SFA: AMB LAVIN CALLS ON DEFENSE MINISTER TEO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 000178

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MASS SN
SUBJECT: SFA: AMB LAVIN CALLS ON DEFENSE MINISTER TEO

Classified By: Amb Frank Lavin; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Lavin reviewed with Defense
Minister Teo Chee Hean progress to date in negotiations on
the U.S.-Singapore Strategic Framework Agreement, in a
meeting December 30. The Ambassador expressed the
frustration the U.S. government felt at the current stage of
discussions, in part because of Singapore's unwillingness to
come through on any of the requests we had made in three main
areas: legal protections for U.S. service personnel, the
ability of US personnel to bear arms, and the provision for
personally owned autombiles. Minister Teo took the
Ambassador's points on board, but did not concede any ground.
The Minister also rejected the Ambassador's assessment that
Singapore was not respecting the spirit of the 1990 MOU, as
amended. End Summary.

A Strong Relationship
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador Lavin called on Minister Teo December 30,
just as the extent of the damage wrought by the tsunami was
becoming widely known and almost immediately after Singapore
began to dispatch the first of its helicopters to affected
areas of Indonesia and Thailand. The conversation opened
with a discussion of what assistance our respective countries
were preparing to send to victims. Upon hearing that the
U.S. aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln would be steaming past
Singapore on its way to Sumatra, Minister Teo offered 24-hour
use of Paya Lebar airbase and Changi naval base for U.S.
relief operations.


3. (C) Ambassador Lavin used this type of cooperation as an
example of the excellent working relationship we now enjoy
with Singapore, particularly on the military side. The
Ambassador expressed pride at the progress we have made
together in the last few years as our operations here ramped
up during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
Singapore staunchly supported us in both operations and is
now providing military assets in OIF. The relationship is
"very positive," said Ambassador Lavin, and has great
potential to grow, which is why we agreed with Singapore's
suggestion that we try to negotiate a Strategic Framework
Agreement to push the relationship to a higher level.

Progress Stymied By GOS Approach
--------------


4. (C) Given these hopes, and the last year and half of
negotiations, the U.S. government now was concerned at the
apparent lack of progress in the talks, the Ambassador
continued. It was dismaying that issues like automobiles
should rise to the level of a conversation between the
Ambassador and the Minister. We did not understand the
apparent disconnect between the Singapore government's stated
desire for an expanded "strategic" partnership and its
unwillingness to provide for the most basic of requests
regarding force protection, quality of life (personal
vehicles) and legal protections for U.S. service personnel.
How could we expand the relationship when we could not even
resolve basic issues over the last several years? Further,
the Ambassador noted, it was the USG's view that two of those
issues (cars and arms) were actually provided for in the 1990
MOU as amended, but now the Singapore government not only was
not fulfilling its commitments under the MOU, but was even
trying to roll back those commitments in its recent texts.


5. (C) Minister Teo challenged the assertion that Singapore
was not living up to the spirit or the letter of the 1990
MOU. Regarding certificates of entitlement (COEs) for
automobiles, Colonel Gary Ang (who has been leading the
Singapore Government's negotiations) stated that "currently
there are no 'outstanding' requests for additional COEs. We
have always responded to your requests." The Ambassador
pressed him to define "outstanding" -- "For example, if we
requested 100 COEs and you provided 10, would you say that
that request was no longer outstanding?" Ang replied, "yes."
Turning to Yeo, the Ambassador remarked that this was an
example of the way Singapore seemed to be approaching these
issues from a narrow, legalistic, and bureaucratic point of
view. It was difficult to square that approach with the
notion that our countries should be significantly expanding a
"strategic" relationship. If we were unable to provide for
even the number of U.S. personnel present now, how could we
deal with expansions in the U.S. military presence that might
be required by projects such as the proposed C-2 center,
asked Ambassador Lavin. This unreasonably restrictive
approach on the part of Singapore called into question the
viability of U.S. participation in projects like the C-2
center. Ultimately, the U.S. would have to place its assets
where they were welcome and provided for, he added.

Teo: Singapore Wants U.S. Here
--------------


6. (C) Minister Teo noted that discussions on the SFA had
begun a year and half ago, when both nations faced serious
challenges, in the war against terror and the fighting in
Iraq. "Singapore knew we would have to deal with these
issues together over a long period of time. Our strategic
objectives have not changed over the years -- we want you out
here in Asia," said Teo. "We expressed that in the 1990 MOU."
Singapore wanted the U.S. in Asia over the long run and had
to create a sustainable political environment to allow that
to happen. Singapore wanted the U.S. military to be
comfortable in Singapore and for Singaporean citizens to be
comfortable with the U.S. "That means," said Teo, "that the
U.S. will not be able to create the same kind of situation as
you enjoyed at Clark airbase or enjoy in Tuscon."


7. (C) Teo urged that we not let these limitations prevent us
from moving the relationship forward. He affirmed that
Singapore was still serious about concluding the SFA and that
his staff would work hard to do it. Singapore was determined
to live up to the commitments it has made and would make.
Teo also alluded to an issue Singapore had hoped to resolve
or improve during the negotiations, but on which the U.S. had
failed to yield -- technology transfer. Teo expressed great
appreciation for the hard work of the Embassy and Ambassador
Lavin personally for ensuring that Singapore got the best
technology available. That said, Singapore had hoped that
the SFA's DCA would provide at least a nod to best-efforts on
technology transfer to Singapore, a hope to which the U.S.
seemed unable to accede, he remarked.


8. (C) The Ambassador expressed appreciation for Teo's
assurance that Singapore would fully live up to earlier
commitments, which we took to mean in part that the
automobile COE issue would be resolved at last.


9. (C) Comment: The purpose of the call was to ensure that
the Singapore government heard at the political level that
wide-spread dissatisfaction exists within the USG on progress
to date in the SFA talks, and that we viewed the main barrier
to progress as the GOS's short-sighted and decidedly
un-strategic, zero-sum approach to the negotiations. The
current mil-mil relationship with Singapore indeed is
excellent and important to us. Its staying precisely where
it is now would be no tragedy. Nevertheless, the
Singaporeans themselves have asked to try to expand the depth
and breadth of the "strategic" relationship. It is a pity
that they have allowed their instinctive need to better their
interlocutor in the negotiations to actually block progress
toward any of our objectives, even relatively simple ones
such as COEs for automobiles. We understand that we will
send to them shortly a line-in/line-out version of the MOU
amendments; Embassy hopes that we can keep our sights focused
on the three key issues as defined in the non-paper from OSD
(COEs, right to bear arms, legal protections) and use
progress on these items as a litmus test for Singapore's
willingness to bring these negotiations to a successful
conclusion. Embassy also recommends that we scrub our own
proposed DCA text again to see if some sort of language
recognizing Singapore's desire for improved technology
transfer can be accomodated.




LAVIN