U.S.-SINGAPORE PROLIFERATION TALKS IDENTIFY FUTURE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 SINGAPORE 003160

SIPDIS

NOFORN

OSD PASS ISP/NPP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015
TAGS: PARM MNUC KNNP ETTC SN
SUBJECT: U.S.-SINGAPORE PROLIFERATION TALKS IDENTIFY FUTURE
WORK AGENDA

REF: A. SINGAPORE 2833

B. STATE 170648

Classified By: Economic and Political Counselor Laurent Charbonnet for
Reason 1.4 (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: On October 17-18, the U.S. held productive
talks with Singapore on a broad range of nonproliferation and
counterproliferation issues. The U.S. delegation, co-led by
ISN/MTR Director Van Diepen and OSD/ISP/NPP Director David
Cooper, was impressed by the level of preparedness and
knowledge of Singapore counterparts and their general support
for international efforts to stop the spread of WMD and their
delivery systems. The GOS recognized the importance of the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in combating WMD
proliferation and agreed there was room for increased
collaboration, particularly in the areas of outreach and
operational cooperation. However, Singapore remained
reticent about being proactive in enforcing existing export
controls and hesitant to expand them, despite averring not
having a principled objection to doing so. The GOS claimed
that a lack of technical expertise and resources hindered its
ability to harmonize its control lists with the multilateral
nonproliferation regimes and to expand its transit,
transshipment, and brokering controls -- despite the fact
that it was already controlling the same items to certain
countries or in certain contexts (e.g., munitions). To help
address GOS-identified gaps in Singapore,s export control
system, it was agreed that ISN,s Office of Export
Cooperation would draft a plan to provide the necessary
training to help improve Singapore,s export controls. Both
sides also agreed to continue the consultative process
through our embassies and planned to meet again in
approximately eighteen months.


2. (U) Singapore's delegation, led by TAN Yee Woan, Director,
International Organizations Directorate, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, included representatives from the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, Defence, Home Affairs, Trade and Industry
and Transportation, as well as Singapore Customs, the
Attorney General's Chambers, the Defence Trade Advisory
Organisation, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the
National Security Coordination Centre. (See para 28 for the
delegation list.)

HIGH-LEVEL COMMITMENT
--------------


3. (C/NF) Van Diepen and Cooper began the talks with a call
on Ministry of Foreign Affairs Second Permanent Secretary
Bilahari Kausikan. Kausikan chairs the Interagency Committee
that makes Singapore's nonproliferation policy and has been a
proponent of closer bilateral cooperation on
counterproliferation. He assured Van Diepen and Cooper of
his government's commitment to improving its
counterproliferation regime, but acknowledged that it "has a
lot to learn." Kausikan noted that the United States and
Singapore have been working together for some time on an
"agency-to-agency" basis, but appreciated the United States'
bringing out a strong interagency team to cover a broad range
of topics, in order to ensure that everyone in the GOS
understands the broader picture. Cooper acknowledged
Singapore,s significant contributions to PSI, and Van Diepen
noted that Singapore is already very capable in many areas
and said that the United States wants to help it build on
that capacity to fill the remaining gaps.

THREAT OVERVIEW
--------------


4. (S/NF) Van Diepen opened the substantive dialogue with an
overview of the proliferation threat, including which
countries have weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs,
where their programs are heading, what specific types of
commodities they are seeking, and how they try to get those
items. His presentation focused on the nuclear, chemical,
biological, and missile programs in countries of greatest
proliferation concern -- Iran, North Korea, and Syria. Van
Diepen also stressed, however, that the threat can change,
and offered evidence that these and other proliferators often
use third-country cut-outs to get around restrictions,
highlighting the need for as complete an export control
regime as possible. Van Diepen used this point to emphasize
the importance of intelligence and data from a comprehensive
export control system in ensuring effective export controls.
Cooper reinforced this point by noting that in some cases
countries need to focus on the end-user and not necessarily
the commodity, as programs of proliferation concern routinely
seek technology that is not controlled. Tan noted that this
context was very helpful for Singapore, particularly for
those officials who do not follow proliferation trends on a
day-to-day basis. Singapore officials asked many practical
questions about distinguishing between items destined for WMD
and missile programs versus conventional weapons or
legitimate industrial programs, and how the United States
managed its restrictions on countries of concern that are not
currently targeted as proliferators.


5. (S) Van Diepen concluded the threat briefing by
emphasizing that the U.S. views Singapore as a key country in
the international effort to combat the proliferation of WMD
and their delivery systems. The U.S. also sees Singapore as
threatened by North Korea,s WMD and missile programs; the
potential that terrorists may acquire and use WMD; and the
instability created in other regions of the world, notably
the Middle East, by the proliferation of WMD and their means
of delivery.

SINGAPORE AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION
--------------


6. (S) Following the U.S. threat briefing, Singapore
delivered a presentation on nonproliferation and export
controls, which focused on how Singapore viewed the WMD
threat. Paul KOH Kok Hong from the MFA opened the briefing
by noting that the threat from WMD proliferation is not new,
but the nature of the threat has changed. First, this change
has precipitated from the rise of terrorism and Singapore,s
belief that if terrorists acquired WMD they would without
hesitation use them. Second, the nature of the threat has
changed because the rise of globalization has made
proliferation easier. Koh continued that Singapore had to
balance its nonproliferation commitments and export controls
while ensuring that Singapore maintained its status as a key
maritime shipping hub.


7. (S) Continuing, Singapore provided an overview of the
Strategic Goods Control Act (SGCA),Singapore's primary
export control legislation; the importance of the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Container
Security Initiative (CSI); and the idea of "total supply
chain security" as a new dimension to counterproliferation
and nonproliferation efforts on which they sought U.S.
support.

PSI
---


8. (C) Defense Department Director for Nonproliferation
Policy David Cooper congratulated the Singaporean delegation
on its growing leadership role in the PSI, and on the success
of the Singapore-hosted August 2005 PSI exercise DEEP SABRE.
He urged Singapore to continue to be proactive on PSI by
helping to expand support for PSI in the region, for example,
at an upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum meeting, and to host a
meeting of the Operational Experts Group (OEG) in the second
half of 2006. He also noted that improving GOS export
controls and preventing proliferation from or through
Singapore was a necessary element of Singapore,s PSI
efforts. Singapore OEG Head of Delegation Kwek (MOD)
responded that Singapore was very happy to contribute to the
OEG process, but that dates to host an OEG meeting were
starting to fill up quickly.


9. (C) Cooper and Stumpf also discussed Singapore,s role in
PSI outreach, with the goal of increasing PSI participation
in Southeast Asia, particularly given the Philippines,
recent endorsement of the PSI Statement of Interdiction
Principles. Tan and Koh responded that Singapore was working
quietly with partners in the region (mentioning Thailand
specifically, but implying there were others). They noted
that they had been communicating closely with Australia about
the results of these conversations. Koh questioned whether
the statement by President Arroyo of the Philippines at the
United Nations General Assembly amounted to an endorsement;
"I was there, listening for it, and didn,t hear it," he
said. Singapore was skeptical that additional endorsements
would be ready for a joint announcement by the time of the
January/February 2006 Asian Senior-Level Talks on
Non-Proliferation, to be held in Japan.


10. (C) Kwek inquired about U.S. plans for senior-level PSI
political meetings. Cooper responded that the details were
still being worked out, but that the U.S. expected this to be
an opportunity for senior foreign ministry officials from all
countries that have endorsed the PSI to demonstrate their
political commitment to PSI and discuss various aspects of
the initiative. Kwek expressed a desire to have dates
announced soon as schedules at that level were filling up
quickly. Cooper speculated that the meeting would be hosted
by Poland on or near the third anniversary in late May 2006,
but promised to encourage an official announcement of these
details as soon as possible.

CHANG DOK
--------------


11. (S/NF) Cooper recalled that, during their earlier
meeting, MFA Second Permanent Secretary Bilahari Kausikan had
raised the issue of the North Korean ship that had recently
refused directions to bunker within Singapore territorial
waters and his speculation that this was an indication that
the proliferators had gotten the message that Singapore was
committed to PSI. In this context, Cooper raised the general
issue of the practice of bunkering "ships of potential
proliferation" concern in areas just outside of Singapore,s
territorial waters, and noted the Chang Dok case from July,
where, according to U.S. information, the ship was bunkered
just outside Singapore,s territorial waters by a Malaysian
company that was operating out of Singapore. Emphasizing
that the U.S. believed this was a case of North Korea
specifically avoiding transiting Singapore for fear that the
Chang Dok,s cargo, which contained a myriad of conventional
weapons and vehicles bound for Africa, would be stopped,
searched, and possibly seized, Cooper asked if there were any
steps that Singapore could take to discourage Singaporean
entities from conducting such bunkering activities with ships
of potential proliferation concern.


12. (S) Singapore officials said that they clearly recalled
this situation, and noted that at the time they explored all
possible means to get the Chang Dok to enter Singapore,s
territorial waters so the ship could be inspected. In
addition, the U.S. side was informed that the Malaysian
company that bunkered the Chang Dok operated out of Malaysia,
not Singapore, and that Singapore already has laws that
prevent Singaporean companies from bunkering ships in
international waters (which they called "OPL bunkering" --
outside port limits). Cooper also opined that we would be
interested in Singapore,s thoughts on how we could
discourage such practices by Malaysian companies.


13. (S) The Singapore delegation asked what the U.S. would
would have done with the Chang Dok,s cargo if Singapore
could have inspected the ship. U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) Attache Matt King noted that, as the Chong
Dok's cargo of conventional arms, including explosives, had
been purposefully mis-declared, Singapore Customs would have
had legal authority to seize the cargo. King added that, if
Singapore starts letting illicit, but non-WMD and
missile-related cargo through, Singapore will increasingly be
targeted by proliferators. Van Diepen continued that just
because a DPRK cargo might not be WMD- or missile-related
does not mean that it should not be stopped and seized. For
example, the proceeds from shipments, such as conventional
weapons, counterfeit cigarettes, and drugs, could be used to
support DPRK WMD and missile programs. Furthermore, by
taking action against all illicit shipments, Singapore can
force proliferators to change their methods, and those new
methods will eventually be discovered.

E.O. on WMD FINANCING
--------------


14. (SBU) Jennifer Fowler of the Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) gave a presentation
on the new U.S. Executive Order 13382, Blocking the Property
of WMD Proliferators and their Supporters. Her presentation
detailed the criteria for designating foreign entities
pursuant to E.O. 13382, and OFAC,s procedures for
implementing and enforcing E.O. 13382 and other financial
sanctions programs. Singapore officials, particularly from
the Attorney General's Chambers and Customs, asked many
questions regarding sanctions-compliance requirements for
U.S. companies and foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, as
well as on OFAC,s approach and jurisdiction for enforcing
sanctions violations by such entities. While the Singapore
law enforcement officials appeared appreciative of the power
of E.O. 13382, MFA's Tan made a strong push for the United
States to advocate for the counter-proliferation sanctions
program in a multilateral forum to give it international
credibility, much in the same way that the U.S. raised
awareness of counter-terrorist financing worldwide and
prevailed on other countries to take actions to disrupt it.

EXPORT CONTROLS
--------------


15. (S/NF) Van Diepen began the discussions on export
controls by addressing Singapore,s control lists. As a
general matter, these lists fall short of those of the four
multilateral nonproliferation regimes. However, (a) for
exports of chemical and biological-related items to Iran,
North Korea, and Syria, Singapore does control almost all of
the Australia Group (AG) items; (b) non-Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) items are controlled if they are
designed or modified for military use, but not if the same
items are "dual-use"; (c) only a few Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) items are not controlled; and (d) very few Wasenaar
dual-use items are controlled. Accordingly, Van Diepen urged
Singapore to harmonize its control lists with those of the
multilateral nonproliferation regimes for exports to all
countries. Singapore responded that its control list was
developed with the understanding that the government would
have to convince industry that controlling these items was
important and could be done with minimal interruption to
commerce and maritime trade. Attempting to address U.S.
concerns about Singapore,s inadequate control lists, Fauziah
Sani, from Singapore Customs, added that the SGCA did have a
catch-all provision, which would subject an item to export
controls if it is known or suspected to be going to a WMD or
missile program.


16. (S) Singapore officials also explained that they do not
yet control all items, in part, because they do not have the
technical capability to recognize those items or understand
their applicability in a WMD or missile program. This lack
of technical expertise, they claimed, would make it nearly
impossible for Singapore to enforce an expanded control list.
Van Diepen pointed out that Singapore already controls some
of these items for a few countries -- Iran, North Korea, and
Libya -- and controls other items when they are "specially
designed" for military applications, but not when the same
exact item is not "specially designed" for military
applications. Given this situation, Van Diepen noted that it
was very hard to understand how Singapore could reasonably
argue that they did not have the required technical expertise
to control the exact same items globally.


17. (S) Singapore officials responded by saying that, while
they have established expanded controls for exports to Iran,
North Korea, and Syria, they have difficulty enforcing those
controls. Cooper remarked that while limited technical
expertise may hamper Singapore's ability to proactively look
for illicit items, Singapore should have the controls in
place as a legal authority to exercise in the event that
illicit items turn up -- through a PSI interdiction, for
example. Tan acknowledged Van Diepen,s and Cooper,s
points, and stressed that Singapore already has made the
decision to expand its control list; the only question, she
said, was timing. Sani explained that Singapore is currently
engaged in industry outreach to bring private business and
the shipping industry on board with the idea of a Singapore
control list in line with the multilateral regimes. Phil
Warker from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) pointed
out that, if Singapore collected more shipping/cargo
information, Singapore authorities could do a better job of
targeting which ships to focus their energies on, which in
turn will help manage the increased workload resulting from
an expanded control list.


18. (S) Singapore officials, emphasizing their desire to
improve their export controls, asked for increased access to
U.S. technical expertise to help identify commodities and
evaluate their applicability in a WMD or missile program.
ICE Attache King offered to coordinate such requests for
assistance through his office.


19. (S) Van Diepen continued the U.S. presentation by
emphasizing the importance of catch-all controls and the
importance of intelligence and manifest and export control
data in implementing those controls. Agreeing with the U.S.
points, Sani asked if Singapore could get "procurement
assessment assistance" from the U.S., addressing what items
proliferators need and end-users of concern. Building on the
importance of catch-all controls, Van Diepen noted the
importance of transit, transshipment, and brokering controls
as a key component of a comprehensive export control system
and encouraged the Singaporeans to control these activities
the same way that exports are controlled, not just relying on
a "catch-all" apparatus.


20. (S) Concluding the discussion of export controls, Van
Diepen raised the issue of Singapore,s controls on
intangible technology. Noting that Singapore does control
certain forms intangible technology, such as e-mail, there
are no controls on oral or visual transmission of controlled
technology that do not occur via an electronic device.
Therefore, Singapore would not control certain types of
training or education, such as instructions on how to
synthesize a controlled chemical or how to use a controlled
machine tool, which is a very valuable form of teaching for
proliferators. Noting the loopholes that existed, Van Diepen
urged Singapore to control all forms technology transfers of
controlled technology.


21. (S) Following the discussion on export controls,
Singapore delivered a presentation on the multi-pronged
approach used to enforce the SGCA. Singapore uses a
combination of risk profiling and border controls, audits,
intelligence information and international cooperation, and
post-and pre-shipment inspections of Singapore entities to
enforce compliance with the SGCA. While Singapore has a
strong system in place to enforce the SGCA, it lacks the
indigenous technical expertise to identify commodities and
evaluate their applicability in a WMD or missile program. To
address this deficiency, Singapore requested training courses
in commodity identification and proposed the U.S. creation of
a help-desk that could provide technical assistance to
Singapore. The U.S. noted that the Department of Energy
(DOE) has offered to provide a commodity identification
course.

BIODEFENSE
--------------


22. (SBU) Cooper presented a brief overview of the U.S.
military's biodefense program, which includes work on
detection and identification, warning and reporting, physical
protection, hazard management, medical countermeasures, and
training and exercising. He noted that the United States is
interested in cooperating with its friends and allies to
ensure that our militaries are not only working to lower the
threat of WMD, but also are better prepared to operate in a
WMD environment. Cooper proposed to work with Singapore on
such training and exercising, if the GOS was interested.
Lieutenant Colonel KWEK Ju-Hon, Deputy Director of the Policy
Office at the Ministry of Defence, expressed his thanks for
the offer, and indicated MinDef would look closely at the
proposal.

APEC and ARF, and HCOC
--------------


23. (C) Stumpf thanked Singapore for its close cooperation on
nonproliferation issues in both APEC and the ASEAN Regional
Forum, and urged Singapore,s further help in continuing work
in both fora. He suggested that the U.S. and Singapore might
consider working on specific initiatives together, as
appropriate to these fora. Singapore was glad to cooperate
in the ARF if relevant and useful areas were identified, and
noted its interest in pursuing "total supply chain security"
in APEC, but the GOS noted that in both fora, the United
States might get better results itself by acting on its own,
given some other (unnamed) ASEAN countries, resistance to
accepting initiatives presented by Singapore.


24. (C) Stumpf noted that the United States looked forward to
the U.S.-China-Singapore ASEAN Regional Forum seminar on
Nonproliferation, to be held in March 2006 in Singapore. Koh
expressed Singapore,s desire to "streamline the agenda" to
concentrate on a smaller number of issues, and to lead on the
PSI agenda item.


25. (C) Recalling Tan,s impassioned pleas for multilateral
approaches to proliferation finance, Van Diepen noted the
inconsistency with Singapore's eschewing subscription to the
Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
(HCOC). Tan said there was no substance problem concerning
the HCOC, but the GOS wanted to be sure it fully understood
and could implement the HCOC, which was far down in its list
of legislative proposals. We,ll get to it, she noted. Van
Diepen was disappointed that Singapore had not chosen to ask
the U.S. for clarification of the HCOC during our three years
of seeking Singapore,s support, and reiterated our readiness
to answer any questions. He pointed out that the HCOC has
only two requirements, both easy for Singapore to meet --
declaring its policy on ballistic missiles and space launch
vehicles and pre-notifying any missile launches (of which
Singapore would have none) -- and noted that the HCOC is a
non-treaty political commitment that does not require
legislative action. Van Diepen stressed the importance of
Singapore adding its name to the 122 other Subscribers, and
to help bolster this multilateral norm. Tan undertook to
re-examine the HCOC, and to get back to the U.S.

PLANS FOR ACTION
--------------


26. (S/NF) Singapore officials identified five areas where
they see weaknesses in their export control system, and would
like assistance to build their capabilities:

-- Commodity Identification: John Wong from the Defence
Trade Advisory Office noted that Singapore "has never had and
will never have" nuclear or missile programs, and described
his agency's expertise in these areas as "near zero." Help
in identifying test and production equipment was also
requested. He expressed particular interest in having a
"help desk" that he could call or e-mail with parts
descriptions or photos, and get a quick opinion on whether or
not the items were controlled and their proliferation
utility. U.S. Embassy ICE Attache and Phil Warker of CBP
said they would be happy to route such GOS requests for
assistance to the appropriate USG offices.

-- Licensing Procedures: Fauziah Sani of Singapore Customs
noted that Singapore has put licensing procedures in place,
but said that when Singapore expands its control lists,
license applications will increase. She expressed interest
in working with the United States to understand how best to
process applications without hampering legitimate trade.

-- Targeting and Risk Management: Sani also expressed
interest in learning more about how the United States
identifies higher-risk cargoes for closer inspection; Vu Le
of the State Department's Office of Export Control
Cooperation indicated that such a training program already
was planned for Singapore in the near future. Warker noted
that CBP could help Singapore build a database of suppliers
and end-users to help them spot anomalous shipments, if
Singapore moves to require full manifest data.

-- Investigative Techniques: Sani expressed interest in
training for both licensing officers and police -- so
licensing officers can make better determinations on whether
a license should be issued, and so police can pursue a
criminal prosecution when violations are committed.

-- Industry Outreach: GOS asked for USG assistance in
helping industry identify items of proliferation concern, and
enlisting industry cooperation, for instance in supply chain
security and the U.S. CT-PAT program.

It was agreed that ISN/EC will draft a proposal with
training the USG could offer to address the areas Singapore
had identified, which would then be agreed to with the GOS
and implemented. The GOS also was interested in receiving
basic training in administering a national authority under
the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol,
given that Singapore has no nuclear facilities, including the
ability to observe U.S.-nuclear plants and learn about
nuclear security. The U.S.-side undertook to have the
relevant USG officials get back to Singapore on this request.

COMMENT
--------------


27. (C/NF) We were encouraged by the size and breadth of the
Singapore delegation, which included all of the relevant
players on most proliferation issues, from financing to
export licensing. The talks highlighted a significant change
in the GOS's general attitude towards nonproliferation issues
over the past few years -- rather than being defensive and
wary, Singapore's participants were highly engaged and eager
to ask practical questions and learn from their U.S.
counterparts. In addition, the GOS clearly identified the
types of training and technical assistance it needs to
implement an expanded export control system that meets
international standards, and agreed to develop a plan of
action with the United States to address those deficiencies.
Both delegations agreed that the bilateral
nonproliferation/counterproliferation process should
continue, but without duplicating or impeding other contacts
or bilateral fora. Regular interagency dialogue meetings --
held approximately every 18 months -- could be useful to take
stock of progress, but that practical work would continue on
an agency-to-agency basis with the overall nonproliferation
relationship monitored via the embassy. The timing/venue of
the next meeting should be finalized in about a year, to
allow plenty of lead time. End Comment.

DELEGATIONS
--------------


28. (U) Singapore agencies' participation in the talks were
led by:

-- Ministry of Foreign Affairs: TAN Yee Woan, Director,
International Organizations
-- Ministry of Defence: LTC KWEK Ju-Hon, Deputy Director,
Policy Office
-- Ministry of Home Affairs: TAN Puay Seng, Security
Development Executive
-- Ministry of Trade: Sandra Soon, Senior Assistant Director,
Trade Division
-- Ministry of Transport: Florence Lim, Assistant Director,
Sea Transport
-- Singapore Customs: Fauziah SANI, Head, Trade Control Branch
-- Attorney General's Chambers: LEONG Kwang Ian, State
Counsel, Civil Division
-- Defense Trade Advisory Office: John Wong, Division Manager
-- Monetary Authority of Singapore: Michael Eng, Assistant
Director, External Department
-- National Security Coordination Secretariat: Angie Tan,
Assistant Director

The U.S. delegation was:

-- Department of State, Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation: Vann Van Diepen, Acting Director, Office of
Missile Threat Reduction; Matthew Hardiman, Office of Export
Controls Cooperation; Vu Le, Office of Export Controls
Cooperation; Matthew Stumpf, Office of Regional Affairs
-- Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense:
Dr. David Cooper, Director, Nonproliferation Policy
-- Department of Homeland Security: Phil Warker, Customs and
Border Protection
-- Department of Commerce: Tracy Martin, Office of Export
Enforcement
-- Department of Treasury: Jennifer Fowler, Office of Foreign
Assets Control
-- Joint Chiefs of Staff: CDR Patrick McCarthy, Deputy Legal
Counsel, Office of the Chairman
-- US Embassy: CAPT Rivers Cleveland, Defense Attache;
Laurent Charbonnet, Economic and Political Counselor; Matthew
King, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Attache;
Vanessa Piepenberg, Assistant ICE Attache; Colin Willett,
Economic and Political Officer.

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