Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANSALVADOR2507
2005-09-09 15:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy San Salvador
Cable title:  

EL SALVADOR: SIX MONTHS FROM ELECTIONS, ARENA

Tags:  ES PGOV PREL ELECTIONS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SAN SALVADOR 002507 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015
TAGS: ES PGOV PREL ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: EL SALVADOR: SIX MONTHS FROM ELECTIONS, ARENA
CLIMBS/FMLN SELF-DESTRUCTS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Butler, Reason 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SAN SALVADOR 002507

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015
TAGS: ES PGOV PREL ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: EL SALVADOR: SIX MONTHS FROM ELECTIONS, ARENA
CLIMBS/FMLN SELF-DESTRUCTS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Butler, Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Six months away from March 12, 2006
municipal and Legislative Assembly elections and fifteen
months into his five-year term, President Saca continues to
enjoy high approval ratings unprecedented in El Salvador's
postwar history. Recent polls rate Saca highest in
infrastructure-building, education, and healthcare, while
manifesting concern about the nation's pressing crime
problems and little satisfaction with sluggish economic
growth. The high level of public confidence in the
administration bodes ill for the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) opposition, mired in disarray and
obsolete 1970s-era revolutionary rhetoric. Three more FMLN
Legislative Assembly deputies defected this week to the
recently-formed Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR),
reducing to 24 an FMLN delegation that only a year ago
numbered 31, and could thereby block votes requiring a
two-thirds majority of the Assembly's 84 seats. Most
political pundits expect that on Saca's coattails, ARENA will
gain at least five additional deputies and make substantial
gains in mayoralties next March. The National Conciliation
Party (PCN) will likely make modest gains at the expense of
the FMLN fissures. ARENA appears to have a good shot at
winning the San Salvador mayoralty for the first time in
nearly a decade. The continuing close bilateral relationship
promises to bolster Saca and his party's advantage further,
as the nation looks ahead to the March contest. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) ARENA presently holds 29 of the Legislative
Assembly's 84 seats; with the usually-dependable support of
its center-right National Conciliation Party (PCN) allies' 14
deputies, legislation requiring a 43-vote simple majority is
more or less a matter of routine business. Seven former FMLN
deputies of the new FDR have aligned themselves with five
Democratic Center (CD) deputies and three Christian Popular
Social Party (PPSC; a Christian Democratic Party/PDC
breakaway group),to form a loose center-left coalition of 15
seats with which ARENA and PCN must negotiate legislation
requiring a two-thirds 56-vote supermajority, such as the

assumption of external debt necessitated by approval of the
federal budget. ARENA and the PCN now hold, respectively,
109 and 53 of the nation's 262 municipalities, including
seven larger cities. The FMLN's 71 municipalities include
Santa Ana and all of greater San Salvador except for one
ARENA-ruled upscale suburb.

POLLS SHOW ARENA IN DRIVER'S SEAT
--------------


3. (SBU) A poll performed August 20-27 by leading daily La
Prensa Grafica involved 1,500 interviews nationwide with
persons above the age of 18. Saca's 72 percent overall
approval rating is scarcely lower than the 74 percent
approval recorded at the end of the first trimester of his
administration. Some 71.4 percent of those polled
characterized the administration's record on education as
"Very Good" or Good", while 68.6 percent qualified as "Very
Good" or "Good" Saca's accomplishments in the area of public
health. Respondents expressed least approval of the
government's achievements in improving El Salvador's economy,
which registered disappointing growth of two percent or less
in recent years.


4. (SBU) A CID-Gallup poll publicized September 7-8 yielded
a 71-percent level of approval for Saca, with 57 percent
characterizing the President as "rather" or "very" sincere
and truthful. Saca's popularity appears rooted in his
attention to improving the nation's infrastructure, his "Very
Firm Hand" anti-gang initiative, and the FOSALUD program
whereby public health clinics are funded via increased taxes
on tobacco, alcohol, and firearms. Some 31 percent of
respondents indicated an intention to vote ARENA, with the
FMLN mustering only 16 percent in intention to vote; some 48
percent responded that they either did not intend to vote, or
had not yet decided which party they favored. Some 60
percent of respondents stated they intended to vote in March.


FOR ARENA, HANDAL IS "THE GIFT THAT KEEPS ON GIVING" -- FDR
MAY BE ALSO
--------------
--------------


5. (C) The FMLM's latest troubles began September 2 with the
public resignation from the FMLN of moderate San Salvador
Mayor Carlos Rivas Zamora--long a thorn in the side of the
orthodox FMLN faction aligned with former Communist Party
leader and failed presidential candidate Schafik Handal. The
resignations of Legislative Assembly FMLN Whip Celina
Monterrosa and deputies Hector Cordova and Arnoldo Bernal
followed on September 6; all three immediately joined the
FDR. The latest exodus raises to seven the number of
deputies the FMLN has lost during the past year. The
defectors were soon to be joined by additional moderate FMLN
mayors, Rene Canjura of Nejapa and Carlos Menendez of
Mejicanos. Among the ranks of high-profile FMLN moderates
from just one year ago, only Santa Tecla Mayor Oscar Ortiz
and Deputy Hugo Martinez remain, and Ortiz is expected to
defect to the FDR as well. The key effect of these FMLN
defections to the FDR is that the left will run at least two
leftist candidates in many mayoral races, including San
Salvador, diluting the leftist vote and paving the way for
ARENA and PCN candidates.


6. (C) The response of the Handal hardliners to the
defections was characteristically intransigent; FMLN national
coordinator Medardo Gonzalez characterized the latest
defections as "irrelevant." Departed FMLN Assembly Whip
Celina Monterrosa viewed Gonzalez's comments as evidence of
the party's leadership being out of touch with political
reality. Furthermore, despite unsubstantiated rumors that
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is funneling funds to the
FMLN, all indications are that the party has little money at
this time to mount a robust national campaign, and clearly
cannot match ARENA's resources, or even those of the PCN in
large municipalities. For its part, the FDR leadership has
indicated that they intend to run full slates in all the
major cities and many municipalities, as well as a full
congressional slate. Despite its bravado, the FDR is only
beginning to build a national party structure, lacks
financing, and is competing head-to-head with the FMLN for
political space on the left. Because of these impediments,
many political observers predict that the FDR will be lucky
to keep two of the present seven National Assembly seats it
holds. Observers further state that the FDR will largely
play the role of spoiler to the FMLN in important mayoral
races such as San Salvador, and will tilt the balance in
these races to ARENA or the PCN.

BILATERAL WARMTH BOLSTERS GOVERNMENT
--------------


7. (C) The close U.S.-El Salvador bilateral relationship
tends to further strengthen ARENA's hand in next spring's
elections. Newspapers have frequently publicized
USAID-funded projects in housing construction for 2001
earthquake victims, potable water supplies for poor rural
communities, new clinics and schools, agricultural and
rural-sector development finance through USDA, and other
much-needed social investment, and U.S. assistance is widely
perceived to be a benefit of postwar ARENA governments' close
relationships with the U.S. Indeed, fears of a possible
deterioration in that relationship likely played a
significant role in the 2004 presidential election, after an
ARENA campaign that highlighted the party's longtime
friendship with the U.S.


8. (C) Recent U.S. ratification of CAFTA, which should go
into effect January 1, was a boon to the GOES, which has
raised expectations that CAFTA can help to jump-start the
nation's sluggish economy. The Embassy is following CAFTA
implementation closely, and USG-commited Trade Capacity
Building (TCB) funds will help facilitate a smoother
transition to a CAFTA environment, and in so doing, further
enhance the GOES's standing. Commerce Secretary Gutierrez's
upcoming visit in October presents an important opportunity
to showcase how CAFTA, and the trade benefits and
institutional strengthening it brings, can help address the
country's widespread poverty and--by extension--its other
pressing social problems. In the wake of July 15 meetings
between President Bush and President Saca, the GOES is
motivated to compete for Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)
funding, with which the GOES plans to facilitate economic
growth among the nation's heretofore-isolated northern
municipalities. Signing a compact with the MCC would also
help legitimize ARENA's economic program by showing it
carries concrete benefits. All of these projects and the
close personal relationship between Presidents Saca and Bush
provide the U.S. with multiple opportunities to continue to
showcase the benefits of the relationship, and to contrast El
Salvador's democratic parties with the FMLN's radicalism.



9. (C) COMMENT: Notwithstanding the traditional handicap
that midterm elections usually represent for any ruling
party, ARENA would appear to be poised to gain both
municipalities and Legislative Assembly seats next March, all
on Saca's coattails. The electorate's understandable
frustration with lack of significant progress on crime and
the economy is more than offset by the low esteem in which
they hold the strife-riven FMLN. The FMLN's latest defectors
not only further erode its relevance to the legislative
process, but in their joining the new FDR and fashioning
possible coalition candidacies, they dilute the left's
strength in even traditional FMLN strongholds such as San
Salvador, Chalatenango, and Morazan. If it cannot find a way
to stem the continuing hemorrhage of its best political
talent, the FMLN may awaken March 13 to find an ARENA-ruled
San Salvador, after the ruling party's near-decade absence
from city hall, as well as key defeats in other departmental
capitals and a significant loss of deputies.


10. (C) At this point, ARENA has by far the best national
political organization, the deepest pockets thanks to the
private sector, and a national leader in Saca who pulls major
votes. Washington and Post need to continue to work closely
with Saca on a successful bilateral agenda that includes
ameliorating the negative effects of criminal deportees,
making CAFTA a vehicle for economic growth and poverty
reduction, and promoting U.S. direct private investment.
Saca and his ARENA team are impressive political operatives
who know how to use the power and resources of the presidency
to run an effective national campaign on their own.
Butler