Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
05SANJOSE2131 | 2005-09-12 23:11:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN JOSE 002131 |
1. (C) As the clock ticks down on a three-year "truce" on the San Juan River dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, Foreign Minister Roberto Tovar on September 8 told Charge that he will propose a new two-year stopgap agreement. He said Costa Rica, however, will demand in the new agreement some limited navigational rights on the river that it has not been able to exercise under the current truce. President Pacheco, responding off the cuff to a reporter's question on August 30, said talks between the GOCR and GON had been fruitless and that the GOCR was no longer willing to "kick the ball down the road" (postpone dealing with the dispute). If the GOCR and GON do not reach an agreement, Costa Rica will file an application with the International Court of Justice by October 23. End summary. Dispute calendar -------------------------- 2. (U) According to the GOCR, the current version of the San Juan River dispute began on July 15, 1998, when the Nicaraguan Army started to impede the movement of armed Costa Rican police on the river. This caused then-President of Costa Rica Miguel Angel Rodriguez to cancel a scheduled visit to Nicaragua. On March 8, 2000, Costa Rica and Nicaragua agreed to OAS mediation of the dispute, but it was clear after a month that there would be no accord. Anticipating that Costa Rica would take the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), then-President of Nicaragua Arnoldo Aleman filed a motion with the ICJ on October 23, 2001, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. Costa Rica had one year to answer the motion or forfeit the case. After months of negotiations, Costa Rican Foreign Minister Roberto Tovar and Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Norman Caldera on September 26, 2002, signed a three-year truce by which the two sides agreed to delay discussion of the Nicaraguan motion and that Costa Rica would not attempt to bring the case to the ICJ. Approaching deadline -------------------------- 3. (C) The current truce expires September 27, and, unless the GOCR and GON arrive at a new agreement, the GOCR has until October 23 to file an application with the ICJ challenging the GON's motion filed four year before. Foreign Minister Tovar told Charge September 8 that if Costa Rica were to fail to respond to Nicaragua's motion in the ICJ, Costa Rica would lose its rights. He said that the GOCR has already drafted its ICJ application and will file it if the GOCR and GON do not reach agreement by the October 23 deadline. President lets slip that negotiations have been fruitless -------------------------- -------------------------- 4. (C) President Pacheco, responding to a reporter's question on August 30, let slip publicly what MFA advisers Sergio Ugalde and Arnoldo Brenes have been telling us privately and confidentially--that negotiations with GON have gone nowhere. SIPDIS The GOCR's goal was to get the GON to agree to arbitration of the San Juan River dispute by the ICJ or some other third party (reftel). The GON, however, refused and instead proposed an extension of the current truce, which is unacceptable to Costa Rica. President Pacheco reflected Costa Ricans' frustration when he told the press: "I thought it would have been possible for two friendly countries to reach an agreement with both yielding a little bit. But it was not to be." He added: "We need to solve this matter once and for all; we're not going to kick the ball down the road (postpone dealing with the dispute) which serves the interests of neither side." Press commentary -------------------------- 5. (U) Since President Pacheco spoke out while negotiations were ongoing, he was criticized in the Costa Rican press for being "indiscreet" and "imprudent." Leading daily newspaper "La Nacion," in a September 1 editorial, accused both sides of carelessness in dealing with the San Juan issue: "Nicaragua's leaders, politicians, and other sectors treat (the dispute) according to their whims. And President Pacheco, without warning, has violated the elementary norms of maturity, prudence, and wisdom. Let's hope our Foreign Ministry can get us back on track for the sake of our national interest." Tovar's two-year plan -------------------------- 6. (C) Having failed to persuade the GON to agree to arbitration, the GOCR, Tovar told Charge, will now attempt to negotiate a new two-year stopgap agreement. It is not merely kicking the ball down the road because, unlike in the existing truce, Costa Rica would insist on acknowledgment of some limited navigational rights on the river (presumably to include the transportation of armed Costa Rican police). Tovar believes such an agreement would save face for both sides and obviate threatened trade sanctions between the two countries. He said that an interruption in trade or an increase in tariffs would both be antithetical to CAFTA-DR and cause bankruptcy for some small- and medium-sized enterprises. Comment -------------------------- 7. (C) Pacheco spoke out of turn but also truthfully. After three years of fruitless negotiations on the San Juan dispute, it is unrealistic to expect the next few weeks to be different. The GOCR is willing to bend, but only so far. No government, Costa Rican or Nicaraguan, can afford politically to "give away" the San Juan River. For the Costa Ricans, the dispute is more about saving face than any practical considerations. In fact, Tovar has told us he doesn't even care much whether an arbitrator rules for or against Costa Rica, only that the matter is finalized. The great virtue he sees in arbitration is that neither the GOCR nor the GON can be accused of giving away territory or the rights of its citizens; instead, the losing party can blame the arbitrator. FRISBIE |