U.S.- BULGARIA SECURITY RELATIONSHIP: PUSHING ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001987

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL BU
SUBJECT: U.S.- BULGARIA SECURITY RELATIONSHIP: PUSHING ON
AN OPEN DOOR

Classified By: Amb. John Beyrle, for reasons 1.4 a and d.


1. (C) SUMMARY. The U.S.- Bulgaria security relationship is
strong and shows no signs of weakening after the August
formation of a three-party coalition including the Bulgarian
Socialist Party (BSP). Despite our concerns in the
pre-election period, the coalition remains a solid ally
supporting U.S. interests by fighting terrorism in Iraq and
Afghanistan, negotiating a U.S. military presence in
Bulgaria, and promoting regional security through deployments
in Bosnia and Kosovo. The GOB faces considerable political
risks in deepening our security relationship as significant
elements of the Bulgarian population remain skeptical of
close military cooperation with the U.S. absent the
perception of tangible benefits to Bulgaria. END SUMMARY.

AN ALLY IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
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2. (C) Bulgaria is a strong ally in the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT). It is a coalition member in Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and has had a 400-man battalion in Iraq
since 2003. To date, Bulgaria has suffered 93 military
casualties in Iraq, 13 killed and 80 wounded. This is the
highest casualty rate of any coalition member, based on the
number of killed and wounded as a percentage of the
contingent's size. Bulgaria is spending significant amounts
of its own funds to support the deployment. Despite the high
cost in both money and lives, the new government has
back-tracked on its campaign promise to withdraw immediately
from Iraq. Instead, they have engaged us in an intensive
dialogue on possible alternative missions. At the same time,
the Socialist-led government has delayed the pullout of
troops from MNF-I until after the December 15 Iraqi elections
at our behest, this despite a legislative mandate to bring
the troops home by December 31.


3. (C) As the battalion in MNF-I prepares to begin its
scheduled redeployment to Bulgaria, the GOB is rapidly moving
toward a follow-on OIF mission. The mission under
consideration involves sending 120 soldiers to Camp Ashraf to
guard Mujahedin e Khalq (MEK) internees, the Iranian
opposition group that received assistance from Iraq under
Saddam. The GOB is nearing a decision on this new mission
despite the fact that 80% of the Bulgarian public opposes any
military presence in Iraq at all. The decision to take on
the MEK mission will be a complete the reversal of the
Socialist Party's election pledge to immediately withdraw
from Iraq. In addition to its substantial contribution in
Iraq, 80 Bulgarian soldiers are part of ISAF in Afghanistan,
and Bulgaria has accepted the Kabul International Airport
security mission, which will bring their ISAF contingent up
to 200-300 in 2006.

OUT OF THE MANPADS BUSINESS
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4. (S) The GOB provides valuable assistance to the USG in the
areas of counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation,
including outstanding operational intelligence cooperation
against terrorist and WMD targets around the world. In
October the USG and the GOB concluded a joint weapons
reduction project in which Bulgaria sent 2608 MANPADS to the
U.S. and destroyed another 2385 at home. The remaining
stocks of MANPADS in Bulgaria are held by the MOD for the
exclusive use of the Bulgarian military. Under our
agreement, the GOB must consult with us prior to granting an
export license for MANPADS or MANPADS components to any end
user outside the EU or NATO. This political agreement, along
with the elimination of Bulgaria's commercial stockpile,
marks the end of Bulgaria as a potential proliferator of
MANPADS. Once again, the decision entailed some political
risk to the GOB, which already faces high unemployment in the
defense sector.

BASING TALKS ON TRACK
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5. (C) Bulgaria is negotiating a supplemental status of
forces agreement and defense cooperation agreement that would
grant U.S. access to Bulgarian military facilities in support
of the Eastern European Task Force concept. A negotiating
team led by Amb. Loftis made substantial progress during
talks in Sofia in September and November. The team plans
another visit to Sofia in January 2006. Bulgarian officials
from the President and Prime Minister on down have expressed
strong public support for U.S. basing, despite the fact that
60% of the Bulgarian people oppose the stationing of foreign
troops in Bulgaria.


6. (C) The Bulgarian military bases under discussion are
already used for bilateral training exercises. Exercise
Immediate Response '06, scheduled for summer 2006, will
demonstrate the ability to rapidly deploy a forward-stationed
strategic reserve force. It will include trilateral
live-fire and training activities with U.S. Bulgarian, and
Romanian forces. The U.S. contingent will be approximately
400 troops. Bulgaria's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
International Military Education and Training (IMET) budgets
have made exercises such as this possible, and they serve as
enablers for a stronger strategic security relationship.

CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL SECURITY
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7. (C) As a NATO member and EU candidate, Bulgaria sets a
strong example for western Balkan countries. Our contacts
within the government frequently mention Bulgaria's efforts
to reach out to Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia in support of
their NATO and EU aspirations. Bulgaria is also active in
supporting Georgia's involvement in the Partnership for Peace
and its desire for broader Euro-Atlantic integration.
Bulgaria is making concrete contributions to regional
peacekeeping operations. In Bosnia, 198 Bulgarian soldiers
participate in EUFOR, and 42 Bulgarian soldiers are in KFOR
in Kosovo. Bulgaria can -- and is willing to -- play a
positive role in ensuring regional stability in the wake of
the Kosovo final status talks.

COMMENT
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8. (C) The three-party ruling coalition's desire to discuss a
follow-on OIF mission and joint basing is admirable given
strong public opposition to each. We will work toward an
agreement on the new OIF mission by the end of this year,
continue our negotiations on joint military facilities, and
continue to enhance an already substantial and successful
security relationship with Bulgaria. Bulgarian officials,
wary of potential parliamentary or popular backlash,
continually ask us for ammunition to rebut the "What is
Bulgaria getting in return?" question. High-level contact
(e.g. visits to Sofia by Generals Jones and Wald, the
upcoming Secretary of Defense meeting with MOD Bliznakov in
Washington) provides a strong part of the answer. But we
should be concerned by the cumulative effect of declining
assistance and FMF budgets, especially as we enter the end
game of basing negotiations, to ensure we are demonstrating
the strongest possible support to a government that is
showing domestic political leadership where it counts most
for U.S. interests. END COMMENT.
BEYRLE