Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SOFIA524
2005-03-18 13:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sofia
Cable title:  

BULGARIA/IRAQ: POLITICS FORCING MOVE TOWARD EXIT

Tags:  PREL MOPS PGOV IZ BU 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000524 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR AND PM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2015
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV IZ BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA/IRAQ: POLITICS FORCING MOVE TOWARD EXIT
STRATEGY

REF: A) SOFIA 0436 B) SOFIA O486 C) SOFIA 0067 D) 04
SOFIA 2261 E) 04 SOFIA 2054 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador James Pardew, reasons, 1.5(B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000524

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR AND PM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2015
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV IZ BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA/IRAQ: POLITICS FORCING MOVE TOWARD EXIT
STRATEGY

REF: A) SOFIA 0436 B) SOFIA O486 C) SOFIA 0067 D) 04
SOFIA 2261 E) 04 SOFIA 2054 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador James Pardew, reasons, 1.5(B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Defense Minister Svinarov's public statement
that Bulgaria may pull its troops out of Iraq by year-end is
strong evidence that election-year politics are forcing the
government to move rapidly toward an exit strategy. Despite
Svinarov's comments, no such decision has in fact been made,
and debate within the government is still at an early stage.
Nevertheless, the death of another Bulgarian soldier last
week (ref A) and President Purvanov's subsequent call for
"quick but not premature" withdrawal from Iraq (ref B) have
clearly spooked the government, which is trailing in the
polls three months ahead of parliamentary elections. With
two thirds of the population opposed to Bulgaria's presence
in the MNF, Sergeant Gurdev's death has made Iraq the
dominant political issue in the country, and one which the
government is clearly hoping to put behind them. Our goal
now is to convince Bulgaria to maintain a battalion-sized
capability in the MNF until the conditions set forth in UNSCR
1546 are met and then to transfer as many of these troops as
possible to the NATO training mission. END SUMMARY.

2.(C) Well-connected insiders, including Foreign Minister
Passy, profess to have been taken by surprise yesterday when,
in response to a reporter's question as to whether Bulgaria
would withdraw its troops from Iraq by the end of the year,
Svinarov said that a report was being prepared for the
government on a possible withdrawal. In addition to Passy,
two top members of the Prime Minister's parliamentary group
and the Minister of Energy also told us today that neither
the Prime Minister's party nor the government has made a
decision in favor of pulling out of Iraq.


3. (C) Explanations for Svinarov's statement range from
benign (he is a loose cannon, he was misquoted) to
conspiratorial (he had the tacit blessing of the PM). There
may be elements of truth to both interpretations, but the
facts as we now know them are as follows: the General Staff

has prepared a decision memo for the Defense Council, which
is chaired by the President and includes top civilian and
military officials but is consultative in nature. Once
approved by the National Defense Council, the paper and
recommendations will be forwarded to the Council of
Ministers, which will develop an official government
position. This is likely to happen before the end of the
month. Once approved, the government's decision will then be
submitted to the National Assembly for a vote before the
middle of April.


4. (C) Passy and others who favor a moderate approach expect
the government's position to be much "softer" than Svinarov's
initial comments would indicate, but no one is willing to
predict a continued Bulgarian presence in the MNF beyond

2005. Vladimir Donchev, the chairman of the Parliamentary
committee charged with intelligence oversight and a member of
the NMSS leadership, believes that the decision to withdraw
will be formally linked to UNSCR 1546, the formation of an
Iraqi government and the adoption of a constitution, rather
than a set date. The effect, however, will likely be the
same, since UNSCR 1546 sets a "deadline (in the Bulgarian
view) for these events to take place by 31 December 2005.
The government's decision is also likely to call for a
redefinition of the military mission away from peace
enforcemnt to training of the Iraqi security forces.

5.(C) The government is clearly reacting defensivelyto the
effect of Iraq on domestic politics. TheSocialists (BSP),
who have called for an immediate withdrawal from Iraq (ref
C),hold a 2-1 lead i the polls over the Prime Minister's
National Moement Simeon II (NMSS) with the three months to
o before elections. The shooting death of Sergean Gurdev,
followed by President Purvanov's speech,seems to have
panicked the government, leading t Svinarov's uncoordinated
remarks and the curren stampede toward a year-end
withdrawal. Passy an others are trying to get the process
back into ormal channels, but the FM's job is made more
dificult by the lack of leadership from the top.

6 (C) Prime Minister Saxe-Coburg Goha was conveniently out
of the country when Svinarov spoke out yesterday. More
importantly, the PM's entire election campaign appears to be
adrift, waiting -- so far in vain -- for him to take the
lead. Svinarov and others who reportedly support a quick


withdrawal from Iraq would like to see the issue neutralized
before the election. In the absence of any effort by the PM
to shift the focus of political discussion from Iraq to the
government's many successes in foreign and domestic policy
the PM's party is in danger of losing further ground.


7. (C) COMMENT. Bulgarians from the Prime Minister on down
have told us repeatedly over the last six months that, absent
some concrete economic or political benefits from the Iraq
deployment, their position would become untenable as
elections approach (refs D-E). With the BSP calling for
immediate withdrawal from Iraq and the polls showing the
Socialist's lead increasing, at least some members of the
government appear to have concluded that no "rewards" will be
forthcoming before June 25, and have decided to try to cut
their losses. Regardless of the precise contours of the
government's upcoming decision, it will be essentially an
exit strategy timed to get them out of MNF operations by the
end of the year and shift the public debate to issues where
they are presumably stronger.


8. (C) The March 25 meeting between the Secretary and FM
Passy and the March 29-30 visit to Sofia by Deputy Secretary
Zoellick potentially can affect the government's upcoming
decision. While acknowledging the pressure faced by the
government and the need for an exit strategy, both the
Secretary and the Deputy Secretary should urge senior

SIPDIS
Bulgarian officials to tie military capability in Iraq to the
approval of the Iraqi constitution, establishment of a
parliament and the presence of adequate indigenous security
forces, rather than a date certain. Only then should
Bulgaria consider shifting the bulk of its forces to the NATO
training mission. END COMMENT