PROMOTING MAINSTREAM ISLAM: THE SINGAPORE MODEL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 001986

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SOCI SN
SUBJECT: PROMOTING MAINSTREAM ISLAM: THE SINGAPORE MODEL

REF: A. SINGAPORE 1835

B. SINGAPORE 887

Classified By: E/P Counselor Laurent Charbonnet, Reasons 1.4(b)(d)


1. (C) Summary. Concerned about the potential threat of
Islamic extremism to Singapore's multi-religious, secular
society, the government of Singapore (GOS) is promoting its
brand of "mainstream" Islam and a Singaporean Muslim
identity. Using its standard tools of incentives,
co-optation, and control, the GOS seeks to ensure Singapore's
social cohesion and security by providing an ideological
alternative to Islamic extremism. Working primarily through
the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS),a
government statutory board, the GOS aims to convince Muslims
that Islam is compatible with modernity, and to harness
religion to ensure their support for (or at least
acquiescence to) its policies. End summary.

--------------
A Nation that Feels at Risk
--------------


2. (C) Flanked by two Malay/Muslim-majority nations, and
having experienced race riots in the 1960s, the GOS has long
been obsessed with promoting racial harmony and winning the
loyalty of the city-state's indigenous Malay/Muslim minority
(15 percent of the population). These efforts have taken on
new urgency since 9/11, the subsequent discovery in December
2001 of a bombing plot by Singaporean Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
terrorists, and multiple bombings in nearby Indonesia.
Singapore's Chinese-dominated leadership worries about the
impact of a global Islamic resurgence on its Muslim citizens,
be it social fissures, independent political movements, or
acts of terrorism.

--------------
Creating a Singapore Muslim Identity
--------------


3. (C) To counter this perceived threat, the GOS, working
through modernist Muslim political and religious leaders, is
promoting what it calls "mainstream" ("sederhana") Islam in
Malay and working to create a unique Singapore Muslim
identity. MUIS has articulated ten attributes of the ideal
Singapore Muslim, most of which emphasize acceptance of the
existing social and political order, such as "Well-adjusted
in living as full members of secular society," and "Believes
that a good Muslim is also a good citizen." Other attributes
support the government's goal of maintaining racial harmony
in Singapore's diverse society, such as "Inclusive and
practices pluralism," is "a blessing to other communities,"
and "appreciates the richness of other civilizations." (The
full list is available at the MUIS website, www.muis.gov.sg.)

--------------
Broadcasting "Progressive" Ideas
--------------


4. (C) MUIS is promulgating "progressive" Islamic views
rather than allowing a vacuum to develop that could be filled
by radical Islamic ideas. The official weekly sermons issued
by MUIS for use in all the city-state's mosques urge Muslims
to work towards improving themselves and their community, and
to avoid violent extremism. Singapore's government-appointed
Mufti (supreme Islamic religious authority),in consultation
with a committee of religious scholars, issues fatwas
(religious opinions) that support the government's goals.
MUIS is also reforming Singapore's Islamic education system
to provide Muslims with "proper" religious knowledge (ref A),
the absence of which, it believes, allowed terrorist
ringleaders to lead astray the local JI plotters.


5. (C) MUIS and other government-linked organizations also
are bringing in well-known Muslim speakers to challenge--on a
religious basis--radical Islamist arguments on issues such as
jihad and the creation of a pan-Islamic state. MUIS is
especially trying to bring in modernist Arabic-speaking
scholars to meet with more traditional Muslim clerics, who
are uncomfortable with English. Singapore's modernist Muslim
leaders, including the Minister in charge of Muslim affairs,
typically attended national schools (in English) rather than
Islamic religious schools (where classes are in Arabic and
Malay),and have degrees in secular subjects. As a result,
they told us they do not feel they have the religious
knowledge or language skills to successfully counter the
theological views of Singapore's more traditional Islamic
leaders. This approach of importing experts is not
completely successful; these modernist scholars are often
challenged by traditional clerics, either directly at the
talks or in articles on the website (www.pergas.org.sg) of
the most conservative Muslim group, the Muslim Religious
Teachers Association of Singapore (PERGAS).

--------------
Excluding Extremist or Critical Views
--------------

6. (C) The GOS tries to exclude voices that might foment
religious divisions or encourage Muslims to challenge the
government. Speeches on religion still require a permit, and
can only be made in one of the four official languages
(English, Mandarin, Malay, or Tamil),effectively preventing
speeches in Arabic about Islam or politics. The GOS monitors
visiting Muslim clerics and denies visas to those it deems a
threat. It particularly restricts those from Saudi Arabia.
While more open to their visits, the GOS also is concerned
that clerics from Indonesia and Malaysia have been coming to
Singapore and meeting with local religious leaders, according
to the head of the GOS Political Islam Study Group. The GOS
bans satellite dishes and controls which foreign channels are
included in the cable TV lineup; Al Jazeera is one of the
many channels not available in Singapore.

7. (C) The GOS tries to downplay news that might enflame its
Muslim minority and to publish stories that support
"progressive" Islamic views in the local media. The
Malay-language newspaper's coverage of the allegations of
Koran desecration at Guantanamo, for example, was
considerably less critical than in the English-language
newspapers. The editor of Singapore's Malay-language
newspaper told us he was reprimanded by government officials
for publishing an article that allegedly threatened racial
harmony.

--------------
Monitoring Potential Critics...
--------------


8. (C) The GOS monitors the Muslim community to squelch
extremist or critical views. The GOS relies not just on the
police and intelligence services, but also on religious and
community leaders for self-policing. Muslims MPs told us
members of the community will report to them when Islamic
clerics deviate from the official Friday sermon, and MUIS
officials will then remind the imam to deliver the prepared
text. MUIS monitors the views and activities of other Muslim
groups. For example, a few years ago the Deputy Mufti
publicly resigned his post--because of differences with the
MUIS leadership, according to newspaper accounts--and went to
work for PERGAS, from whence he provided MUIS with
information about the group's views and tried to influence
the traditional clerics to become less insular.


9. (C) Many Muslim journalists and community leaders have
told us that this monitoring makes them reluctant to
criticize the government. They fear government reprisals,
such as a defamation suit or detention under Singapore's
Internal Security Act (ISA) for fomenting racial tension.
The immediate past-president of MUIS told us that he feared
being "blacklisted" after he argued at a closed-door session
that the GOS deters Muslim challenges to the government by
keeping the Muslim elite busy with social welfare work; a
listener reported his comments to the GOS, which then
"requested" a written text of his presentation.

--------------
...And Co-opting Them, As Well
--------------


10. (C) The GOS tries to co-opt Muslims critical of its
policies through incentives. MUIS, for example, now provides
cash-strapped PERGAS with office space. The Association of
Muslim Professionals (AMP),which was initially critical of
the GOS and PAP Muslim leaders, now receives part of the
mandatory payroll deductions from Muslims' salaries (the
government-administered "zakat") to fund its social service
programs. AMP's president told us this has had made AMP more
reluctant to publicly challenge government policies.


11. (U) The GOS seems so far to have earned the tacit
acceptance of most Singaporean Muslims by accommodating their
religious practices and beliefs. Singapore allows Muslim
family law (Syariah),for example, and has a system of
Syariah courts to administer it. According to a judge on the
Syariah court, secular lawyers who are Muslims work with the
Muslim religious judges to craft opinions that harmonize the
religious ruling with Singapore's civil code. Singapore's
Muslims can easily find MUIS-certified halal food (including
at McDonalds),wear Islamic or traditional Malay clothing
(except for students in the national schools, who must wear
the school uniform),and invest in Islamic financial
products. Muslim holidays such as Idul Fitri are national
holidays. Even PERGAS concedes that while an Islamic state
is the ideal, it is acceptable to live under a secular
government such as Singapore's that allows Muslims to live in
accordance with Islamic teachings.


12. (U) The GOS hinders the development of Muslim opposition
through its conciliatory actions on foreign policy and
security issues. The GOS carefully explained the arrests of
the suspected Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists to the Muslim
community. It is treating the JI detainees well, focusing on
reeducating them with "proper Islamic knowledge" (provided by
volunteer Islamic religious teachers) and is co-operating
with the Muslim community to ensure the detainees' families
are well-treated, according to both GOS officials and Muslim
leaders. The GOS is also accommodating the foreign policy
priorities of its Muslim minority by reaching out to the
Middle East (ref B) and by urging the United States to deal
evenly with the Palestinians.

--------------
Insulating Politics from Religion and Race
--------------


13. (C) The GOS tries to separate politics from race and
religion. Parliamentary districts are drawn so that Muslims
are a minority in every district, but, in partial
compensation, electoral rules require parties to have a
minority candidate on the election slate of most
constituencies. Race and religion are two topics that remain
"out of bounds" for political discussion. The GOS typically
reprimands religious groups who intrude in the political
sphere, although it did allow them to publicly express their
views on the question of whether to allow a casino to be
built in Singapore. Singapore's Malay political party
(PKMS),which is informally affiliated with UMNO in Malaysia
and seems to have some allies on the governing board of
PERGAS, occasionally tries to use religion and race for
political purposes, such as calling for the next president of
Singapore to be Malay.

-------------- --
Promoting Social Cohesion and Religious Harmony
-------------- --


14. (U) The GOS is concerned about Muslims segregating
themselves from the larger society. It is trying to "enlarge
the common space" in which Singaporeans of all races and
religions interact through voluntary activities such as
sports, and mandatory regulations such as racial quotas for
public housing (home to 85% of Singaporeans). Since 9/11 and
the arrests of the suspected Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists, the
GOS has stepped up its efforts to promote social cohesion.
It is encouraging interactions among members of different
faiths through newly formed groups like the Inter-Religious
Organization (IRO) and inter-racial confidence circles. The
GOS has also written a declaration of religious harmony,
which is recited annually on Racial Harmony Day.


15. (C) Comment: This GOS effort to promote its version of
"progressive" Islam that supports the existing social and
political order is an example of the PAP government's
top-down social engineering. This approach seeks to ensure
the PAP's continued dominance, while simultaneously providing
for a stable society and preventing the incursion of
radicalized views from Muslim communities abroad. By
promoting an Islamic ideology that is compatible with
economic development, commerce, and modernity, the PAP hopes
to convince Singapore's Muslim community to accept its vision
of Singapore as a diverse, secular state. End Comment.
LAVIN