PRESIDENT LAGOS ASKS U.S AND CHILE TO EXPEDITE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 002573

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2015
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL PGOV CI
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT LAGOS ASKS U.S AND CHILE TO EXPEDITE
SOLUTION TO AVOID AID CUTOFF UPON ICC RATIFICATION

REF: A) SANTIAGO 02544

B) SANTIAGO 02469

Classified By: Ambassador Craig Kelly. Reasons: 1.4 (b and d).


1. (U) This is an action request. See para 12.


2. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Walker conveyed to the
Ambassador on December 23 President Lagos' desire for the
U.S. and Chile to find a satisfactory solution that would
avoid a cut-off of aid under ASPA when Chile ratifies the
ICC. Walker said Lagos wants a resolution before the end of
his administration in March. He said it would be a disaster
for the bilateral relationship if Chile were to ratify the
ICC and the U.S. were to respond by cutting off military
assistance. He argued that a strong relationship was more
important now than ever, given recent troubling developments
in the region (i.e. Morales' election in Bolivia,
Chavez-Morales axis). Walker proposed that USG and GOC
officials find an acceptable formula before the January 25-26
Defense Consultative Committee (DCC) meeting in Santiago. He
suggested that U.S. and Chilean officials meet during the
first week of January to begin detailed discussions. End
summary.


3. (C) Foreign Minister Walker called in the Ambassador on
December 23 to convey President Lagos' desire to find a
satisfactory solution before the end of his administration in
March to avoid a cut-off of aid under ASPA when Chile
ratifies the International Criminal Court (ICC). Foreign
Ministry Director General for External Relations Carlos
Portales (the MFA's number 3) accompanied Walker. Poloff
accompanied the Ambassador.

POTUS-Lagos Meeting in Mar del Plata
--------------


4. (C) Walker opened the discussion by recounting President
Lagos' satisfaction with his meeting with POTUS in Mar del
Plata in November during the Summit of the Americas. Walker
commented that the two Presidents had developed an excellent
relationship during the past six years. Walker, who attended
the Mar del Plata meeting, said the Presidents' relaxed and
comfortable exchange of views was evidence of their closeness
and the importance they attach to a strong bilateral
relationship. Walker said that during the meeting, President
Lagos told the President Chile would eventually ratify the
ICC and that he understood the USG's obligations under U.S.
law (e.g. ASPA). Walker added that the two Presidents agreed
on the importance of finding a satisfactory way to resolve
the consequences of ratification to keep relations on track.
Following the meeting in Mar del Plata, President Lagos
instructed the Foreign and Defense Ministries to carry out
President Lagos' commitment, Walker added.

Solution to ICC Ratification: Sense of Urgency
-------------- -


5. (C) Turning to the present, Walker said that he, Minister
of Defense Ravinet, and President Lagos had had a lengthy
discussion the day before (December 22) on the issue. The
three acknowledged that Chile ultimately would ratify the
ICC, but agreed that ratification would be put off until the
next administration (post-March 11). Walker said the three
also acknowledged that the Lagos Administration was under
considerable domestic pressure from members of Congress to
make progress towards ICC ratification during the remainder
of its tenure. Therefore, Walker noted, it is likely the
Senate will approve constitutional amendments necessary for
congressional ratification of the ICC during the next
administration. Walker said that President Lagos stressed
repeatedly during the December 22 meeting his interest in
finding a solution, and had instructed him (Walker) to find a
solution soon.


6. (C) Walker said preserving the strong U.S.-Chile
relationship is more important now than ever, given the
recent troubling developments in the region. Specifically,
Walker cited Evo Morales' recent election in Bolivia, the
Chavez-Morales axis, and increasing ties between Venezuela
and Argentina as reasons why "like-minded countries" like the
U.S. and Chile need to remain close. In reference to the
Chile-Mexico strategic partnership that will be signed during
President Fox's visit to Santiago in January (ref B),Walker
said Chile's concerns about growing instability in the region
was a driving force behind the Lagos-Fox agreement in New
York in September to conclude a Chile-Mexico strategic
partnership agreement. Given the current troubling situation
in the region, Walker argued the U.S. and Chile needed to

ensure there were no divisions between the two that could be
exploited by others. Switching to English, Walker said "it
is urgent that we (the U.S. and Chile) reach a similar
agreement."


7. (C) To fulfill President Lagos' desire and to follow
through on the spirit of the two Presidents' commitments in
Mar del Plata, Walker proposed the U.S. and Chile conclude a
mutually satisfactory agreement before the U.S.-Chile Defense
Consultative Committee (DCC) meting in Santiago on January
25-26. Acknowledging the challenges posed by the holiday
season and the New Year, Walker suggested that U.S. and
Chilean officials meet during the first week of January to
begin discussing details. Walker said the Foreign Ministry
would be in charge of the discussions, but that the MFA would
work in close consultation with the Ministry of Defense.
Turning to Director General Portales, Walker said "he will be
in charge of this for us."

Ambassador Sends Cautionary Note
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador responded that a strong U.S.-Chile
relationship was also very important for Washington, and
acknowledged the close working relationship between the two
Presidents. The Ambassador indicated said the USG also
wanted to avoid a cut-off of assistance and that Washington,
like Santiago, was exploring options. However, the
Ambassador cautioned Walker against believing that an
exception to ASPA for Chile would be easy if Chile were to
ratify the ICC and not conclude an Article 98-type agreement.
The Ambassador made clear that if Chile were to ratify the
ICC and not enter into an Article 98 agreement with the U.S.,
the USG must uphold the law (i.e. ASPA). Walker said that
President Lagos understood that ratification would trigger
ASPA sanctions. While noting that ASPA legislation allowed
for certain types of waivers, the Ambassador counseled Walker
against believing that a waiver would be easily doable in the
absence of an Article 98 agreement. The Ambassador
reiterated that an Article 98 agreement remained the most
effective way to avoid a cut-off of military assistance.


9. (C) The Ambassador asked Walker if Chile could
simultaneously ratify the ICC and conclude an Article 98-type
agreement. Like MOD U/S of War Gaspar (ref. A),Walker and
Portales said "no." The Ambassador then asked Walker if the
GOC could conclude an Article 98 "executive" agreement that
did not require congressional approval. Both Walker and
Portales said "no," since ratifying the ICC involved changing
Chilean law and changes to Chilean law directly involved
Congress. Portales added that given the degree of
congressional interest in the ICC, concluding any sort of
executive agreement related to the ICC would not be
politically possible.


10. (C) The Ambassador sought clarification on what the GOC
had in mind in terms of an agreement to avoid, noting that
MOD U/S of War Gaspar had talked about an agreement that
could include both SOFA and Article 98-related components.
Walker noted the details had not been ironed out, and
stressed it was important for the two sides to begin
discussions soon. Portales interjected to stress that it was
important to distinguish between SOFA-like and Article
98-type agreements. Noting he had spoken with Gaspar
following the latter's meeting with the Ambassador, Portales
said he (Gaspar) was referring to "a SOFA-like agreement, not
an Article 98-type agreement." The Ambassador said Gaspar
also had indicated the MOD was considering a general
immunities agreement with a number of countries, including
the U.S.. Walker said he believed a series of bilateral
agreements was better, and encouraged the U.S. and Chile to
pursue a bilateral agreement.


11. (C) Walker closed by encouraging the USG and the GOC to
fulfill the two Presidents' desires as conveyed at Mar del
Plata, and conclude soon an agreement that would avoid a
strain in the bilateral relationship at this very important
time. The Ambassador assured Walker he would convey the FM's
request to Washington and seek guidance.


12. (C) Action Request: FM Walker is the third senior GOC
official this week to convey the GOC's desire to find a way
to avoid a cut-off in aid under ASPA once Chile ratifies the
ICC. Post believes it is in our interest to begin more
detailed discussions with the GOC and to take a stab at a
mutually satisfactory agreement before the end of the Lagos
Administration. It is possible that President Lagos, who
enjoys high popularity, may be willing to use some capital on
this before he leaves office. It is worth a try. We

therefore recommend that we initiate discussions with the
Chileans here in Santiago at the Ambassador-Portales level
and request guidance.
KELLY