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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TAIPEI1626
2005-04-05 14:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

CHEN ADMINISTRATION ISSUES SEVEN POINT STATEMENT

Tags:   CH  PGOV  PREL  TW  US 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001626 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2030
TAGS: CH PGOV PREL TW US
SUBJECT: CHEN ADMINISTRATION ISSUES SEVEN POINT STATEMENT
ON CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

Classified By: AIT/T ADIR David J. Keegan. Reasons E.O 12958 1.5 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001626

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2030
TAGS: CH PGOV PREL TW US
SUBJECT: CHEN ADMINISTRATION ISSUES SEVEN POINT STATEMENT
ON CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

Classified By: AIT/T ADIR David J. Keegan. Reasons E.O 12958 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) Taiwan National Security Advisor Chiou I-jen contacted
AIT Director by phone on April 5 to inform him that President
Chen Shui-bian had just concluded a meeting to discuss how to
respond to the recent contacts between the KMT and Beijing,
especially the recent trip of KMT Vice Chairman Chiang
Ping-kun. Participants in the meeting included the Vice
President, Premier Hsieh Chang-ting, Chiou, Presidential
Office Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun, DPP Chairman Su
Tseng-chang, DPP Vice Chairman Lee Ying-yuan, and NSC

SIPDIS
staffers Chen Chung-hsin and Lin Jin-chang.


2. (C) The meeting concluded with the decision to issue a
seven-point statement (subsequently faxed to AIT, informal
translation below) and a call, contained in point five, for
an inter-party meeting to reach a consensus on how to handle
cross-Strait issues.


3. (C) Comment. While it has been clear for several days that
President Chen and his administration have been searching for
an effective and politically viable response to Chiang's trip
to the mainland, it is unclear how successful this initiative
will prove. It offers no indication of what opposition
political parties might stand to gain by participating in and
thereby giving legitimacy to this DPP effort to undercut the
partisan political gains that they believe they have secured
through Chiang's trip.


4. (C) Translation.

The Conclusions of a Meeting of the Presidential Office, the
Executive Yuan, the DPP and the DPP party Caucus, April 5,
2005, on Responding the New Cross-Strait Political and
Economic Situation


1. The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent
country. Sovereignty belongs to the 23 million people of
Taiwan. Only the 23 million people of Taiwan have the
authority to decide on any changes to Taiwan's future course.
This is the most important consensus of Taiwan society, and
the Beijing authorities should respect it.


2. Differing points of view on cross-Strait relations

should be resolved peacefully. The right of the Taiwan people
to freely choose (their future) should be respected. We
resolutely oppose the passage of China's so-called
"Anti-Separation Law" and the use of "undemocratic" and
"non-peaceful" means to resolve cross-Strait differences.


3. Taiwan is already a country with a democratic
constitutional government; it has its own popularly elected
government. No political party, organization or individual
whatsoever has the authority to represent the people of
Taiwan or to infringe on the authority of the government on
any cross-Strait issue which touches on national sovereignty
or the implementation of governmental powers. Cross-Strait
exchanges should be conducted according to current laws. The
relevant agencies will deal according to the law with anyone
who, without permission or properly delegated authority,
privately reaches agreements with foreign governments, the
other side of the Strait, or those whom they dispatch.


4. The government will hold fast to the principle of
"conciliation without drawing back, holding firm without
confrontation." To resolve cross-Strait issues and improve
cross-Strait relations. Executive agencies will take a clear
and determined stance in response to China's consistent
denial of our sovereignty and government, its plotting and
manipulation, and its schemes to divide Taiwan as well as the
intentional or unintentional cooperation of any domestic
political party or individual with these actions.


5. Competition between political parties is a normal part
of democracy, but the interests of the entire country and the
well-being of the people must always be superior to party
interest or personal benefit. This is especially true
concerning contacts, dialogue and negotiations over
cross-Strait issues. We should first come to a consensus
between the ruling and opposition parties and among all the
people. Only then can we be united and seek from foreign
(forces) the greatest benefit for our nation and our people.
The President is prepared to invite both ruling and
opposition party leaders to hold a meeting to ensure that
this series of mainland excitements does not harm the
interest and the dignity of Taiwan.

6. In accordance with the consensus conclusions of the
(2001) Economic Development Meeting and the (subsequent)
Ta-hsi Conference, the government will implement with all its
strength a cross-Strait economic and commercial policy to
"Deeply cultivate Taiwan and reach out to the world," and to
"Actively open up and effectively manage." We will
constructively follow through on "Giving priority to Taiwan,
giving priority to the economy, giving priority to
investment, and giving priority to investment in Taiwan
first" in order to protect the economic life of Taiwan. We
cannot open up in an instant and disregard the most basic and
essential requirement to "manage effectively." National
security and executive agencies should now examine and adjust
economic and commercial policies. We should undertake
negotiations under the auspices and mechanisms of the WTO to
address agricultural, service industry and other issues.

7. The greatest difference between the two sides of the
Strait is not our political separation, but the conflict
between the democratic and the non-democratic. If the Beijing
authorities hope to reduce the differences between people on
both sides, they should not try to offer Taiwan small favors
under a non-democratic system. Instead, they should seriously
consider how to eliminate their authoritarian system and how
to truly advance toward down the path of democracy. Even
more, the Beijing authorities should seriously consider that,
in order to become a rising great power, they should become a
protector of international peace, and they should become a
power that threatens to destroy the international order
through non-peaceful means.

End Translation.
KEEGAN