SANAA EAC MEETING 04/11/2005

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000955

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/11/2005

REF: A. SANAA 912

B. SANAA 896

C. SANAA 895

D. SANAA 891

E. SANAA 883

F. SANAA 882

G. SANAA 876

H. SANAA 875

I. SANAA 863

J. SANAA 860

K. SANAA 836

Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (S/NF) Begin Summary: The Ambassador convened an EAC
meeting on April 13, 2005, to review the current threat,
ongoing security measures and approve reverse trip wires.
President Saleh informed the Ambassador that Kanaan had been
captured along with several of his top associates and Yemen
forces have made significant progress in the fighting in the
Saada area. The EAC agreed that, although current threat
indicators point to a relatively safer environment, embassy
employees and the greater American community should continue
security measures recommended previously to avoid the large
crowds, tourist areas and downtown Sanaa. Key offices and
personnel represented at the meeting included: AMB, DCM,
DATT, FPD, IPC, MO, LEGATT, POLE, RMAS,OMC, RSO, CONS, PD and
USAID. End Summary.


2. (C/NF) Per Department guidance , the EAC discussed and
adopted the following &Reverse Trip-Wires8 as a tool to
gauge future recommendations for cessation or continuation of
&Authorized Departure8:

a. Decrease in terrorist threats against
Americans in Yemen, combined with security environment
characterized by no credible, specific information or
non-counterable terrorist threats or plans for attack against
Americans or other Western citizens or interests, to include
international schools.

b. Host nation responsiveness, resources and
capabilities are assessed as adequate to protect American
personel and assets from terrorist threats and political
violence.

c. EAC, RSO, and MOI concur that travel within
Sanaa and designated areas of Yemen, including selected major
cities, is safer under the restrictions and guidelines in
place prior to the approval of authorized departure status.

d. EAC agreement that acts of violence resulting
from spillover from the Saada fighting or any other
transnational or indigenous group does not pose a significant
risk for the American community in Sanaa, or major Yemen
cities that are authorized for Embassy travel by post
management.


3. (S/NF) The Ambassador advised the EAC that President
Saleh had called on the evening of April 12 to inform him
that Kanaan, the person believed to have been planning an
attack against American and Jewish leaders (reported in
reftels),and some of his close associates had been captured.
President Saleh assured the Ambassador of Yemen,s continuing
efforts to capture any and all other associates of Kanaan.
President Saleh also asserted that the Al-Hoothi fighters in
Saada have been significantly reduced and are on the run.


4. (S/NF) RMAS had nothing to add.


5. (SBU) The Management Officer briefed the EAC on how
authorized departure status had affected the embassy staff.
The Management Officer praised the support Post has received
from Washington. He specifically mentioned the
responsiveness of Post,s contacts in obtaining clearances on
all of the documents needed to assist Post,s dependents.
Initially only one person requested orders to depart;
however, two others have since indicated that they wished to
depart under authorized departure. A cable went out yesterday
requesting permission to use Israel and Ethiopia as alternate
safe havens. The officers and the spouses were advised of
the possibility of not being able to return to post until AD
is lifted. The Management Officer advised that at large posts
the EAC decides each request for authorized departure. The
EAC agreed that the front office was in a better position to
decide on those requests.


6. (S/NF) The EAC discussed whether or not to continue the
security measures currently in place. The Ambassador pointed
out that even though the arrest of Kanaan, who represented
the most serious and immediate threat against the embassy,
has been reduced, the political violence in Saada which
spilled over into Sanaa in the form of several grenade
attacks and the threat of violence from other groups could
affect our security. The EAC discussed the viability of the
security measures and how closely people were following them.
The Management Officer advised that the shuttle schedule had
been expanded to encompass more varied times for entry and
egress; however, the result was that almost no one chose to
ride the shuttle. The concept of a four-hour window for
employees to come and go from the embassy also caused some
difficulties for employees to comply with. The EAC agreed to
continue the security measures of restricting travel to the
downtown area, avoiding large clusters of officers and/or
foreigners and to continue to vary times and routines, not
just travel but all other activities. The EAC agreed to meet
on Sunday to discuss whether or not to change that posture.
The EAC agreed to allow each office supervisor to monitor the
arrival and departure times of their employees. The EAC
agreed to discuss at its next meeting whether or not to send
out a warden message to the American community and what to
advise them.


7. (SBU) The Management Officer was directed to send a
Management Notice reiterating to Embassy staff the
restrictions on travel and to continue varying times and
routes. The Shuttle schedule, however, will return to its
previous variations of six different routes and times.


8. (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene immediately
following the Country Team Meeting at 1430 hours on Sunday,
April 17, 2005, to review the security situation and discuss
need for updating Warden messages..
Krajeski