Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA974
2005-04-19 04:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

NATEC'S BAHRAN: WE NEED USG SUPPORT, INVITE TO US

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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000974 

SIPDIS

ENERGY PLEASE PASS TO NNSA DIRECTOR US LINTON F. BROOKS,
STATE PLEASE PASS TO KATHY CROUCH NP/ECC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL KNNP YM IAEA NPT COUNTER TERRORISM ENVIRONMENT
SUBJECT: NATEC'S BAHRAN: WE NEED USG SUPPORT, INVITE TO US
LINTON BROOKS

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000974

SIPDIS

ENERGY PLEASE PASS TO NNSA DIRECTOR US LINTON F. BROOKS,
STATE PLEASE PASS TO KATHY CROUCH NP/ECC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL KNNP YM IAEA NPT COUNTER TERRORISM ENVIRONMENT
SUBJECT: NATEC'S BAHRAN: WE NEED USG SUPPORT, INVITE TO US
LINTON BROOKS

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: In an April 17 meeting with Ambassador,
Director of the Yemen National Atomic Energy Commission
(NATEC),Dr. Moustafa Bahran, asked for USG assistance to
train NATEC staff and pushed for Yemen's acquisition of
radioactive detection equipment. Bahran also invited Under
Secretary (US) of Energy for Nuclear Security and

SIPDIS
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA),Linton F. Brooks, to a May sub-regional conference.
End Summary.

-------------- --
Bahran: No One in the Region Is Better Than Us
-------------- --


2. (C) In an April 17 meeting with Ambassador, NATEC Director
Bahran asked for USG help to train NATEC security personnel.
(Note: NATEC Security personnel are commissioned with
enforcing laws and procedures to secure radioactive materials
in Yemen. End Note). Stating that his agency had the
competency and potential to deal with nuclear and radioactive
security, Bahran asked for training by the Department of
Energy (DOE) and/or the National Regulatory Commission (NRC).
"No one in the region is better than us," exclaimed Bahran,
but training would greatly help in "sustaining" and
"strengthening" Yemen's ability to deal with radioactive
materials. He stressed that it would also help by exposing
his staff to the "vigilance" required in radioactive source
management. Ambassador assured Bahran that he would pass his
requests to Washington, but patience would be required.

-------------- ---
Yemen COULD Become a Way Station... God Forbid!
-------------- ---


3. (C) Discussing once again Yemen's need for radioactive
detection equipment to patrol points of entry, Bahran readily
conceded that Yemen did not have a problem with radioactive
orphan source smuggling. "But Yemen could become a way
station... God forbid!" he warned. "We are not controlling
any borders," noted Bahran in highlighting NATEC's need for

help, "but this is the year that we start." He added that
the DOE's "MegaPorts" initiative has agreed to help NATEC.


4. (C) Bahran also revealed that his plans to secure Yemen's
borders from radioactive smuggling would require several
low-end radioactive detection pagers that would be used by
Coastguard and border crossing personnel to initially screen
any suspect cargo. Then, if the case warranted, trained
specialists with higher end pagers, capable of detecting
exact radioactive sources, would conduct subsequent
inspections.


5. (C) While making his case, Bahran showed Ambassador what
he described to be a "confidential" document highlighting
Yemen's nuclear security needs. (Note: The document was most
likely Yemen's Nuclear Security Plan that it presented to the
IAEA to ask for radioactive detection equipment. Bahran has
presented separate requests to the IAEA and the DOE for
radioactive detection equipment. It is unclear to post
whether the two requests highlight the need for identical or
different equipment. End Note). Bahran was confident that
with the requested equipment and training he could stop any
non-legal transport of radioactive sources through Yemen.

--------------
Invite to US Linton Brooks
--------------


6. (U) Bahran also asked Ambassador to pass an invitation to
US of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the
NNSA, Linton F. Brooks to a conference on controlling
nuclear and radioactive materials at borders. The conference,
sponsored by the IAEA, will be held on May 26-24 at the Grand
Mohur Sheraton in Aden, Yemen.


7. (U) Begin Text of invitation letter:

The National Energy Commission presents it compliments to you.

It is my pleasure to inform you that the Republic of Yemen is
hosting the Sub-Regional Seminar on Measures to Monitor,
Detect, Identify and Respond to Incidents Involving Nuclear
and Radioactive Materials at Borders, 24-26 May 2005, in
Aden. The seminar is intended to raise awareness on the
subject and the participants are decision makers and experts
from participating countries that are Member States of the
IAEA (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, Yemen). Also I would like
to inform you that (Bahrain, Djibouti, Oman, Palestinian
National Authority, and Somalia) have been invited to
participate in the seminar by Yemen because they are not
Member States in the IAEA.

It is my opinion that this seminar is an excellent
opportunity for the NNSA to participate and maybe deliver a
presentation on the kind of efforts and assistance that your
government is providing in this regard.

Accordingly, it is my pleasure to invite representatives from
your side to participate in this seminar.

The National Atomic Energy Commission avails itself of this
opportunity to renew to you the assurances of its highest
consideration.

Accept my best regards,

Dr. Moustafa Bahran
Science and Technology Advisor to the President of the Rep.
NATEC Chairman

End text.


8. (C) Action Request and Comment: Post has previously
determined that Yemen does not have an identifiable
radioactive source smuggling problem and that Bahran's
request for radioactive detection equipment is not
justifiable at this time. However, providing training would
be a measured and pragmatic option through which the USG
could demonstrate its appreciation to an ally in the IAEA and
a potential regional leader in nuclear and radioactive source
management. Post asks Department, DOE and NRC for
information on training programs to help an aspiring agency
with the potential to be a role model in the region. End
Action Request and Comment.
Krajeski