SANAA EAC MEETING 04/11/2005

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000912

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/11/2005

REF: A. SANAA 896


B. SANAA 895

C. SANAA 891

D. SANAA 883

E. SANAA 882

F. SANAA 876

G. SANAA 875

H. SANAA 863

I. SANAA 860

J. SANAA 836

Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (S/NF) Begin Summary: Ambassador convened an EAC
meeting on April 11, 2005, to review the current threat,
ongoing security measures and to discuss reverse trip wires.
The EAC agreed that current threat indicators continue to
point to a mid to long term threat for the community. The
Ambassador noted that the Embassy re-opened today, Monday 11
April 2005, with no incidents per request REFTEL A. EAC
members agreed to continue security measures recommended
during previous EAC meetings to include restrictions on
non-essential travel throughout Yemen with emphasis on
avoiding downtown Sanaa. Key offices and personnel
represented at the meeting included: DCM, DAT, FPD, IPC, MO,
LEGATT, POLE, RMAS, OMC, RSO, PD, and USAID. End Summary.


2. (C/NF) Per Department guidance, the EAC discussed
"Reverse Trip-Wires" as a tool to gauge any future
recommendation for cessation of "Authorized Departure." The
EAC agreed to meet again on April 13, 2005, to approve
changes to the Reverse Trip-Wires" recommended by the EAC.
For now EAC members agreed that it was prudent to continue
with measures delineated in REFTELS B and C, including the
need for supervisors to actively manage their staffs' work
schedules thereby ensuring prudent changes in arrival and
departure times.


3. (SBU) The EAC was also briefed by the Management Officer
regarding particulars of the current Authorized Departure
(AD),and the Ambassador re-emphasized the necessity of
following AD policies closely regarding the return or arrival
of personnel out of country or traveling on a TDY basis.


4. (SBU) The Ambassador advised the EAC that he had met
with the Director of the Political Security Office and had
requested the Director's support in getting permission to
bring in and set-up transmitters to enhance our Emergency and
Evacuation radio network as well as the local guard force
network. EAC members noted that it is difficult to determine
if the PSO Director will support and move this important
project forward after years of preventing progress on radio
upgrades.


5. (S/NF) RMAS had no new threat information for review by
the EAC.


6. (C/NF) The RSO briefed EAC members that no indications of
pre-attack planning were detected by RSO surveillance
detection teams or guard force assets. However, the EAC was
informed about a phone call threat to the Yemen American
Language Institute (YALI) at 1325 hours, 11 April 2005, when
an unidentified male stated in Arabic that YALI should "Watch
out after 1300 hours." The YALI director chose not to
evacuate his facility but instead coordinated additional
security with MOI through the RSO, alerted his neighbors to
the potential threat while assisting Embassy guards in
conducting an inspection for suspicious packages. The YALI
Director speculated that someone aware of YALI's closure the
previous two days was making crank calls. RSO reported no
additional information regarding the source of the threat and
recommended to the YALI director an ID Caller system to
assist in future investigations of phone threats.


7. (SBU) The EAC was briefed by the RSO about a report that
another grenade attack took place in Sanaa, against a
military vehicle near the Ministry of Fisheries in Hadda.
Additionally, the RSO advised that a second report was sent
to him regarding a grenade that was reported to have been
thrown at an unspecified target, near the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. RSO notes that this may be circular reporting and
as of this report is unable to confirm either attack.


8. (S/NF) The DATT informed EAC members that contacts within
the Ministry of Defense (MOD) stated that the fighting in
Saada had lessened and that the situation was now under
control.


9. (U) The Public Diplomacy Officer was directed by the
Ambassador to provide press guidance on the insurrection in
Saada and the closing of the Embassy on April 9 and 10, as
well as the Embassy's re-opening on April 11th.

10. (U) The Ambassador announced that a Town Hall meeting
would be held for the Embassy community at 0900 a.m., 12
April, on the patio of the EMR.


11. (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene at 1430 hours on
Wednesday, 13 April 2005, to review updates on Embassy
security and decide on reverse trip-wires.
Krajeski