Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANTIAGO1885
2005-09-13 13:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Santiago
Cable title:  

IN COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY VISIT, A/S OF VERIFICATION

Tags:  PARM PINR PINS PREL KNNP CI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SANTIAGO 001885 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR VC (YEHL, WILLIAMS); DEPT FOR WHA/BSC (SHERIDAN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PARM PINR PINS PREL KNNP CI
SUBJECT: IN COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY VISIT, A/S OF VERIFICATION
AND COMPLIANCE DESUTTER EMPHASIZES PARTNERSHIP, PRAISES
CHILEAN COMMITMENT


Classified By: A/DCM SEAN MURPHY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SANTIAGO 001885

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR VC (YEHL, WILLIAMS); DEPT FOR WHA/BSC (SHERIDAN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PARM PINR PINS PREL KNNP CI
SUBJECT: IN COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY VISIT, A/S OF VERIFICATION
AND COMPLIANCE DESUTTER EMPHASIZES PARTNERSHIP, PRAISES
CHILEAN COMMITMENT


Classified By: A/DCM SEAN MURPHY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (SBU) Summary: As part of the ongoing Compliance
Diplomacy initiative, A/S of Verification and Compliance (VC)
Paula A. DeSutter emphasized the importance of Chile as a
strategic partner with the capacity to influence key
organizations and countries on current topics in arms control
and nonproliferation during her August 18-19 meetings with
Chilean officials. The GOC appreciated A/S DeSutter,s visit
to Chile and warmly received her calls for collaboration and
cooperation, and perceived her visit as clearly demonstrating
the importance of Chilean participation in responding to
noncompliance and on countering proliferation. End summary.


2. (SBU) During August 18-19 meetings with Chilean
representatives, A/S of Verification and Compliance Paula
DeSutter emphasized the importance of Chile as a strategic
Partner on matters of international security. She emphasized
that Chile is a country that has both credibility and
international influence on controversial topics in arms
control and nonproliferation. All participants agreed that
flexible and active partnerships are key in combating the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A/S
DeSutter's Compliance Diplomacy discussions were well
received, and her visit clearly demonstrated to the Chileans
the importance of their participation on this issue. During
her visit A/S DeSutter was accompanied by DCM Emi Yamauchi,
EPOL Officer Stephanie Acosta-Mikulasek, Thomas Yehl and
Shara Williams of VC, and additional Embassy staff.

--------------
Meetings with Ambassador Luis Winter
--------------


3. (SBU) On August 18, A/S DeSutter held discussions in two
meetings with Ambassador Luis Winter, Director of Special
Policy, at the Ministry of Foreign Relations. A/S DeSutter
was accompanied by Thomas Yehl, Director of the Office of
Technology and Assessments, and Shara Williams, Diplomacy

Fellow at the Office of Technology and Assessments.
Ambassador Winter was accompanied by Francisco Bernales,
Director of International Security and Dismarmament, Maria
Luisa Rodriguez, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Pedro
Suckel, Assistant Director of International Security and
Disarmament. The second meeting with Amb. Winter included a
larger set of officials from the Ministry of Foreign
Relations, the Chilean Commission of Nuclear Energy, the
National Customs Service, the National Authority for the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),
the National Intelligence Agency, and the National Customs
Service.

--------------
Compliance Diplomacy
--------------


4. (SBU) In both meetings, after a brief explanation of her
Bureau,s organization, A/S DeSutter explained her Bureau,s
three main missions: assessing the compliance of other
nations with arms control treaties, agreements, and
commitments; assuring verification of agreements under
negotiation; and acting as the principal policy liaison to
the U.S. intelligence community on matters of verification
and compliance.
--------------
The Libyan Model
--------------


5. (SBU) A/S DeSutter also noted that the Bureau of
Verification and Compliance has been responsible for
coordinating U.S. assistance to Libya with the destruction of
their WMD programs and Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR)-class missiles. Citing her experiences with Libya as
a model, A/S DeSutter emphasized the necessity for both the
assessor having "good" intelligence information and the
assessed having a desire to comply as critical components of
effective and successful elimination of WMD.


6. (SBU) A/S DeSutter continued by discussing the necessity
to adapt old tools of assessing compliance and responding to
noncompliance, and then complement them with new ones to
further policy. She saw two main factors as central to
streamlining the process of working in arms control and
noncompliance issues: agility and flexibility in choosing
different types of multilateral, bilateral, and cooperative
mechanisms. This combination, she explained, would balance
the reliance on large international organizations with a more
tailored and flexible approach. During her discussions, the
A/S emphasized the dangers of the unintentional consequences
of inaction.

7. (SBU) A/S DeSutter's comments were well received by
Ambassador Winter and his colleagues. Recognizing Chile,s
limitations in terms of population size (15 million) and
distance, Amb. Winter acknowledged their dependence on
international security and peace given their open economy.
Amb. Winter believes the general public understands the
importance of Chile,s recent role on the U.N. Security
Council, the Committee on Disarmament, the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),and within the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In reference
to the problem of intentional noncompliance, as in the case
of Iran, Amb. Winter conveyed uncertainty in how to respond
and whether verification was effective. A/S DeSutter noted
the importance of long-term thinking about enforcement which
may require short-term costs from enforcers. She also noted
the difference between North Korea and Iran, and the
latter,s emphasis on cultivating a positive international
image. She concluded by underlining the value of Chile as an
important partner to the U.S.


8. (SBU) Ambassador Winter requested to remain informed of
U.S. advancements in compliance and verification of WMD. He
agreed that the international community must continue to act,
and that Chile was prepared to participate.

--------------
MTCR
--------------


9. (SBU) Ambassador Winter said Chile is now prepared to
join the MTCR, but that Chile needs to be invited again and
to be assisted with joining and doing customs regulations and
legislation.

--------------
PSI
--------------


10. (SBU) He added that GOC officials would be meeting this
week (August 22-26) regarding the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI).

--------------
Control of Chemical Weapons
--------------


11. (SBU) Amb. Winter said that Chile, while it is not now a
member of the Executive Council of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),expects to
participate next September. He added that Chile is prepared
now to join the Australia Group.

-------------- --------------
Chile's Membership in the Non-Aligned Movement
-------------- --------------


12. (SBU) Regarding Chile,s membership in the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM),Amb. Winter stated that Chile only shares
some of NAM,s positions. He commented that it is both
difficult to moderate the NAM and difficult to leave the NAM.
He stated that Chilean Deputy Perm Rep to the UN Labb was
furious at the behavior of Egypt and the NAM during the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in May

2005. However, he believes Chile can play a more helpful and
moderating role on these issues from within NAM rather than
from outside.

--------------
The Inter-Agency Working Group
--------------


13. (SBU) In the second meeting following the one-on-one
meeting with Ambassador Winter, A/S DeSutter met with a
larger group of Chilean officials, hosted by Amb. Winter,
from the various Chilean agencies that deal with
nonproliferation and disarmament issues, as listed above.
After briefing the group on the VC Bureau's function, A/S
DeSutter expanded on the process of implementing the various
arms control treaties, stating that it should be a
cooperative process and that many put too much faith on
on-site inspections. The process must build on existing
approaches, she said, but at the same time relying on
available national means and methods. She suggested that,
for countries with limited means, the widely available and
informative open sources like the Internet should be
considered.

--------------
The Non-Compliance Report
--------------


14. (SBU) During the meeting, A/S DeSutter described the
Bureau,s Congressionally-mandated role in preparing the
Noncompliance Report. She noted that the Bureau requires
access to quality and highly-classified intelligence, and
that it exhaustively and systematically reviews,
nation-by-nation, compliance with an array of arms control
treaties including the BWC, CWC, START, MTCR, NPT, the
Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
She also described the extensive review process for the
report before its release, assuring her audience that the
process was rigorous.

--------------
Cooperation with Chile
--------------


15. (SBU) A/S DeSutter emphasized Chile's role as an
important partner with international credibility and a
regionally persuasive voice. A/S DeSutter explained, in
addition, that just because a country does not have the
weapons, it does not mean it could not be a transit country.
She concluded that a good exchange of opinions to create a
timely detection of threats is the way to control these world
threats.

-------------- --------------
Verification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
-------------- --------------


16. (SBU) GOC officials asked about U.S. policy on the BWC
and its proposed verification protocol. The A/S explained
that the task of verifying biological weapons was much more
difficult because of dual-use equipment and anywhere
production. In the case of noncompliance and an inspection,
she asked, rhetorically, &What would you discover? How
would you determine if the work is offensive?8 She said the
existence of the Protocol would have led to international
complacency resulting from the fact the international
community believed something had been done to verify the
treaty. But she said that sense of security would be false,
and because the U.S. believes the biological weapons threat
is credible and worrisome, the U.S. cannot support the
Protocol that would lead to a false sense of security. She
said to attempt to verify compliance with controls on these
types of WMD requires flexible multilateral collaboration
even more than with other technologies.


17. (SBU) The meeting concluded with Ambassador Winter
emphasizing that Chile is committed to ending proliferation
and eliminating WMD. The Chileans want to work with and
within international treaties and their commitment on this
issue is "very clear."

--------------
Emphasis on Collaboration and Cooperation
--------------


18. (C) After the interagency meeting, Amb. Winter pointedly
remarked in a one-on-one discussion that some Chileans
perceive the U.S. administration as unilateralist, and that
it was positive to hear A/S DeSutter,s emphasis on
cooperation and collaboration. He thought it was very good
that she described PSI as a cooperative approach. He made a
point to say it was &big deal8 and &means a lot8 for
Chileans to hear that A/S DeSutter had come to Chile to ask
for their assistance and support.

--------------
Public Diplomacy
--------------


19. (SBU) In meetings after the interagency discussion, A/S
DeSutter explained the purpose of her trip and the role of
the Bureau of Verification and Compliance to members of the
media in a roundtable discussion and on an embassy radio
program. She also met informally with members of the
military, think tanks, and academics at a working lunch
hosted by the Ambassador.


20. (SBU) Finally, she met with the Director Latora
Villanueva and staff of the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission
to learn about Chile,s uses and plans for nuclear energy and
control of radioactive material.


21. (SBU) A/S DeSutter has reviewed and cleared this report.
KELLY