Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TAIPEI1684
2005-04-07 11:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

CHEN ADMINISTRATION WARNS KMT, BEIJING OVER

Tags:  PREL PGOV CH TW 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001684 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: CHEN ADMINISTRATION WARNS KMT, BEIJING OVER
LIEN-HU MEETING

REF: A. TAIPEI 1626

B. TAIPEI 1625

C. TAIPEI 773

D. TAIPEI 1572

E. TAIPEI 1437

Classified By: AIT Acting Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001684

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: CHEN ADMINISTRATION WARNS KMT, BEIJING OVER
LIEN-HU MEETING

REF: A. TAIPEI 1626

B. TAIPEI 1625

C. TAIPEI 773

D. TAIPEI 1572

E. TAIPEI 1437

Classified By: AIT Acting Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: The Chen administration's April 5 "Seven
Point" statement was aimed at laying down a marker for both
Beijing and the KMT ahead of a proposed meeting between PRC
President Hu Jintao and KMT Chairman Lien Chan, according to
a readout provided to AIT on April 6. Taiwan officials said
that the government did not oppose Lien's visit to Beijing,
but would react strongly if Lien signed any sort of "peace
agreement" with the PRC leadership. While Chen
administration officials have warned in public of a "slow
down" in cross-Strait economic measures, privately they have
assured AIT that there has been no decision to reverse the
government's plan to resume cross-Strait initiatives after
May. The April 5 National Security Council (NSC) meeting
convened by President Chen Shui-bian also decided that the
government would encourage a visit to Beijing by People First
Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong but President Chen would not
authorize Soong to carry any formal messages on his behalf.
Officials continue to express concern over attempts by the
KMT to cite USG "acceptance" of Beijing's Anti-Secession Law
and "support" for the recent KMT-CCP accord as a
justification for the opposition party's unilateral overtures
to Beijing. End Summary.

Seven Points, Three Goals, One Objective
--------------


2. (C) NSC Senior Advisor for cross-Strait affairs Chen
Chung-hsin provided AIT a readout on the April 5 NSC meeting
chaired by President Chen Shui-bian that produced a "Seven
Point Statement" on cross-Strait policy (Ref A). Chen said
the NSC had three objectives for calling the meeting and
issuing a public statement. First, the NSC saw the need to
enhance coordination within and among the NSC, Executive Yuan
(EY),Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),and DPP Legislative
Yuan (LY) Caucus. Secondly, the NSC wanted to secure
agreement to make clear its "bottom line" limit for
government tolerance of KMT actions. Finally, the NSC
determined it needed to send a message to Beijing that the

government remained ready to talk, but only if Beijing ceased
its "united front" tactics.


3. (C) The NSC's Chen acknowledged that the government did
not expect KMT Chairman Lien Chan to agree to an inter-party
meeting or consult with the DPP administration before his
visit to Beijing. The overriding objective of the April 5
exercise, Chen continued, was not to block Lien's visit but
to warn both Lien and Beijing that the government would take
harsh measures against both parties if the visit produced a
formal KMT-CCP accord. Chen said that Taipei's "red line"
would be if Lien and PRC President Hu Jintao were to sign any
type of "peace agreement" that would lull the Taiwan public
into believing that Beijing had renounced the use of force
when it had not. "We don't oppose Hu and Lien exchanging
opinions," Chen emphasized, "but we will not tolerate Lien
signing agreements as if he were the leader of a sovereign
country."

Creating a DPP-KMT Back-channel
--------------


4. (C) Chen told AIT that the Chen administration also agreed
on April 5 to cut all official contacts with the KMT except
those required in the LY. While senior Chen administration
officials would refuse to meet with KMT counterparts, Chen
said that the DPP's LY Caucus would keep open a line of
communications with the KMT. In this context, Chen said the
DPP Caucus was tasked with informing the KMT leadership that
the Chen administration would not take any legal or political
retaliatory actions against the KMT as long as Lien did not
sign any formal documents during his upcoming visit to
Beijing. Chen said the government was encouraging the KMT
(and Beijing) to use the "Lunar New Year charter flight
model," in its approach to engaging Beijing. If the KMT were
willing to step back and let the government take the lead on
future cross-Strait economic measures, Chen continued, then
the DPP made it clear that the government will give the KMT
credit for "creating a positive atmosphere" for progress.


5. (C) However, Chen asserted that the DPP Caucus also
conveyed the message that if the KMT did sign a "peace
accord" or blocks action on the special defense procurement
budget in the current LY session, the DPP might carry out
threats of legal action (Ref B). Chen stated that the
current Ministry of Justice investigation of KMT Vice
Chairman P.K. Chiang's recent Beijing visit was in response
to a private law suit initiated by a "grass-roots DPP
supporter" and was not a government initiative. When
pressed, however, Chen acknowledged that the government
approved of the MOJ's decision to proceed with an
investigation as a "warning" to Lien over what he might face
if he "goes too far" in Beijing. Chen added that the DPP had
also told the KMT that it would use the December local
election campaign to smear the KMT as traitors if Lien signed
a formal accord with Beijing. (Comment: Opinion is divided
within both camps over how large a factor cross-Strait issues
will be in the year-end local election. To be safe, however,
KMT candidates have been conspicuously quiet on the recent
KMT-CCP contacts, with several admitting to AIT that they
fear the issue may setback their electoral prospects. End
Comment.)

Taiwan's Open Door Policy in Doubt
--------------


6. (C) The NSC's Chen said that no decision had been made on
whether to reconsider the government's plans for cross-Strait
economic liberalization measures to retaliate against Beijing
for its recent "united front" activities (Septel). However,
the NSC's Chen said that Beijing had repeatedly conveyed to
Taipei its hope that the Chen administration would "not close
the door" to future cross-Strait contacts in the wake of the
Anti-Secession Law. Chen stated that if Beijing insisted on
playing the "united front" card in place of dealing directly
with the Chen administration, the issue of "closing the door"
might be revisited after the Lien-Hu meeting.

Will Chen Play a Soong Card?
--------------


7. The NSC's Chen ruled out the possibility that the
President would formally authorize PFP Chairman James Soong
to travel to Beijing as an "authorized" representative of the
Taipei government. Chen said Beijing was less likely to
accept Soong at this stage if he were a formal DPP envoy
given the President's refusal to accept "one China" or the
"1992 consensus." However, Chen said the government would
actively support a visit by Soong in a private capacity, if
he focused on "explaining the Chen-Soong 10 points" to the
PRC leadership (Ref C).

USG Being Dragged Into Political Debate
--------------


8. (C) Taiwan officials continue to urge the USG to be
careful not to be drawn into the domestic political debate
over the KMT's cross-Strait initiatives (Ref D). KMT
spokesmen and LY members have made repeated public assertions
in recent days that the USG has accepted Beijing's
Anti-Secession Law and has made a strategic decision to
withdraw its security commitments to Taiwan. KMT officials
and opposition-affiliated media outlets have also claimed
that the USG has put pressure on the Chen administration to
endorse the KMT's overtures to Beijing. DPP Deputy Secretary
General Yen Wan-ching told AIT on April 7 that EAP DAS
Schriver's April 6 testimony should help quiet the debate
over the USG position on the Anti-Secession Law, but he
bemoaned that the Taiwan media did not give the testimony
wide coverage (Note: the pro-unification United Daily News
did not report on the hearings at all. End Note.)

Comment: Ultimatum or Empty Threat
--------------


9. (C) The April 5 meeting appears to have simply confirmed a
policy course set by the President as early as March 28 (Ref
E). The NSC meeting's main accomplishment appears to have
been to provide a venue in which to publicize the
government's strategy to derail the KMT's recent cross-Strait
initiatives. Notably, the government did not consider
measures to take ownership of items on the KMT-CCP "Ten
Points" as a means for wresting back control of the agenda.
As Septel reports, the Chen administration's plan to use a
combination of carrots and sticks to force the KMT to back
off its plans to engage Beijing unilaterally will face strong
resistance from the KMT. If the strategy fails, and the KMT
and CCP do initial an agreement later in the year, the DPP
government may be forced to choose just how many of its
threats over legal action and cross-Strait economic
engagement it can afford to follow through on.
KEEGAN