Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TAIPEI1085
2005-03-14 10:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

TAIWAN REACTS NEGATIVELY TO ANTI-SECESSION LAW

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR CH TW 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001085 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN REACTS NEGATIVELY TO ANTI-SECESSION LAW

REF: A. 3/12/05 AIT-EAP/TC E-MAIL


B. TAIPEI 773

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001085

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN REACTS NEGATIVELY TO ANTI-SECESSION LAW

REF: A. 3/12/05 AIT-EAP/TC E-MAIL


B. TAIPEI 773

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: Taiwan issued a strong formal reaction to the
PRC National People's Congress (NPC) March 14 passage of the
Anti-Secession Law. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairman
Joseph Wu, speaking for the government, condemned the PRC
move as "provocative" and in violation of the will of the
Taiwan people and international community. Taiwan officials
dismissed late revisions made to the final text as
insufficient and insincere. President Chen Shui-bian did not
offer an immediate reaction on March 14. However, on March
12 he called on Taiwan's people and opposition parties to
join a March 26 demonstration to protest the new law.
Officials say the rally is being organized in order to
pre-empt potentially destabilizing alternative proposals,
such as a referendum or countervailing law. Nevertheless,
Chen administration officials express concern that the rally
could be hijacked by the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) to
promote Taiwan independence themes that would exacerbate
cross-Strait tensions. The opposition offered mixed
reactions to the PRC move. While People First Party (PFP)
Chairman James Soong and the KMT Spokesman credited Beijing
for toning down the final version of the text, other senior
Pan-Blue officials, including KMT Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou
and Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, blamed Beijing for
fueling tensions. However, the volume and tone of Taiwan
reaction was clearly divided along partisan lines. End
Summary.

MAC: Strong Condemnation
--------------


2. (C) MAC Chair Joseph Wu issued a statement on March 14
urging the international community to "Strongly Condemn" the
PRC over its enactment of the Anti-Secession Law earlier in
the day. Wu's statement served as the Chen administration's
formal response to the PRC legislative move, but MAC and
National Security Council (NSC) officials tell AIT that
Premier Frank Hsieh is expected to make a further official
comment on March 15. The MAC statement, using often
emotional language, accused Beijing of "hurting the feelings

of the Taiwan people" and warned that the new law will "have
serious consequences for security in the East Asia region."


3. (C) Taiwan officials dismissed revisions made to the final
text of the Anti-Secession Law as insufficient and insincere.
National Security Bureau (NSB) Director Hsueh Shih-min
publicly accused Beijing of playing word games in order to
distract public attention from the seriousness of the text.
National Security Council (NSC) Senior Advisor for
cross-Strait affairs Chen Chung-hsin told AIT that most
officials (himself excepted) viewed the changes over the
conditions for resorting to "non-peaceful measures" as a
change for the worse. MAC Senior Secretary Jan Jyh-horng,
who shared the text of Taiwan's response with AIT on March 12
(AIT translation sent to EAP/TC, Ref A),said that the PRC's
late revisions had no impact on the government's planned
strong reaction to passage of the law.

Chen's Next Step
--------------


4. (C) President Chen Shui-bian did not immediately respond
to the passage of the Anti-Secession Law. However, Chen had
strongly criticized the law during a March 12 speech to the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Chen accused Beijing of
planning to use force to destroy Taiwan's democratic
achievements and urged one million people to take to the
streets in protest on March 26. Presidential Office
Secretary Liu Shih-chung told AIT shortly after the March 12

SIPDIS
speech that Chen will wait several days before issuing any
further statements. Liu said that the substance and tone of
Chen's formal response will depend heavily on how he assesses
"domestic and international reaction" to the new law.

Pan-Blue Takes Its Own Road
--------------


5. (C) Attempts by the Chen administration to forge a united
front on the PRC law appear to be faltering. KMT Spokesman
Chang Jung-kung expressed regret over the PRC's law, but
credited Beijing for moderating language in the final text.
Taipei Mayor and KMT Vice Chairman Ma Ying-jeou convened a
press conference on March 12 to register opposition to the
PRC law on behalf of local leaders in Taiwan. However, Ma
used considerably milder language than the MAC statement and
urged leaders in Taiwan to avoid actions that could
exacerbate the situation. PFP Chairman James Soong issued a
statement along the same lines. Like Ma, Soong's remarks
were as critical of Taiwan independence activists as they
were of Beijing. Soong called on President Chen to stick to
the joint Chen-Soong policy platform (Ref B) announced on
February 24 in order to stabilize the situation.


6. (C) Soong's comments are likely to exacerbate negative
reaction from pro-independence elements of the Pan-Green base
to the PRC's new law. MAC's Jan told AIT the government is
particularly concerned about attempts by the TSU to hijack
the themes for the March 26 rally. Jan said if the March 26
rally is dominated by calls to change the name of the country
or enact a new constitution, Beijing will likely react with
more pressure. The NSC's Chen said that he has urged
academic and media contacts on the Mainland to cease open
criticism of the rally in order to help the government in
Taipei keep control of the event.


7. (C) The TSU's reaction to the PRC move was predictably
theatric. After burning a PRC flag, TSU leaders announced
the start of a 24-hour hunger strike to protest the
Anti-Secession Law. A number of leading DPP pro-independence
figures, including legislator Trong Chai, joined the TSU in
its public protests. The TSU also renewed their call to hold
an anti-China referendum and for the enactment of an
Anti-Annexation Law. MAC's Jan expressed concern that the
text of the TSU's draft law was not as radical as expected.
While the government does not endorse enacting countervailing
legislation, Jan cautioned that the TSU's text may appeal to
many DPP legislators.

Comment: Preventing a Downward Spiral
--------------


8. (C) As expected, Taiwan's formal position on the
Anti-Secession Law is being driven by domestic political
calculations. Unsurprisingly, the camps that espouse
independence are reacting more heatedly than those that do
not. Chen's dark Green supporters were already upset over
his February 24 cohabitation agreement with the PFP's Soong.
Passage of this law, and the Pan-Blue's relatively muted
reaction to it, is likely to only harden their demands for
the President to take a tougher line against Beijing. The
Pan-Blue's soft response is likely to further pressure from
Chen's deep Green base to take harder measures towards
Beijing. The PRC's public diplomacy in the coming two weeks
could also influence the course of events in Taiwan. Taiwan
officials say PRC Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing's March 11
dismissal of Taiwan as a local government helped hard-liners
at the MAC win an internal debate over how to craft Taiwan's
initial response to the Anti-Secession Law (Septel). By a
similar token, moves by Beijing to soften its public line in
the coming days could bolster the hands of moderates in
future policy battles. Nevertheless, the PRC's enactment of
the law has already handed pro-independence activists a major
PR victory and setback efforts to inject moderation into
Taiwan's cross-Strait policy debate.
PAAL