was helpful, the Taiwan media either underplayed the
story or distorted Schriver's comments. Ding suggested that
repeated, clear messages about the importance for domestic
consensus and cross-Strait engagement would help create a
more positive domestic atmosphere. Chiang also asked AIT to
urge President Chen to "tone down" the public language he has
been using towards the KMT in order to preserve room for
future contacts.

Comment: Fostering Moderation
--------------


6. (C) President Chen's April 9 "offer" to endorse Lien's
visit notwithstanding, neither side shows much appetite for
conciliation. Voices of moderation like Chiang's are in
short supply, and hard-liners on both sides are actively
twisting past USG policy statements to advance their own
partisan agendas. To counter this trend, AIT will continue
to privately press leaders in both political camps to move
towards a cross-Strait policy consensus and explore
opportunities for public diplomacy. AIT has already widely
disseminated the text of DAS Schriver's remarks. We endorse
Chiang's suggestion for further public statements out of
Washington. If some sort of domestic consensus can be
achieved ahead of Lien's visit, it could potentially
facilitate the first real progress in cross-Strait relations
in almost seven years. However, if the two sides fail to
move beyond partisan gamesmanship, it may result in yet
another long-period of legislative gridlock and cross-Strait
policy inertia.
PAAL