KMT DEFENDS RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CCP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001709

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: KMT DEFENDS RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CCP

REF: A. TAIPEI 01626

B. TAIPEI 01572

C. TAIPEI 01625

Classified By: AIT Acting Director David Keegan, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: KMT Mainland Affairs Director Chang
Jung-kung told AIT that the KMT and PRC are building a
cooperative relationship that is based on their shared
opposition to Taiwan independence. Chang stated that the KMT
and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have a tacit agreement not
to discuss the status of the "Republic of China" and instead
would focus their interaction on economic issues. Chang and
other KMT officials told AIT that the recent KMT cross-Strait
initiatives represent a policy assessment that the Chen
administration's attempts to align with the U.S. and Japan
had failed, and that Taiwan's best approach would be to join
the "band-wagon" of China's rising economic strength. KMT
officials remain adamant that they will assert unilateral
leadership in cross-Strait engagement and will not consult
with President Chen Shui-bian or any other political party.
KMT officials reject government charges that KMT Vice
Chairman P.K. Chiang's "Ten-Point" agreement with the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) amounted to "treason," arguing that he
did not sign any formal document. KMT officials have
publicly rejected the "treason" charges, contending that that
the Beijing government should not be considered a "foreign
country" under the "ROC" constitution. End Summary.

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KMT-CCP Agreement Good for Taiwan
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2. (C) KMT officials continue to assert that they acted both
legally and in the interest of cross-Strait stability despite
the April 6 Ministry of Justice (MOJ) statement that
prosecutors were investigating a private complaint
challenging the legality of the "Ten-Point" agreement reached
by the KMT and CCP on March 30. While KMT Vice Chairman P.K.
Chiang, who is the subject of the investigation, has offered
his full cooperation, other KMT leaders have denounced the
government for employing political persecution. Privately,
KMT officials claim the Chen administration's March 6
"Seven-Point" statement was aimed at derailing the KMT's
emerging relationship with Beijing.


3. (C) On April 6, KMT Mainland Affairs Director (and party
spokesman) Chang Jung-kung and KMT Overseas Affairs Director
Ho Szu-yin, in separate meetings, provided AIT with the KMT's
formal readout of its ongoing efforts to reach out to
Beijing. Chang asserted to AIT that the KMT-CCP
rapprochement was aimed at stabilizing cross-Strait
relations. Chang admitted to AIT that the KMT commitment to
the "Republic of China" (ROC) was unacceptable to its CCP
counterparts. Instead, Chang said, the PRC and the KMT have
based their cooperation on their shared opposition to Taiwan
independence, and have focused on that commonality. To
support his argument he said that the KMT's visit to Beijing
reassured the PRC government that Taiwan independence was not
the majority opinion in Taiwan. As evidence of the KMT's
access and influence on cross-Strait relations, Chang claimed
that the PRC now believes that "as long as there is a KMT,
Taiwan will not tread down the path of independence." Chang
went further, suggesting that Lien Chan's upcoming visit to
Beijing would convince the PRC to tolerate even the most
provocative pro-independence statements by Chen Shui-bian
because they would understand that Chen would be unable to
institutionalize his vision.

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Showing up the DPP
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4. (C) Chang dismissed the DPP's April 5 "Seven-Point"
statement (Ref A) as irrelevant, asserting that it had failed
to counter adequately the KMT-CCP "Ten-Point" agreement. He
told AIT that the DPP is disingenuous when it claims that it
wants to engage the PRC. Chang asserted that the PRC has
been looking for opportunities to show good will toward
Taiwan, but the DPP government has blocked these efforts at
every turn. He criticized the DPP's April 5 call for a
cross-partisan consultations as petty politics aimed at
discrediting the KMT's achievements and making it impossible
for anyone to visit the PRC. In response to the DPP's
allegation that the KMT-CCP "Ten-Point" agreement was
illegal, Chang countered that the agreement was simply a
consensus and not a signed document. Publicly, Chang has
stated that the government's claim that KMT contacts with
Beijing violated Article 113 of the Criminal Code represented
a disguised attempt to assert an independent Taiwan. Since
the "ROC" constitution recognizes "one China," Chang has
argued that the only way for the government to charge the KMT
with violating the ban on private entities "negotiating with
a foreign government" would be for the Chen administration to
define the PRC as a "foreign government."

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What's On the Table
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5. (C) Media speculation notwithstanding, Chang stated
firmly that the KMT delegation could not get any concessions
on the PRC stance on World Health Assembly (WHA) observership
for Taiwan. (Note: New Party official Spencer Chang told
AIT, however, that initial discussions did include possible
concession on the issue. See Ref B. End note.) Chang also
recognized that the KMT's status as an opposition party
limited its role in cross-Strait politics, but argued that
the party could still play an important and active role in
engaging the PRC, especially on economic and business issues.
(Note: KMT Legislator Alex Tsai said, however, that the KMT
hoped to work out some language with the PRC that would be
seen by the Taiwan public as a PRC renunciation of the use of
force. See Ref C. End note.) Ho cited agricultural trade
in particular as an important area of opportunity for
cross-Strait relations. Chang told AIT that, in fact, the
KMT and CCP discussed 12 points, including the 10 released
publicly and two points on problems with telemarketers based
on Kinmen island, and facilitating travel of businessmen
between the PRC and Taiwan. He noted that many of the
points, with the exception of the charter flights, are
actions the PRC could take unilaterally and did not require
Taiwan approval.


6. (C) Chang conveyed confidence that the KMT would continue
to be the main player in cross-Strait interactions. He told
AIT that while Beijing has welcomed anyone who accepts the
"1992 consensus," President Hu Jintao personally invited Lien
Chan to visit. Chang made it clear that the KMT is unlikely
to support inter-party dialogue on cross-Strait issues with
either the People First Party (PFP) or the Pan-Green. Chang
told AIT that PFP Chairman James Soong wanted to talk to the
KMT, but he dismissed the request as being insincere. He
also made the point that Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)
Chairman Joseph Wu had attempted to dissuade every KMT
delegation from visiting the PRC -- KMT Legislator Chiang
Hsiao-yen in January and Chiang's recent trip -- but the KMT
ignored both requests.

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KMT Jumps on the "Band-Wagon"
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7. (C) The KMT's Ho told AIT that the KMT's outreach toward
the PRC represented an assessment made after the December
2004 LY election that Taiwan's reliance on aligning itself
with the United States was not a viable cross-Strait
strategy. Ho explained to AIT that the election results,
along with then-Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary
Armitage's comments in late 2004 criticizing President Chen's
independence rhetoric, gave the KMT confidence to embark on
what he called a "band-wagoning" strategy based on direct
contact with the Mainland and an emphasis on business and
economic relations with the PRC. Ho, like Chang, justified
the visit and "Ten Point" agreement as representing the
people's will, remarking that longtime pro-independence
supporter and Taiwan businessman Hsu Wen-long's public letter
in support of a "one-China principle" underscored the
public's support for engagement with China rather than
confrontation. Ho stated that the KMT would continue to
build upon the agreement and positive rapport between the KMT
and CCP and referenced Lien Chan's potential visit to the
PRC. According to Ho, the timing of Chan's visit was
dependent on public opinion.


8. (C) Ho was confident that there would be no political
fallout for the KMT and the public would not brand the party
as a "sell-out." He agreed, however, that the PRC was using
the KMT as part of a "cunning strategy" to control the
cross-Strait agenda. Still, Ho dismissed critics who said
the KMT was serving as Beijing's tool, arguing that it did
not matter whether the KMT was playing into the PRC's hands
because the majority of people wanted to reduce cross-Strait
tension.

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Comment: Internal Politics as Usual
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9. (C) The KMT leadership shows little interest in responding
to either the carrots or sticks being employed by the Chen
administration to prevent the KMT from aiding PRC "united
front" tactics. Whether out of conviction that what they are
doing is the right thing for Taiwan or simply a desire to
undermine Chen Shui-bian and James Soong, the KMT leadership
has made it clear that it is uninterested in forging a
domestic political consensus on cross-Strait policy. The DPP
government's heavy-handed attempt to threaten criminal
penalties over P.K. Chiang's recent visit is unlikely to
dissuade the KMT from taking its own road with Beijing.
Ironically, Chiang personally appears to be the rare voice of
moderation within his own party. His friendly April 7
meeting with Premier Frank Hsieh, a similarly lonely voice of
reason on the DPP side, marked a rare glimpse of
statesmanship in an otherwise increasingly petty partisan
game of political chicken.
KEEGAN