Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANTODOMINGO3864
2005-08-02 19:37:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Santo Domingo
Cable title:  

DOMINICAN BANKING #9 -- MEJIA SAYS "BANKING FRAUD"

Tags:  DR EFIN KJUS PGOV PREL 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 SANTO DOMINGO 003864 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR WHA/CAR (SEARBY),DEPT PASS TO SEC, FEDERAL
RESERVE; TREASURY FOR WAFER, DOJ FOR OIA (MAZUREK AND
ORJALES)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: DR EFIN KJUS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN BANKING #9 -- MEJIA SAYS "BANKING FRAUD"
RIGHT OUT LOUD

REF: 05 SANTO DOMINGO 3723

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 SANTO DOMINGO 003864

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR WHA/CAR (SEARBY),DEPT PASS TO SEC, FEDERAL
RESERVE; TREASURY FOR WAFER, DOJ FOR OIA (MAZUREK AND
ORJALES)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: DR EFIN KJUS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN BANKING #9 -- MEJIA SAYS "BANKING FRAUD"
RIGHT OUT LOUD

REF: 05 SANTO DOMINGO 3723


1. (SBU) This is number 9 in a series of cables on
consequences of the Dominican bank failures of 2003.

Dominican Banking Series #9 -- Mejia Says It Right Out Loud:
"Banking Fraud"

More than a year of virtual silence on Dominican banking
frauds has ended with Hipolito Mejia's erudite, detailed and
dignified public rebuke to Leonel Fernndez. Mejia's 15 page
letter, sent on July 29 and published as a paid advertisement
on July 31, cites extensively texts of reports and remarks by
the IMF, reputable bank analysts, the Inter-American
Development Bank, the UN Development Program, U.S. Treasury
Under Secretary John Snow, ambassadors accredited to Santo
Domingo, and Dominican civic organizations, then explains and
defends his economic management, and concludes with a
statesmanlike offer to cooperate in the national interest and
to assure that his party, the PRD, does so as well.

The case against Baninter owner and executive Ramon Baez
Figueroa has been kept out of the public eye almost since
Figueroa was set free on a bail pledge on Christmas Eve,

2003. Investigating magistrate Eduardo Sanchez Ortiz took
more than nine months to assemble the elements for the formal
charge, operating as the sole investigator and shaper of the
case under the former Napoleonic Criminal Procedures Code;
Baez's attorney Vincio "Vincho" Castillo stalled procedures
for nearly a year by petitioning for removal of the president
of the three-judge panel charged with assessing the
recommendations of Sanchez Ortiz. That motion was denied on
March 28 of this year, allowing the judicial process to
continue.

Any news item ages, but the long absence of the Baninter case
from public discourse and from the media has been of
particular concern. The Fernandez administration
consistently avoided comment both in public and with the
Ambassador and staff in private, commenting simply that the
matter was with the courts. There has been little movement
in the Bancredito case of Arturo Pellerano, suspended in
November 2003 apparently out of deference to the Pellerano

family; in the Banco Mercantil case one individual, Andres
Aybar, was arrested and charged on June 14, 2005.

The impression left by this relative silence was that Bez
and his associates were being left to bribe, influence and
intimidate their way out of the charges, and that these
important cases would face the oblivion characteristic of all
corruption cases in Dominican justice over the last twenty
years. The only counter indication to this has been the
Central Bank's dogged pursuit of Luis Alvarez Renta in the
civil courts in Miami, despite the recommendation by Snchez
Ortiz that Alvarez Renta not face criminal charges in the
Dominican Republic.

In this setting, in his extempore public remarks in May and
June Fernandez had on several occasions blamed the financial
and economic crisis of 2003-2004 on Mejia "mismanagement" of
the economy, while conspicuously omitting any mention of bank
frauds. This appeared to be one more indication that the
cases were slipping away.

Hipolito Mejia had remained low profile for the May-June PRD
party consultations, which resulted in the election of his
ally Ramon Albuquerque to head the party. This was unlike
the brash, rough, comic speaker during the 2004 presidential
campaign, capable of goading candidate Fernndez for wearing
"panties" and spending all his time on the Internet. But the
letter Mejia sent to Fernandez last Friday, in addition to
assuming the newly dignified stance of a statesman, did the
country the service of documenting the belief of the
community of experts and international institutions that
fraud at Baninter and other banks was the greatest proximate
cause of the nation's misery in 2003-2004, and that the fraud
had been undetected or not pursued until the pyramid
accounting schemes collapsed in late 2002.

Mejia's document is specific, extensive, sober, and well
reasoned. His dignity and espousal of the national interest
raise his profile sharply and stand in strong contrast to the
glib, relatively slippery "big picture" analysis that
Fernandez spins out on public occasions and in private. The
inept drafting of the constitutional amendment of 2002 leaves
Mejia ineligible to present himself as a presidential
candidate once again; if that were not the case, his July 29
letter would have established a platform for a new
presidential bid. He belied the tone somewhat during a
television interview on August 1 in which he groused in his
more characteristic style about the ineptitude of the
Fernandez administration.

Fernandez was in Panama for a regional summit when the letter
arrived. Presidential legal advisor Cesar Pina Toribio and
the presidential press spokesman replied to journalists that
the administration is not in any way interfering with the
courts - partial and insufficient replies to Mejia's theses.
In El Caribe of July 31 senior columnist Miguel Guerrero
regretted that the administration had not waited to reply to
Mejia until President Fernndez could evaluate the former
president's reasoning and his offer to assure that his party
in Congress supports measures in the national interest.

In the meantime, as the papers are playing up the Justice
Ministry's semi-annual report on homicides and decrying gang
violence, last week's sicario-style hit against Ramon Baez's
former assistant was a disquieting indication that white
collar crime might not be as bloodless as it appears. Angel
Miguel Antonio Bello Perez was driving along the 27 of
February elevated roadway in the center of town at night when
several individuals pursued him and riddled him and his
pickup truck with bullets as he tried to elude them
andmaneuver out of the road,s narrow chute. The police have
told the public that Bello had just exchanged a large sum of
cash at an exchange house and was the victim of a robbery
attempt. Their theory does not account for the violence of
the attempt or the fact that it was carried out in such a
precarious and public place.


2. (U) Drafted by Michael Meigs.


3. (U) Appendix: Informal translation of the concluding
pages of Mejia's letter of July 27 to Leonel Fernandez.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- -

Mr. President: From the analysis by international experts,
multilateral financing organizations, international entities
which provide follow-up to the development of the nations of
the world and the region, by the United States Department of
the Treasury, representatives of foreign governments in our
country, officials of its own government, and the Association
of Banks of the Dominican Republic, one can conclude that:

a) The banking crisis was the result of a fraud to benefit
the owners or companies and persons linked to the banks that
caused the crisis.

b) The fraud occurred over an extended period of time which
included not only the first two years of my administration,
but also the four previous years presided over by you.

In this regard, you can ask the Governor of the Central Bank
to send you the documentation where it reveals that in the
case of Baninter, the fraud began to take shape in 1989.

c) The banking supervision before the crisis exploded was
very deficient. This includes the supervision of the last
fifteen years, which includes the four years of the
government which you presided over from 1996 to 2000. It was
during my government that the bank fraud was discovered and,
once proven/confirmed, we acted in consequence, submitting to
the justice system those responsible for same.

d) Those responsible for the fraud managed to outwit not
only the supervisory authorities but also the monetary
authority of the country. Well-known international firms
such as PriceWaterhouseCoopers were also fooled, despite the
fact that they have more qualified technical resources than
those which the Superintendency of Banks of the Dominican
Republic has generally had. The present Governor of the
Central Bank could send you a copy of the letter sent by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers to the President of Baninter, in which
it reveals that that firm of external auditors was also
fooled by the executives of that bank.

e) Almost all of the experts and entities mentioned
acknowledged that the decision to rescue the depositors of
the banks which had been fraudulently bankrupted was taken
given the perception that if that had not been done, the rest
of the banking system could have been affected, giving rise
to a systemic crisis that would cause the payment system to
collapse. The present authorities of the Central Bank could
confirm to you whether it is true or not that 19 savings and
loan associations and 3 multi-banks had substantial deposits
in Baninter and several pension funds, retirement plans, as
well as deposits of foundations, non-governmental
organizations, and churches. (sic)

f) The economic and financial crisis of 2003, which was
manifested in the form of a heavy devaluation, accelerated
inflation, an increase in the deficit of the public sector
due to the arising of a considerable quasi-fiscal deficit of
the Central Bank, a loss of reserves, an increase in the
public debt, and economic stagnation, was unleashed by the
banking crisis, and not the reverse, as you and some of your
functionaries have indicated. None of the experts and
entities mentioned has stated that in 2001 and 2002 the
country was immersed in an economic crisis.

g) The bank frauds were what caused an intense wave of
uncertainty and distrust, which led to a greater
dollarization and flight of capital. The mistrust and
uncertainty, therefore, were not produced by the economic
policy of 2002-2003 but rather by the uncovering of the
enormous bank fraud, which (sic)

h) both the IMF and the Dominican government considered that
it should be made known to the entire country, to establish
clearly that those responsible for the bank frauds would have
to pay for the consequences of their actions under the terms
established by the Dominican justice system.

i) Abiding by the formulas for liquidation and dissolution
provided by the Monetary and Finance Law, in the opinion of
experts, was not feasible in the case of the collapse of the
largest bank in the country, if one wanted to avoid a domino
effect which would infect the rest of the system%s banks.
For that reason the IMG required the approval of a
complimentary Law (the law of Exceptional Program of
Prevention of Risk for Financial Intermediation Entities) to
the Monetary and Finance Law, because the latter did not
contemplate the occurrence of situations such as the one
presented in the Dominican Republic in 2003.

j) The decision in 1996 to sell the Banco del Comercio
Dominicano to Baninter, when the latter had already been
violating banking norms for seven years with the so-called
parallel bank that was hiding in accounts under the title of
&interbank,8 unfortunately, constituted an incorrect
decision. If memory does not fail me, I believe that it was
in mid-1997, when you were the President of the Republic,
that Baninter acquired the Banco del Comercio Dominicano, a
bank with serious problems of liquidity and solvency, which
before being handed over to Baninter, was cured by the
Central Bank.

The hypothesis which you and some of your functionaries,
specifically the President of the Board of Economic Advisers
and the Secretary of State for Finance, hold that it was the
economic policy carried out in the first two years of my
government which caused the banking crisis that the country
faced in 2003 has disturbed not only Dominican society but
also governmental, multilateral, financial, and international
economic circles.

The astonishment has been enormous, as all the evidence and
analysis of international experts, of multilateral financing
entities leave no doubt that the cause of the banking crisis
was a fraud that had been taking place since 1989 and which
began to have repercussions in August of 2002, exploded in
April of 2003, and was made known to all of the country in
May of 2003.

Baninter began to face liquidity problems in August-September
of 2002. In case you do not remember, the Dominican economy
was growing at a relatively high rate during the first half
of the year 2002, amounting to 7.3%. The deficit of the
consolidated public sector was 2.2% of the GNP, less than the
4.3% that you handed over to me in August of 2000. The
deficit of the current account of the balance of payments was
4.3% of the GNP during the first 9 months of 2002, less than
the 6.7% that you handed over to me in August of 2002.

In August of 2000 you handed over to me an economy with an
exchange rate of RD$16.50 per dollar. In August of 2002,
that is to say, two years later, the exchange rate was
RD$18.46 per dollar, for an accumulated depreciation in two
years of 11.9%, which ws quite in line with the inflation of
14.% that was verified from August of 2000 to August of
2002, revealing that the real exchange rate did not suffer
sudden movements/shifts that could harm any particular sector
of the economy. I do not know why some of your officials
state that when Baninter began to request liquidity
assistance from the Central Bank in August of 2002, the
exchange rate rose to 20, 23, or 26 to one, when in reality
it was 18.46 to the dollar, which they use to uphold the
absurd thesis that it was the &exchange crisis8 that
detonated the bank crisis.

Don%t forget, Mr. President, that you handed to me a Central
Bank with barely US$197 millions in Net International
Reserves, which as you will not have forgotten was due to
your decision not to adjust the prices of fuels in October of
1999, and the decision made by the authorities of the Central
Bank to gradually consume the reserves existing at that
moment up to August of 2000. The reserves fell by US$350
millions from December of 1999 to August of 2000. In August
of 2002, when Baninter began to request liquidity assistance,
the Net International Reserves of the Central Bank were
US$546 millions, almost three times what you handed over to
me.

As you see, Mr. President, the economic indicators that the
Dominican economy presented during the first 8 months of 2002
were better than those you handed to me in August of 2000.
The careful review of them will not allow any qualified
analysts to deduce that these indicators, deriving from the
anti-cyclical economic policy that we adopted in order to
face the negative external shocks that we faced in 2001 and
2002, were the causes of the bank fraud that was discovered
in 2003.

The crisis of Baninter, Bancrdito, and Banco Mercantil was
not caused by the economic policy, but rather by practices
that international experts categorize as frauds and
administrative handlings totally foreign to established norms.

Allow me, with all due respect, Mr. President, to ask you the
following question: If as you say, it was the supposed
bad/wrong economic policy of my government that precipitated
the crisis of Baninter, Bancrdito, and Banco Mercantil, why
then didn%t the rest of the country%s banks also fail?

The answer to this question, for all international experts
and multilateral financing agencies, is obvious. For all of
them, the origin of the crisis was a fraud, nothing more.
For that reason all have been disturbed and surprised by the
strange hypothesis which you and some of your officials have
presented.

I cannot let pass the opportunity to explain to you why in my
government the decision was taken to save/safeguard the
depositors, beyond the reasons advanced above by
international experts and multilateral financing agencies,
who make their statements on the basis of experience in the
world when the collapse is located in a &bank which is
very/too large to collapse8 and the authorities fear the
real possibility of contagion by the rest of the system,
which would, in the absence of the rescue of the depositors,
would cause the collapse of the system of payments and the
arising of a large and prolonged recession in our country.

For years the different governments that we have had,
including yours and mine, have struggled to encourage
Dominicans to save and invest in this country. For years, on
many occasions, the authorities of the Superintendency of
Banks repeated to the holders of savings accounts and to
depositors in the banking system, that the Dominican system
was healthy and solid, that there was nothing to fear,
statements which were made on the basis of the financial
statements that the banks delivered to the supervisory
authorities. In April of 2003, when the fraud was revealed,
we had two options: to rescue or not to rescue the
depositors who had believed in what the different
governments, for years, had been telling them: that saving
and depositing in our banks was safe. Your own Foundation,
Mr. President, the Fundacin Global Democracia y Desarrollo,
was among those Baninter depositors, with two current
accounts, 1 savings account, and 64 financial certificates
totaling RD$119,132,136.98.

I did not hesitate for a single instant to recognize that the
decision made by the monetary and financial authorities of my
government was the correct one. I acknowledge that the way
in which the depositors and owners of savings accounts were
rescued, with titles and short term certificates, is a matter
which is subject to debate and argument. But when one is
faced with a risk of contagion as high as the one perceived
by the monetary authorities and the IMF itself, there is not
much room or time to theorize, while hundreds of thousands of
depositors and savers throughout the entire system are
waiting for signals to determine whether they should move
their savings abroad or not.

The decision that was adopted constituted an exercise in
justice and responsibility of State, even though aware of the
negative political effects that this would cause my
government and my political future, which at that moment
enjoyed an ample advantage in popularity surveys. I was
simply assuming the blame for all of the governments of the
decade of the 1990%s, mainly yours corresponding to
1996-2000, because they were incapable of setting the bases
necessary to safeguard the sacred savings of the people.

I am not aware of a single banking crisis in the world that
has not had serious fiscal repercussions. Ours cost 21% of
the GNP. Argentina%s (1980) and Indonesia (1997) cost 55%
of the GNP, China (1999) 47%, Jamaica (1995) 44%, Chile
(1981) 42%, Thailand (1997) 35%, Macedonia (1993) 32%,
Uruguay (1981) and Turkey (2000) 31%, Israel (1983) 30%,
South Korea (1997) 28%, Japan (1992) 24%, Venezuela (1994)
22%, Ecuador (1998) 20%, and Mexico (1994) 19%. Why do they
generate these fiscal costs? Because in the end, the risk
of not rescuing the banks and/or the depositors is too high.
In our case, the banks could not be rescued because the
origin of the collapse was fraud. For that reason, the ones
who were directly rescued were the depositors and savers.

President, you left me no other alternative than coming out
in defense of my administration, pointing out to you
relevant and inarguable aspects of the reports from all of
the international experts contracted by the IMF and other
multilateral organizations, who because of their nature and
professionalism, maintain a totally independent attitude,
without any political ties and without binding themselves to
public positions, in contrast to some functionaries who in
order to stand out and impress their Presidents, lead us to
make statements lacking in foundation, instead of objectively
and professionally informing us.

Mr. President, the banking crisis caused by the fraudulent
activities of some private banks is an extremely serious
subject and, therefore, it requires that all of us treat it
with the degree of seriousness and depth that it deserves.
This includes you as President of the Republic and myself as
former President. The price that all of us Dominicans have
had to pay for the fraud committed by private bankers has
been enormous. Let us allow justice to do its work and let
us avoid, with our statements, any disturbance of the
transcendent work performed by one Power, which like the
Judicial Power, must operate outside of political pressures.

Lastly, I invite you to reflect profoundly on this subject.
If for reasons of which we are not aware it is uncomfortable
for you to recognize in the fraud of the private bankers the
only and true reason behind the banking crisis of 2003,
evaluate whether silence constitutes a less irritating option
for the country, than the presentation of hypotheses bsed on
the criteria that everything bad is due to the previous
government.

I exhort you to look ahead/forward, lending urgent attention
to the serious problems which could be incubating in the
national economy, due to an excessive and
extemporaneous/untimely rigidity of the norms of the banking
system, specifically in relation to the Regulation for the
Evaluation of Assets, which is the fruit of impositions by
the IMF, despite the enormous progress in matters of
solvency, capitalization, and improvement of the mechanisms
of governability which the national banking sector has
experienced in the last two years.

I take advantage of this occasion to repeat to you that your
government may always count on my support for the approval of
all those reforms and measures which our country may require
to face the challenges and opportunities that CAFTA-DR
presents us, as well as the coherent initiatives which permit
the solution of the problem of the Central Bank,s debt,
because so long as we do not face the root problem of the
significant quasi-fiscal deficit, it will not be possible to
guarantee the permanent of price stability. It seems to me
that the role that the Legislative Power has played, in which
the Dominican Revolutionary Party has a majority
participation, approving all of the reforms which your
government has submitted for its hearing, is a clear
demonstration that for our party and for the undersigned, the
country comes first before our party or private interests.
For those purposes you can count on our support,

Yours very truly,

Hiplito Meja



4. (U) This report and others in the series are available on
the classified SIPRNET at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/santodomingo/ along with
extensive other material.
HERTELL