Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SOFIA1719
2005-10-07 12:54:00
SECRET
Embassy Sofia
Cable title:  

BULGARIA PROPOSES MINIMAL FOLLOW-ON MISSION IN IRAQ

Tags:  MARR MOPS PREL BU IZ NATO 
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S E C R E T SOFIA 001719 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL BU IZ NATO
SUBJECT: BULGARIA PROPOSES MINIMAL FOLLOW-ON MISSION IN IRAQ

REF: SOFIA 01639

Classified By: AMB. JOHN BEYRLE FOR REASON 1.4 (a,b)

S E C R E T SOFIA 001719

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL BU IZ NATO
SUBJECT: BULGARIA PROPOSES MINIMAL FOLLOW-ON MISSION IN IRAQ

REF: SOFIA 01639

Classified By: AMB. JOHN BEYRLE FOR REASON 1.4 (a,b)


1. (U) This is an action request. See Para 8


2. (S) Summary: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed
DCM Oct. 7 that Bulgaria,s follow-on military activity in
Iraq would consist of 40 soldiers dedicated to the NATO
Training (NTM-I) and Multi-National Security Transition
Command (MNSTC-I) missions. It also confirmed that the
current contingent would remain in Iraq through the December
elections. The briefing ended with a request for "feedback"
on the government,s decision. End Summary


3. (C) The decision was taken Oct. 4 by leaders of the
three political parties that make up the ruling coalition,
including PM Stanishev. According to Plamen Bonchev, MFA
director for NATO and International Security, President
Purvanov has already been briefed on the decision, which will
be presented to the Council of Ministers Oct. 13. This
timeline meets their previous assurances that a final
decision would be made before Purvanov,s Oct. 17 White House
meeting.


4. (C) Both the NTM-I and NATO Missions had been included
in our Engagement Team,s brief (Ref),although the NTM-I
presentation stressed the need for force protection rather
than instructors. Bonchev said the actual positions to be
filled in both missions would be decided at the expert level,
but they envisioned individual officers assuming specific
positions as they became available, rather than the
deployment of a 40-person unit.


5. (C) In addition, the political leaders confirmed the
current contingent would remain in Iraq through the Dec. 15
elections. Its departure would begin the following week in
order to meet the Parliamentary deadline of a December 31
withdrawal. Bonchev asked for U.S. logistical support in
making this timeline work.


6. (S) In response to Bonchev,s request for feedback,
DCM replied there was clearly the hope for a larger and more
meaningful contribution from Bulgaria, but we would seek an
official Washington response.


7. (C) Comment: Bulgaria,s decision is disappointing,
especially in light of its miltary,s strong desire for a
more robust follow-on mission. It does, however, follow a
policy announced six months ago and will likely be acceptable
to a much larger percentage of the Bulgarian public. We
believe additional contributions to other international
missions may also be a possibility. Given the continuing
high political sensitivities of this issue, we think the
best tactics are to accept this decision with statements of
appreciation for Bulgaria,s contributions and sacrifices in
Iraq, while continuing to work with them on gradually
increasing their participation.


8. (U) Action Request: Please provide guidance in
response to request for feedback on this decision. In
addition, it would be useful to know how many positions are
currently available between the two missions and if an
increase in the proposed participation would be operationally
useful.
BEYRLE