DOMINICAN INDUSTRIAL DISASTER WAITING TO HAPPEN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTO DOMINGO 005004

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CAR, WHA/EPSC, INR/IAA; USSOUTHCOM ALSO
FOR POLAD; TREASURY FOR OASIA-MAUREEN WAFER; DEPT PASS USDA
FOR FAS; USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/MAC/WH/CARIBBEAN BASIN
DIVISION; USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USFCS/RD/WH; DHS FOR
CIS-CARLOS ITURREGUI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: DR ECON ETRD TBIO
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN INDUSTRIAL DISASTER WAITING TO HAPPEN

REF: 05 SANTO DOMINGO 4805


1. (SBU) Summary. The intentional gas release by the
National Refinery (REFIDOMSA) on October 24 revealed how
poorly the Dominican petrochemical industry regulates itself.
It also revealed how ill prepared the city of Santo Domingo
and the Dominican government are in preparing for or
responding to industrial accidents, natural disasters or
terrorism. End Summary.


2. (U) On the afternoon of Sunday, October 24, the Refineria
Dominicana de Petroleo station number 5 began to release
mercaptan gas from a storage tank over the Caribbean Sea. The
intent was to empty the storage tank for cleaning. After a
large amount of gas had been released into the atmosphere,
the wind changed direction and the gas drifted back over the
city of Haina (west of Santo Domingo) and the southern
districts of Santo Domingo, causing widespread illness and
emergency room visits.


3. (U) LP Gas in its natural state is odorless and colorless.
Mercaptan is the chemical component added to the LP Gas to
produce the characteristic smell. Mercaptan is considered an
environmental irritant and is hazardous only in large
quantities, causing asphyxiation by displacing oxygen. In
lesser quantities it causes respiratory irritation.


4. (U) Unofficial reports from local medical contacts
estimate the number of victims seeking urgent medical care to
have been approximately 7,000. Five families from the
official American community visited local emergency rooms
with multiple family members complaining of nausea, vomiting,
and numbness in their arms and legs. Several American
children from the Embassy community became ill after being
dropped off at Carol Morgan School. Carol Morgan and several
other schools in the area later closed after the noxious
fumes related to the gas release had sickened many children.
Three local fatalities are being blamed on the gas release.
Physicians said the gas had exacerbated previously existing
medical conditions. As a result of the gas release, the
"Gringo" neighborhood in Haina was in a state of chaos. The
medical center closest to the refinery did not have
electricity to treat patients and several medical staff
became ill from fumes rising from patients, clothing. Clinic
director Catalina Bido stayed on duty although she was
nauseous and vomited twice and was suffering from fatigue and
headaches, symptoms consistent with gas intoxication.


5. (SBU) An inspector within REFIDOMSA station number 5, who
asked not to be named, commented that these events were far
from unexpected. The inspector says that the plant is rife
with safety violations. Toxic gases are routinely emitted
into the atmosphere or drained into the sea. Safety equipment
is routinely not used and inspection violations or complaints
are quickly swept under the rug.


6. (U) The local fire department headquarters related in an
internal memo that the mercaptan gas was released so that the
plant could clean their storage facility but that an
unexpected wind change toward the city caused temporary
contamination of the city.


7. (U) Immediately after the incident, Refidomsa President
Aristides Fernandez Zucco and Industry and Commerce Minister
Francisco Javier Castillo offered contradictory versions of
the origins of the leak. Fernandez Zucco changed his story
the next day and President Fernandez dismissed him that
evening (reftel). A committee from the National Emergency
Commission is investigating whether there was malpractice or
a lack of compliance with procedures for the management of
cases like this.


8. (U) A greater question remains. Why was there such a poor
local and federal response to the disaster?


9. (SBU) While the Dominican Republic has a "911" system,
citizens place very low confidence in the authorities'
ability to respond. When disasters occur, citizens express
their distress over the local radio waves and in the printed
press. One caller related, "I didn't know whether I should
open my doors and windows or close them. Was my neighborhood
in danger? Should I flee? No information from anyone!"


10. (SBU) Citizens' skepticism concerning the emergency
medical system may be valid. After the October 24 gas release
city and national officials offered no comment for a full 24
hours, and then they spoke to emphasize that their agencies
were not at fault. At no point did anyone provide the medical
community or local citizens with information on the gas
release or what they could do to keep themselves or their
community safe. Had the gas been a more toxic substance,
thousands would have been killed.


11. (SBU) Disaster preparedness reform is needed in the
Dominican Republic. Currently the city and federal emergency
response organization do not work well together. Each
organization zealously guards its own territory.


12. (U) Law 147 of 2002, created a national system for
prevention, mitigation and response to deal with natural and
man-made disasters. This law designated 22 government
institutions to form part of the National Emergency
Commission (CNE). Several non-governmental organizations also
belong, including telecoms and electricity distribution
companies and the Red Cross. A tripartite council including
the head of Civil Defense, a representative of the Army and
Santo Domingo Fire Chief heads the commission. The Head of
the Civil Defense is the Executive Director of CNE.


13. (SBU) Institutional issues hindered response to the
mercaptan gas release, although many consider the industrial
establishments in Haina to be the equivalent of a ticking
time bomb. Recent changes in city districting have left
Haina outside the jurisdiction of the Santo Domingo Fire
Department. And the Fernandez administration has shifted the
policy, planning and preventive aspects of the Disaster Law
back to the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency. This
leaves CNE and COE outside of the planning loop, providing
immediate emergency response only.


14. (SBU) Traditionally, local police and fire departments
are the frontline guardians of public health and safety.
These institutions suffer from poor coordination, lack of
funding for training, and the lack of authority to inspect,
enforce, or investigate issues of public safety. On the day
of the gas release, the office of military intelligence sent
investigators to REFIDOMSA to bring the refinery technical
manager back to military offices for questioning. The police
and fire are not fully integrated in the greater
command-and-control system, and their expertise goes largely
ignored.


15. (SBU) The government needs to re-assess their ability to
prepare and respond to disasters. The national 911 system
needs to be effectively managed so as to gain the confidence
of the public. While radio and TV reporters reported what
they could learn during the event to report what they knew,
the government had no plan to integrate the press into their
disaster response system.

16. (U) The U.S. Office of Overseas Preparedness (OFDA) has
provided significant training to Dominican authorities
through USAID for disaster preparedness in the past.
Unfortunately, when the admininistration changed in August
2004, the trained technicians were replaced with political
appointees with little knowledge of the work.


17. (U) Finally, the GODR needs to re-examine their disaster
plan, practice it, and correct problems before worse
disasters occur.


18. (U) Drafted by Medical Officer Ty Flewelling.
HERTELL