GWOT ASSESSMENT: PERSPECTIVE FROM SINGAPORE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 001028

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL SN
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: PERSPECTIVE FROM SINGAPORE

REF: STATE 60794

Classified By: Amb. Franklin L. Lavin, Reasons 1.4(b)(d)


1. (S/NF) Singapore has been a reliable and highly capable
partner in the global war on terrorism, as it shares our
concerns about terrorism and possesses the political will and
capabilities to confront it. Over the last several years,
Singapore has publicly supported our CT efforts, even
providing military support for Coalition activities in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Singapore has signed up for a range of
CT programs here: the Container Security Initiative (CSI),
DOE's Megaports and the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) and has actively promoted enhanced maritime security in
the Malacca Strait.

More Good Work Can Be Done
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2. (S/NF) Despite Singapore's strong record to date, many
areas of cooperation remain fertile for further development.
Some suggestions:

A) Singapore is strengthening its non-proliferation trade
control regime; it wants to learn from us and work with us
more operationally. Intelligence exchanges of very sensitive
CT information have expanded tremendously in the last few
years and Singapore has proven judiciously protective of
those confidences. We need now to consider how to increase
sharing of intelligence on counter-proliferation to improve
Singapore's ability to prevent abuse of this huge entrepot
for shipments of WMD and related items.

B) Singapore has proven a very useful "test bed" for trying
out new DoD technology and techniques, on a small,
controllable scale. We should consider working with
Singapore to try out more CT tools, including systems of
interest to DHS (tracking systems for people, goods and
money, for instance).

C) As part of our Maritime Security Initiative, Singapore
could prove a useful partner in developing our UAV
capabilities in the region, and has expressed an interest in
providing basing support for our Global Hawk. We expect this
will have to wait for Global Hawks to be freed up from
Iraq/Afghanistan duty and for Australia to come on-line
first. But, it's something we should start thinking about
now.

D) Our current law enforcement cooperation is "good" but not
"excellent." A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) would
improve law enforcement cooperation with Singapore, a key
node for regional law enforcement work. We should
re-invigorate our efforts to negotiate an MLAT and consider
other methods to improve cooperation at the investigation
stage of criminal cases.

E) We are doing more with Regional Affairs than ever before,
but we can still do more.

Leveraging This Relationship
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3. (S/NF) Singapore is frequently a "first adopter" of our CT
initiatives in the region, with nearby countries tending to
follow suit. For example, Singapore has taken the regional
lead on maritime security issues and others followed -- after
Singapore and the United States "re-packaged" the initiative.
And, after the GOS started to deploy military assets on
cargo ships to ward off piracy attacks, Malaysia decided to
do so as well. We can leverage Singapore's willingness to
build regional political will to combat terrorism, especially
when direct USG involvement carries some political baggage.
Similarly, in some circumstances regional organizations, such
as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),can help promote our CT
objectives in a multilateral setting.

Some Structural Weaknesses Remain
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4. (S/NF) In ramping up our CT relationship with Singapore,
we need recognize a few factors that may limit the growth or
direction of the cooperation. First, a perception of overly
close U.S.-Singapore cooperation can engender resistance
among other regional countries. Second, Singapore's
government structure makes it hard for them to understand
open political systems. Thus, they often don't understand or
approve of what's happening in, say, Indonesia or Taiwan.
Third, as a small country in some ways reliant on our mutual
friendship, they view influencing perceptions within the U.S.
government as a key element of their national security. This
occasionally leads them to "over spinning."

Moving the Talking Point Beyond "Counterterrorism"
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5. (S/NF) Finally, we believe we can sometimes better achieve
our goals by packaging them as part of a broader problem:
drug smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, and
piracy, to name a few. To the extent we can embed our CT
initiatives in these other issues, we are likely to meet with
greater support in the region.
LAVIN