Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANSALVADOR2126
2005-07-27 20:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy San Salvador
Cable title:  

EL SALVADORS'S EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY - ARAB

Tags:  PREL PGOV IS MO QA BA ES UNGA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 002126 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV IS MO QA BA ES UNGA
SUBJECT: EL SALVADORS'S EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY - ARAB
ALLIES

REF: A. SAN SALVADOR 553

B. SAN SALVADOR 723

C. 2004 SAN SALVADOR 3103

D. 2004 SAN SALVADOR 795

E. SAN SALVADOR 1983

Classified By: A/DCM Mark Silverman, Reason 1.4 (b).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 002126

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV IS MO QA BA ES UNGA
SUBJECT: EL SALVADORS'S EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY - ARAB
ALLIES

REF: A. SAN SALVADOR 553

B. SAN SALVADOR 723

C. 2004 SAN SALVADOR 3103

D. 2004 SAN SALVADOR 795

E. SAN SALVADOR 1983

Classified By: A/DCM Mark Silverman, Reason 1.4 (b).


1. (C) Summary: Following a July 20 visit by Morocco's
Health Minister, leading daily "La Prensa Grafica" led July
25 with a 3-page spread detailing El Salvador's evolving
political strategy and rapprochement with the Middle East.
The article discussed El Salvador's hopes of gaining an
ECOSOC, or even a non-permanent UNSC seat, and echoed Embassy
reporting from January (Ref A) that, in 2004, El Salvador
supported additional anti-Israeli resolutions at the UNGA.
The article also provided a historical backdrop to current
GOES efforts to gain favor with countries such as Qatar and
Morocco.


2. (C) As noted in reftels, the GOES is adopting a more
"practical" foreign policy and is leveraging what little
political weight it has on Middle-East issues (Ref A),on
China/Taiwan recognition (Refs B,C),and even on votes that
the U.S. once took for granted, such as the annual UNGA Cuban
human rights resolution (Ref D). El Salvador's more nuanced
foreign policy and political calculus may affect Salvadoran
positions in the lead-up to, and plenary of, the 60th UNGA -
including on such critical topics as UNSC enlargement,
though, as noted in Ref E, El Salvador is not likely to
support the G-4 proposal on UNSC reform. End Summary.


UN VOTE PACT WITH MOROCCO
--------------


3. (SBU) A full-page article in the leading daily, "La Prensa
Grafica", noted the July 20 visit of the Moroccan Health
Minister, and quoted FM Lainez as stating that El Salvador is
changing its diplomatic strategy by reaching out to
non-traditional allies such as Morocco and Qatar. The
article detailed a vote swap: Salvadoran support for
Morocco's candidate to the International Court of Justice, in
exchange for Moroccan support for El Salvador's bid to gain
an ECOSOC seat. The story referred to the December 2003
visit to Morocco by then-FM Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Avila

as the starting point of the current relationship, and
detailed official communications discussing the vote swap.


4. (SBU) The article also discussed other bilaterals with NEA
leaders, such as Saca's September 2004 visit with Qatar's
Emir in New York and Vice President de Escobar's June 2005
visit to Qatar. Additionally, the article said that reaching
out to the Middle East began under former President Flores,
who in 1999-2000 established diplomatic relations with
Bahrain and Qatar and that, as part of this turning point,
then-FM Brizuela de Avila made a November 2001 speech before
the UNGA defending the Palestinian right to
self-determination.


UNSC REFORM and THE ANTI-ISRAELI VOTES
--------------


5. (C) An adjoining full-page article noted El Salvador's
ambition to secure not only an ECOSOC seat, but also a
non-permanent UNSC seat. In an over-simplified manner, the
article outlined UNSC reform possibilities as the U.S.
position of maintaining the status-quo, versus the
"EU/Japan/Brazil" position of increasing the number of
permanent seats. The article transitioned into a discussion
of, and, eventually, a separate full-page article describing
El Salvador's vote shifts on Israel/Palestinian resolutions
at the 59th UNGA, and implicitly inferred that this was a
strategy to distance itself somewhat from US/Israel policy
and to increase NEA support for El Salvador's participation
in UN bodies. (Note: Ref B reported on El Salvador's
ideological retreat on Israel at the UN and the emerging
"practical" approach of the Saca administration, and
commented that El Salvador is trying to show some
"independence" at the lowest possible cost to the
all-important bilateral relationship with the U.S. End
Note.) (Comment: As post outlined in Ref E, El Salvador is
not likely to support the current G-4 UNSC expansion
proposal. End Comment.)


6. (SBU) The pair of articles described how El Salvador
changed its vote on A/RES/59/123 - "Israeli Settlements in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory", and noted that El
Salvador voted in favor of many pro-Palestinian resolutions.
(Note: Ref B highlights six "anti-Israeli" resolutions that
El Salvador abstained on at the 58th, but supported at the
59th UNGA. End note.) The articles discount the possible
fallout with Israel, and quote Israeli Ambassador to El
Salvador Jonathan Peled as stating that El Salvador's voting
will not affect the bilateral relationship, and that El
Salvador, like any independent country, at times votes more
in favor of Israel, and at times less.

INTERVIEW WITH FM LAINEZ
--------------


7. (SBU) Part of the coverage was a four-question interview
with FM Lainez. Lainez was quoted as stating, "foreign
policy is dynamic and evolutionary, and El Salvador must find
its place within the new globalized world, and to do so you
can see El Salvador is taking new postures with respect to
various policies, not just the Near East." In response to
questions on whether El Salvador had changed from its
predictable past voting on Arab-Israeli policy issues, and
what risk this might imply regarding traditional allies,
Lainez stated that the government's decisions have been the
"fruit" of an analysis of the issues, that each decision is
discussed with the involved parties, and that El Salvador has
always tried to take rational and principled votes.


COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Comment. While the articles trace this evolving
diplomatic strategy back to the Flores Administration,
Embassy has noted significant changes under the Saca
Administration. This could be in part due to the
transaction-oriented business backgrounds of both Saca and FM
Lainez and their willingness to look at strategy through that
optic and depart from the status-quo. Additionally, the
Salvadoran Ambassador to the UN, Carmen Gallardo, is thought
to be more oriented toward the European Union, and is also
likely an advocate of a revised Salvadoran foreign policy.
As reftels have noted, however, the bilateral relationship
with the U.S. is all-important; this fact limits major
departure from long-time support of key U.S. foreign policy
priorities. This said, El Salvador's continued deployment in
Iraq has allowed the GOES to secure political capital with
the U.S., and small exercises of independence and leveraging,
such as changing posture on anti-Israeli votes, or even
supporting UN reforms that are not the first choice of the
U.S., can be expected from time to time.


9. (C) As noted in Ref D, El Salvador is not in favor of, and
has stated concern with, the G-4 UNCS enlargement proposal,
particularly in that Brazil would be allotted a permanent
seat. Despite GOES "concern" and recurring statements that
UN reform should be carried out in an integral way, El
Salvador has still not firmly committed to voting against the
G-4 proposal. Interlocutors continue to tell Emboffs that El
Salvador is waiting to see all of the proposals to develop a
firm stance. End Comment.
Barclay