AMBASSADOR BOYCE'S JUNE 27 MEETING WITH MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 002023

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PINR TH ID BM SN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BOYCE'S JUNE 27 MEETING WITH MINISTER
MENTOR LEE KUAN YEW

Classified By: Ambassador Franklin L. Lavin reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. On June 27, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand
Ralph Boyce and Singapore's senior statesman, Minister Mentor
Lee Kuan Yew, exchanged perspectives on Thai Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra's leadership style, prospects for a
peaceful resolution to Thailand's problems in the South,
Thailand's role in ASEAN as well as the Burma problem,
Indonesian President Yudhoyono, and the next UN Secretary
General. In the hour-long meeting, Lee questioned Thaksin's
long-term impact on the Thai political landscape and his
prospects for improving the situation in the South, but
welcomed his influence as a "pacesetter" in ASEAN. End
Summary.

Thaksin's "Un-Thai" leadership style
--------------


2. (C) Asked for his views on Thaksin's leadership and
Thailand's future, Ambassador Boyce noted that Thaksin's
political style is significantly different from that of other
Thai politicians, and that it may have transformed Thai
politics. Thaksin's party, he noted, was the first to win in
both Bangkok and upcountry, the first to win reelection, and
the first to campaign on real issues -- such as health care
-- and then deliver on his promises. In many ways, his
personal style is "un-Thai," in that he is a strong
"CEO-style" leader rather than a coalition-builder; he can
also be impatient and is often too quick to react to
criticism without thinking, Boyce observed.


3. (C) Lee agreed that Thaksin's problem is that he does not
have the ASEAN "style," and tends to step on corners. Lee
noted that Thaksin shoots from the hip and tends to make
quick decisions without much advice, and as a result has
antagonized both Prime Minister Abdullah in Malaysia and
President Yudhoyono in Indonesia. Lee questioned how much
long-term impact Thaksin would have on the political culture
of Thailand, however, noting that "he cannot change the Thai
character" (characterized by forbearance, give and take, and
a live-and-let-live philosophy). Thaksin is not that kind of
man, Lee said, but once he is gone Thai politics will revert
to a more traditional style. Lee noted that Thaksin will not
be able to stop the "money politics" that have always defined
Thai politics, and that he has in fact brought it to a whole
new level.


4. (C) Despite these concerns, the Minister Mentor said that
from a Singapore perspective, Thaksin is a positive influence
on ASEAN because he is willing to be "out in front" on many
issues and his forward-leaning attitude is influencing other
ASEAN members. FTAs are an example: former Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir once denounced bilateral and regional FTAs,
but now that Thailand has decided to pursue such
arrangements, Malaysia has realized it too must follow this
path; Indonesia is likely to follow, suggested Lee.

The South
--------------


5. (C) Lee said that the situation in the South is the one
serious problem that could upset much of the progress Thaksin
has achieved in Thailand. Ambassador Boyce noted that
Thaksin's treatment of the issue as a simple law-and-order
problem that could be fixed with a few arrests had
exacerbated this situation, and turned a manageable problem
into a full-fledged crisis. Ambassador Boyce noted that many
of the social programs in the South that had been dismantled
by the Thaksin government had actually been working. Lee
agreed that the situation was grim. The local "Muslim mafia"
is involved, and that will not disappear easily, he said. He
noted that it is only a matter of time before international
terrorists become involved, and the situation goes "the
Mindanao route." Ultimately, a way needs to be found to give
Thai Muslims a standard of living closer to that which their
brethren enjoy in northern Malaysia, Lee stressed. Lee said
that Thaksin's personality, his tendency to shoot from the
hip, and to take hardline stands, may make the problem even
more difficult to solve. Ambassador Boyce noted that
Thaksin's hardline on the South, although it did worsen the
situation, was immensely popular in the rest of Thailand.


6. (C) Lee asked about the commission appointed by Thaksin to
make recommendations on resolving the southern problem.
Ambassador Boyce said that while it has been suggested that
the commission is merely an eyewash for the Bangkok elite,
the person tapped to head the commission, Anan, is a serious
character who is not afraid to speak out. Ambassador Boyce
said he is confident the inquiry is being done in the right
spirit. The recommendations, however, are expected to focus
on culture, education, and public outreach. The South will
still have day-to-day law enforcement issues to cope with, a
difficult task given that the worst of the police and
military are still sent there as punishment, he said. Lee
asked if Thaksin might consider putting Anan in charge of
implementing the commission's recommendations; Ambassador
Boyce noted that this possibility has been discussed.

Burma
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador Boyce asked how ASEAN will deal with the
issue of Burma's membership and potential chairmanship of the
organization. Lee noted that he thought expansion of ASEAN
had been a mistake, but that it was one ASEAN now had to live
with. He said that expelling Burma at this point would be
going too far, but that the junta must be told that they "are
an embarrassment" and suspended from attending meetings until
they change their ways. Lee noted that convincing Vietnam of
this would be hard, and Cambodia and Laos were not supportive
either. Lee also noted that Thaksin has not been
particularly helpful on this issue. Thaksin's instinct to
"react to everything" has led to poor decisions, he said,
such as distancing Thailand from initiatives like Malaysia's
effort to persuade Burma to drop its claim to the
chairmanship. He is in danger of making Thailand appear to
be a mouthpiece for the junta, Lee said.

Yudhoyono
--------------


8. (C) Ambassador Boyce asked Lee for his thoughts on
President Yudhoyono of Indonesia. Lee said that Indonesia is
not on a rapid path to stability and prosperity, but that he
is more optimistic than he was when Yudhoyono was first
inaugurated. Lee noted that Yudhoyono seems to have found a
certain self-confidence, particularly in his dealings with
Vice President Jusuf Kalla, where he now appears to be
asserting himself on key matters. According to Lee,
Yudhoyono has decided that he is the President, he wants to
be President, and he wants to leave his mark on the
Presidency. Yudhoyono won't get into a confrontation with
Kalla, Lee said, but he does appear willing and able to keep
Kalla in his place and not be pushed around. Kalla, Lee
noted, is a doer -- he is very smart, very quick, and will
take over the job if given the opportunity; he will also
become the wealthiest man in Indonesia if given a chance.

The Next UN Secretary General
--------------


9. (C) Ambassador Boyce noted that Thaksin is determined
that Deputy Prime Minister Surakiat Sathirathai should be the
next UN Secretary General, and that Thaksin believes that
ASEAN and China support Surakiat's candidacy. Lee shared
that he does not believe Surakiat is up to the task. Lee
also said that he thought it unlikely that most ASEAN
countries and China support Surakiat, although they will not
tell Thaksin "no" directly. He questioned whether Surakiat
has any hope of winning the position, asking, "will the world
want to be saddled with Surakiat for five years?" Lee
suggested that the UN should "pass Asia," and allow the
Secretary General to be selected from a different continent.

SIPDIS


10. (U) Ambassador Boyce cleared this cable.
LAVIN