Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TAIPEI1407
2005-03-28 06:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

CHEN SHUI-BIAN: RESILIENT, IN CONTROL, BUT BOXED IN

Tags:  PGOV PREL TW 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

280604Z Mar 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 001407 

SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS TO AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: CHEN SHUI-BIAN: RESILIENT, IN CONTROL, BUT BOXED IN

REF: A. 2004 TAIPEI 3956


B. TAIPEI 00019

C. TAIPEI 00020

D. TAIPEI 00130

Classified By: AIT Deputy Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 001407

SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS TO AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: CHEN SHUI-BIAN: RESILIENT, IN CONTROL, BUT BOXED IN

REF: A. 2004 TAIPEI 3956


B. TAIPEI 00019

C. TAIPEI 00020

D. TAIPEI 00130

Classified By: AIT Deputy Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. In the three months since he led his
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) into its December
legislative election setback, President Chen Shui-bian has
stepped back from the confrontational public rhetoric he
brought to both the presidential and legislative campaigns
last year. His change in behavior was personified in his
January appointment of the more moderate Frank Hsieh as
Premier and his willingness to compromise to achieve a lunar
new year charter flight agreement with Mainland China. At
the same time, Chen has continued to apply the divisive
tactics of the campaign to his backroom political maneuvering
within the DPP and with the opposition in the Legislative
Yuan (LY).


2. (C) Belying predictions that he had been gravely weakened
by the LY setback, Chen demonstrated extraordinary
resilience, repositioning himself in full control of the DPP
and its secession struggle and driving wedges into the
Pan-Blue majority coalition, all the while maintaining ties
with his fundamentalist, pro-independence base. In recent
days, Beijing's Anti-Secession Law has challenged Chen's
"conciliation" policy, but not his hold on the DPP, where he
remains the final arbiter, ensuring that he will not soon
become a lame-duck president and that he may be able to
determine the issue that now concerns him most -- his own
presidential legacy. End Summary.

Conciliation and Cooperation
--------------


3. (C) Surprised and humiliated by the failure of his DPP to
win a majority of seats in the December 11 LY election,
President Chen Shui-bian resigned as party Chairman. He
adopted a lower profile in sharp contrast to the supremely
confident leader who relentlessly pushed his independence
agenda in the campaign and kept the opposition reeling. Chen
showed unaccustomed humbleness in his New Year's address,
calling for the ruling party to show "humility" (Refs A,B,C).


4. (C) In January, Chen further shifted tactics and began
calling for cross-partisan cooperation, urging Blue and Green

camps to reconcile and begin working together for the good of
Taiwan. In late January, he appointed Frank Hsieh
(Chang-ting) to replace the more confrontational, inflexible
Yu Shyi-kun as Premier. Hsieh brought a more moderate face
to the Chen government, both domestically and cross-Strait,
by working to build a &consultative and co-existence8
government style and to defuse cross-Strait tensions that had
built up over DPP campaign issues, announcing he would not
engage in precipitous &name rectification8 and would go
slow on constitutional reform, while respecting the extant
Republic of China constitution. The January 15 lunar new
year charter flight agreement with Mainland China was made
possible when Chen agreed not to insist that Taiwan
government officials responsible for cross-Strait relations
must be part of Taiwan,s negotiating delegation (Ref D).

Chen in the Catbird Seat
--------------


5. (C) In January, Chen also moved to reassert unquestioned
leadership of the DPP through an adroit set of personnel
moves. Shunting the popular Su Tseng-chang into the DPP
Chair and bringing Chen,s longtime nemesis Frank Hsieh back
to Taipei as Premier left Chen squarely in the party driver's
seat, with the two leading presidential successors now
vulnerable to failure and wholly beholden to Chen. The other
two contenders for the DPP presidential succession have been
relegated to back seats. Former Premier Yu Shyi-kun was
demoted to Presidential Office Secretary General, while Vice
President Annette Lu (Hsiu-lien) has, either reading the
writing on the wall or under instructions, played a more low
key role over the past three months.


6. (C) Chen used a similar divide-and-conquer approach with
the opposition, orchestrating a political courtship with the
PFP, which sowed distrust between the PFP and its Pan-Blue
coalition partner, the KMT, and effectively undermined the
Pan-Blue coalition. When it became clear that no DPP-PFP
alliance would materialize, Chen held a highly publicized
meeting on February 24 with PFP Chair James Soong, announcing
a &Ten Point8 agreement. The once-proud majority Pan-Blue
coalition was left in tatters, with only ad hoc cooperation
between KMT and PFP after the latter announced "equidistance"
between the two major parties. Instead of two camps, green
and blue, Taiwan now has three -- green, blue and the ORANGE
PFP.

Fundamentalist Challenge
--------------


7. (C) The greatest challenge to Chen,s moderate tack on
domestic politics and cross-Strait relations has come from
pro-independence elements within the Pan-Green coalition.
Independence advocate Yao Chia-wen, President of the
Examination Yuan, told AIT that independence activists were
holding back and giving Chen operating room for the time
being, although they opposed his compromises with Pan-Blue,
especially the Chen-Soong meeting, and with China.
Pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) leaders told
AIT they expect the pendulum will swing back in their
direction in the aftermath of Mainland China,s
Anti-Secession Law. TSU has announced plans to hold an
"anti-annexation8 rally on May 8, which would double as a
campaign rally for the May 14 National Assembly election.


8. (C) For their part, Chen and the DPP are seeking to
re-take the initiative in the Green coalition with their
March 26 rally, which its leaders hope will appease much of
the Taiwan anger over the Law. Lo Chi-cheng, Executive
Director of the pro-DPP Institute for National Policy Review
(INPR),told AIT that the government is trying to avoid being
forced to pass legislation retaliating against the PRC
Anti-secession law. Protest rallies in Taiwan, Lo explained,
typically prove the end of the matter, as participants
departed with their anger expiated. The DPP government, he
said, hoped the rally would leave it free to deal with
cross-Strait issues. NSC Senior Advisor Lin Jin-chang told
AIT that the DPP was closely watching to make sure Green
coalition partner TSU and its mentor Lee Teng-hui were not
able to &hijack8 the March 26 rally and turn it into a
launch vehicle for independence rage.

Boxed In
--------------


9. (C) Having skillfully dealt with both the opposition Blue
and his own Green independence fundamentalists, Chen now
faces a new set of factors that constrain his options and
reinforce his present moderation. The nascent DPP-PFP
cooperation requires restraint to avoid alienating the DPP,s
skittish new partner. In addition, public opinion poll after
public opinion poll show that a majority of Taiwan people
support the cross-Strait status quo. INPR's Lo showed AIT a
copy of an island-wide public opinion poll his institute
conducted last week, which showed just over 70% of
respondents opposed a slowdown in exchanges with Mainland
China -- 40% wanted exchanges to proceed unchanged and 30%
wanted them to increase. The December 11 LY election, Lo
noted, demonstrated the consequences for Chen of ignoring
public opinion and pushing the line on independence.

Search for a Legacy
--------------


10. (C) A number of DPP and Pan-Blue contacts have told AIT
that Chen is now wholly focused on building his presidential
legacy. Chen Wen-cheng, Special Assistant to Vice Minister
of National Defense Michael Tsai (Ming-hsien),told AIT that
Tsai had found his old friend, Chen Shui-bian, largely

SIPDIS
indifferent to the December city/county elections and wholly
focused on his own legacy. As President Chen moved deeper
into his second term as President, MND's Chen continued, he
was determined both to avoid becoming a lame-duck president
and to define and guarantee his own presidential legacy. At
this point, MND's Chen noted, that legacy could still go
either way -- cross-Strait peace and stability or Taiwan
identity and separation.


11. (C) INPR,s Lo told AIT that the December LY election
had made President Chen realize that support for independence
was limited and that most Taiwan voters wanted to maintain
the status quo. Now, Mainland China's Anti-Secession Law had
effectively closed the independence option for the forseeable
future. Chen, Lo concluded, had received this message and
had moved into line with the majority of Taiwan voters who
wanted to maintain the status quo and to continue and even
improve cross-Strait relations.

Comment: Can the Leopard Change His Spots?
--------------


12. (C) Has Chen Shui-bian changed, as his moderate
supporters hopefully proclaim, or is this merely one more in
a long line of course alterations by a master political
chameleon? The fact that a number of Pan-Blue leaders and
analysts, with their deep suspicions and inveterate
skepticism of Chen, are seeing a shift and even urging the
U.S. to help reinforce this positive direction, suggests
there is more than just the wishful thinking of Chen,s
moderate supporters. KMT legislator Su Chi and Blue-leaning
commentator Emile Sheng separately told AIT that Chen
Shui-bian,s behavior had significantly changed in recent
months, but expressed concern that hard line DPP independence
advocates might undermine Chen,s current stance.


13. (C) It would, however, be premature to pronounce Chen
Shui-bian a changed man, suddenly turned practitioner of the
Golden Mean. Pronouncements of Chen change have been legion
and usually turn out to be nothing more than a brief hiccup.
Certainly, Chen,s heart lies elsewhere, and he would love
nothing better than to be the George Washington to a
&Republic of Taiwan.8 However, Chen,s situation itself
has altered, necessitating a shift in tactics and, perhaps,
policy. Perhaps the December 11 election and numerous
public opinion polls brought home to Chen the fact that a
solid majority of Taiwan voters prefer the status quo over
moves toward independence or unification. Mainland China,s
detested Anti-Secession Law, spelling out in black and white
the consequences for independence, moreover, completed the
box in which Chen must now live and govern.


14. (C) These changed conditions have produced a Chen who is
willing, at least for the time being, to pursue development
of cross-Strait relations if and when the present
Anti-Secession Law imbroglio can be surmounted. The
longevity of Chen moderation will depend entirely on its
fruitfulness. If cross-Strait relations can be stabilized
around a status quo that many in Taiwan term &de facto
independence,8 then Chen just might begin to secure his
quest for a legacy. It will not likely bring him the Nobel
Peace Prize that some of his moderate supporters
half-jokingly envision, but it would be the long-term
&status quo8 that most Taiwan people support.


15. (C) Close Chen aides tell AIT that the LY election
setback has forced the President to postpone his second term
agenda, including constitutional reform, by 12-18 months in
order to give him time to regain full control of the
political agenda. Given Chen's leadership style and track
record in office, his actions in the current period are
likely motivated more by the tactical objective of regaining
his first term momentum than any long-term shift in policy
priorities. Chen may appear to be weakened by the December
LY election setback, but in reality he is in a stronger
position now than he was during the immediate fallout from
the LY's attempt to impeach him over the Fourth Nuclear Power
Plant in 2001. In 2001, Chen convened the Economic
Development Advisory Council (EDAC) to co-opt, and ultimately
undermine, the Pan-Blue's perceived strength on cross-Strait
issues. Chen's cross-Strait policy moves and cohabitation
arrangement with the PFP appear to be in this same mold.
Then, just as now, Chen tugged on internal contradictions
among his political opponents to effectively drive the policy
agenda, despite lacking a majority in the legislature. In
2001, Chen maintained a moderate course for nearly a year,
before he reverted to a hardline stance on cross-Strait
relations that ultimately won him the 2004 election.


16. Now, as then, it is clear Chen has changed, at least for
the moment. How long that change lasts may depend as much on
external circumstance, including U.S. actions, as it does on
any change of heart.
PAAL