SINGAPORE SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 002971

SIPDIS

NOFORN

FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KTFN ETTC ECON SN
SUBJECT: SINGAPORE SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

REF: A. SINGAPORE 2155


B. SINGAPORE 1706

Classified By: DCM Judith R. Fergin, Reasons 1.4(b)(c)(d)


1. (C) We look forward to your visit to Singapore from
October 19-20. This will be an excellent opportunity to
thank Singapore for its close counterterrorism cooperation
and identify ways in which we can expand the relationship.

Sense of Vulnerability
--------------


2. (C) Singapore has an acute sense of its vulnerability to a
terrorist attack and the severe damage one could cause to its
society and economy. While Singapore has not yet experienced
an attack, the GOS uncovered a plot in December 2001 by
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to set off a series of truck bombs
against western targets here, including the U.S. Embassy.
Under the broad powers of the Internal Security Act (ISA),
the GOS has detained the plot members and required them to
undergo a program of religious counseling designed to
encourage cooperation and eventual rehabilitation. Several
of the detainees have proven difficult to "bring around."
GOS officials view a terrorist attack as inevitable and see
an externally planned and launched attack as the most likely
threat scenario. It maintains a high degree of readiness,
including by deploying armed soldiers in the subway system
and in major shopping areas and regularly launching civic
awareness campaigns.


3. (S/NF) The GOS senior leadership is concerned about the
ability and will of Indonesia to combat terrorism.
Singapore's intelligence services -- small but highly
professional -- closely monitor the situation there. The GOS
remains concerned with the training and operational
experience being gained by terrorists in the southern
Philippines and is increasingly concerned that external
forces could radicalize the conflict in southern Thailand.
Singapore's security forces work well with their Malaysian
counterparts and believe they have the situation there in
hand. The GOS tracks developments in Singapore's ethnic
Malay/Muslim minority community and monitors the activities
of certain foreigners in the country.

A Strong Partner
--------------


4. (SBU) Singapore has been a reliable and highly capable
partner in the Global War on Terrorism. In addition to
providing support in Iraq and Afghanistan, the GOS
participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative, the
Container Security Initiative, Megaports and several other
counterterrorism and border security programs.


5. (C) Counterterrorism intelligence cooperation has been
close; sharing of information gleaned from respective
detainees has led to further capture of terrorist suspects
around the region. The GOS, however, is loathe to allow such
information to be used in legal proceedings.

Terrorism Finance
--------------


6. (C) Singapore is a regional financial center and therefore
an important participant in the effort to stop terrorist
financing in Southeast Asia, although it has yet to identify
and freeze any terrorist assets. It is in the process of
revising its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist
Financing (AML-CTF) regulations for banks and other financial
and non-financial institutions to conform to FATF
recommendations (Ref B.) We are working to address
shortcomings in Singapore's terrorist finance controls. For
example, Singapore's bank secrecy laws, its Financial
Intelligence Unit's inadequately small database of names (Ref
A),and lack of routine currency reporting requirements could
be exploited.

Message for GOS
--------------


7. (U) Your interlocutors will be eager to share perspectives
on regional terrorism developments. In addition, you should
stress that:

(S) -- We appreciate Singapore's close counterterrorism
cooperation and productive intelligence exchanges.

(S) -- (With ISD) We welcome the opportunity to share the
knowledge and expertise Singapore has gained in its
successful efforts against regional terrorist groups --
especially Jemaah Islamiyah -- and look forward to building a
closer, operational relationship with you.

(U) -- Singapore should strengthen its terrorist finance
controls. In particular, Singapore should adopt a
declaration system for cross-border transportation of
currency to enable law enforcement to monitor movements of
cash.
(U) -- Singapore's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) should
expand its database to capture more Suspicious Transaction
Reports (STR's) and better track terrorist financial flows.
By comparison, Hong Kong's FIU gathered more than eight times
as many STR's in 2004 than Singapore. (Singapore had 1,760
in 2004 while Hong Kong had 12,006 in the first ten months of
2004.)
LAVIN