YEMEN GWOT ASSESSMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000916

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER YM COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN
SUBJECT: YEMEN GWOT ASSESSMENT

REF: STATE 60749

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S) Summary. President Saleh has logged some major CT
gains and significantly improved security in Yemen since the
post-9/11 forging of the U.S-Yemen GWOT partnership. Recent
successes include: the round-up of an emerging al-Qa'ida cell
with plans to target the U.S. Ambassador, prosecution and
conviction of the USS Cole and M/V Limburg terrorists, and
success in the largest destruction program in the region.
There continue to be frequent and troubling lapses in the
ROYG's performance, including the release of extremists,
failure to share information, and inaction on small arms and
light weapons (SA/LW),as Saleh has sought to balance
domestic political equities while ensuring that he extracts
maximum benefit from the U.S. (read: aid) for his
cooperation. The ROYG can be helpful but almost always not
as helpful as we would like. It can be frustrating.
Friction in the US-ROYG relationship is mitigated by the fact
that, in objective terms, we are light-years ahead on core CT
issues from where we were before 9/11.


2. (S) We seek to institutionalize the gains of past
engagement in order to transform a sometimes reluctant Yemen
from an occasional friend into a full-time partner. ROYG CT
capabilities are growing, albeit modestly, as a result of USG
assistance. Progress will be slow, steady, and dependent on
intensive personal relationships built through provision of
USG training and equipment. Here is how we propose to
improve out cooperation with key ROYG allies in the GWOT.


3. (S) Country Team strategy is to improve the performance
and capabilities of Yemeni security organizations to support
GWOT efforts. Current USG-ROYG CT priorities are to: improve
border and maritime security; control the flow of SA/LW and
jihadists from Yemen to support terrorist activities in Iraq,
KSA, and the Horn of Africa (HOA); enhance the ROYG's CT unit
of choice, the Central Security Forces Counter-terrorism Unit
(CSF-CTU); improve the ROYG's ability to target terrorists in
Yemen; and, encourage the ROYG to implement much needed
economic and democratic reforms.

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Background: President Saleh and the GWOT
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4. (C) Saleh,s decision to join the fight against
international terrorism was no doubt influenced by U.S. and
coalition boots on the ground in Afghanistan. He continues
to see value in an ongoing GWOT partnership, but can be
counted on to leverage this cooperation into further U.S.
military, security and development assistance. He is a
high-maintenance and highly opportunistic operator. Saleh
tends to focus on short-term CT solutions, preferring to make
tactical decisions than to have a comprehensive policy on CT
cooperation.


5. (C) Saleh is a master at balancing competing interests and
he weighs any USG CT request against appeasing domestic
institutional, tribal and Islamic elements. Saleh's
balancing act has slowed or stalled U.S. efforts to elicit
GWOT related cooperation. For example, such "internal
sensitivities," combined with weak Yemeni financial
institutions, are responsible for the ROYG's non-supportive
posture on the UN action freezing Sheikh Abdul Majid
al-Zindani's assets.

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Border Security: Land and Sea
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6. (C) The establishment, training and partial equipping of
the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) is a major U.S. security
assistance success and the YCG's initial presence up and down
the nation's coastline, focusing on critical points, has
improved maritime security. Currently the ports of Aden and
Hodeidah are more secure than they were one year ago.
However, Yemen's oil terminals in Ras Isa and Bir Ali remain
vulnerable to terrorist attacks as the YCG does not have yet
have the infrastructure to support patrols near these
facilities. The YCG has begun initial monitoring and
interdiction of smugglers from the Horn of Africa. The
effectiveness of the USG-supported YCG is limited by its
small size.


7. (C) Yemen and Saudi Arabia have announced joint efforts
to tighten border security, but improvement and application
has been limited and uneven. The security of Yemen's land
and maritime borders remains a priority concern. Tackling
land border security is beyond Yemen's current capacity along
its long and largely unregulated boarder with Saudi Arabia.
Eight days of joint maneuvers between Yemeni and Saudi
military along the eastern border began on March 30 and is an
noteworthy, albeit largely symbolic, step. Successful
control of the Yemeni-Saudi border will require active buy-in
from the ROYG, and we should encourage the KSA to fund border
security assistance to Yemen in the context of their border
security initiative.


8. (C) Post received 750,000 USD for the EXBS program, and
plans to use the funds to provide training and equipment to
the seriously under-manned, under-trained, and under-funded
Yemeni Border Guards. One of our first goals will be to
provide basic training and to facilitate cross-border
coordination and information exchange with the Saudis. A
mobile training team would be appropriate for providing
border guard specific training. In addition to specific
training for border guards, MOI has requested tactical
vehicles and night vision goggles. For the ROYG to
effectively monitor its borders to prevent weapons smuggling
and terrorist activities, we must increase support for this
program. The ROYG must, in turn, demonstrate sufficient
political will to eliminate any official involvement in
weapons smuggling.

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CT Cooperation with MOI - Success of CSF-CTU
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9. (C) The training and equipping of the Ministry of Interior
(MOI) Central Security Forces Counter Terrorism Unit
(CSF-CTU) is a major USG security assistance program success.
The Yemeni Central Security Force (CSF) is a paramilitary
counter-terrorism, emergency reaction, and counter-coup force
that can provide reinforcement to the Yemeni armed forces.
We have been hindered by long-standing Department policy that
prohibits using FMF funds on paramilitary forces. Its
primary missions are internal security and counter-terrorism
operations. Within the CSF, only the Counter-Terrorism Unit
(CSF-CTU) is tasked with the primary domestic
counter-terrorism mission; no CSF units conduct defense.


10. (S) The USG-trained CSF-CTU proved itself an elite cadre
in a fight against the "Believing Youth8 movement founded by
slain anti-American Shi,ite cleric Hussein Badr Eddine
al-Houthi. Last summer,s conflict was characterized by its
long and bloody nature which, like the Abyan conflict in
2003, took the ROYG and its armed forces by surprise.
CSF-CTU was redeployed several weeks ago to the same region
to put down a resurgence of the al-Houthi insurrection.
Employing lessons and skills learned in the interim from USG
trainers, reports from the field indicate that in the current
fighting CSF-CTU forces are employing techniques to isolate
insurgents and limit collateral damage. Sources on the
ground currently report that the CSF-CTU are effectively in
the lead and working with the armed forces to use appropriate
strategy and techniques to fight a well trained enemy
unafraid to go on the offense, operate at night, and employ
guerrilla tactics.


11. (S) Currently, the ROYG is inclined to employ the CSF-CTU
immediately to deal with any serious para-military situation
in recognition of the skills they have developed from
effective training and from experience gained. Given the
small size of this force, 150 soldiers, it cannot sustain
more than a dozen or so casualties without a serious
degradation of its capabilities. We support the recent
request of the CSF to expand its force. Additionally, the
country team supports strongly considering a similar proposal
by MOD to help train and arm several special forces
battalions of the regular army. Having several professional,
trained infantry battalions would permit the ROYG to employ
them as a first line of defense instead of immediately
deploying the elite CSF-CTU.


12. (C) The MOI has sought funding from LEGATT to provide
basic services and training for a newly established
counter-terrorism investigative unit (CTIU). CT
investigations have been predominately conducted by the PSO.
The MOI CTIU consists of 100 investigator from MOI's Criminal
Investigative Unit and is supervised by Colonel Hisham
Ghazani, considered by FBI as "someone we can work with". In
December 2004 the CTIU disrupted an AQ cell in the early
planning stages of preparing to attack numerous western
targets and six suspects were arrested. The CTIU is now
working jointly with a team of FBI agents interviewing the
perpetrator of an failed attack on the U.S. Ambassador.
Country team believes that based on past successes in CT
cooperation with MOI and Minister Alimi, there is great
potential in strengthening our relationship with the CTIU.
LEGATT is the action office, supported by the country team,
in building a strong partner on CT issues.

13. (SBU) USG GWOT efforts are hindered by Yemen's
rudimentary fingerprint system and lack of a national
database to store records. Yemen has no system to maintain
this critical biometric data when they are able to capture
it, nor do the authorities have the skills to properly record
prints or recover them from crime scenes. Working with FBI,
country team proposes the development of a searchable
fingerprint system base on internationally exchangeable print
standards as well as detailed crime scene investigation and
evidence collection. A local ability to properly process
evidence would be a significant asset to GWOT investigations,
as would the creation of a national database of known
criminals. FBI is prepared to provide the necessary
equipment and training to Yemen, but post is still seeking
DOS or other funds to cover the USD 4 million cost for
implementing the program over three years.

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CT Information Sharing
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14. (S) The Political Security Organization (PSO) is
currently the premier agency charged with CT in Yemen. It is
pervasive and paranoid. The head of the PSO, Major General
Ghalib al-Gamish is a close confident to President Saleh.
Information sharing with the PSO is problematic, however,
despite the fact that it is fully committed to preventing
terrorist attacks in Yemen. Gamish has cooperated closely on
following several recent terrorist networks involving
jihadists from Iraq, and we anticipate that cooperation on
these and other CT related issues will continue. We have
seen the PSO coordinate with other governments in the region,
and it usually takes action swiftly on CT related leads
provided by the USG and other governments.


15. (S) The ROYG and the PSO have taken stances which are
contrary to USG security interests. Specifically, the ROYG
has released detainees associated with al-Qa'ida as part of
its Ramadan amnesty in the last three years. This year,
however, the ROYG for the first time provided Post with an
advance list of releasees, and agreed to continue to hold
some, but not all, of the terrorism suspects. The ROYG has
also been intransigent on allowing USG investigators access
to prisoners that we believe to be directly connected to AQ.
Not only does the PSO refuse to share information collected
on these individuals with the USG, but it insists that it has
no information at all, despite holding and interrogating them
for months or even years.


16. (S) A relatively new organization, the National Security
Board (NSB) is headed by Colonel Ammar Saleh, one of three
nephews of the President. Western educated, Saleh enjoys
contact with many westerners and has worked closely with
emboffs on a joint US-ROYG destruction program. His decision
making process on CT issues, however, needs maturing. He is
often shortsighted and opportunistic, much like his uncle,
President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The NSB significantly limits
its staff and relies heavily on the PSO to execute
operations. Post believes, however, that with time,
training, and assistance, the NBS could develop into a useful
partner in the GWOT.

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Terrorist Financing and Zindani: Need ROYG Action
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17. (S) Despite nascent efforts to build an effective
anti-money laundering regime, the ROYG's capability to stop
the flow of money is extremely limited and ROYG officials
tend to view terrorist financing as a problem more for
regional neighbors than for Yemen. Since the 2003 passage of
a money laundering law, Central Bank officials, MFA contacts
and representatives of private banks have made repeated
requests for U.S. assistance to build their infrastructure.
CBY capabilities are minimal and any assistance to build
their financial intelligence unit and interagency
capabilities would be welcomed.


18. (C) As in some other areas of CT cooperation, the ROYG
lacks the political will to take action on the freezing of
Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani's assets under his designation
by the UN as someone giving material support to al-Qaida.
The ROYG has used the excuse of requesting legal
documentation on Zindani's culpability and Gulf charities
mentioned above to delay further action, rather than comply
with its responsibilities as a member state.
Krajeski