Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA891
2005-04-10 10:00:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SANAA EAC MEETING 04/09/2005

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101000Z Apr 05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000891 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2015
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/09/2005

REF: A. SANAA 883


B. SANAA 882

C. SANAA 876

D. SANAA 875

E. SANAA 863

F. SANAA 860

G. SANAA 836

Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000891

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2015
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/09/2005

REF: A. SANAA 883


B. SANAA 882

C. SANAA 876

D. SANAA 875

E. SANAA 863

F. SANAA 860

G. SANAA 836

Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (S/NF) Ambassador Thomas Krajeski convened an EAC
meeting on April 5, 2005, to discuss the possible threat and
review security measures taken by the Embassy and community.
EAC members recommended continuation of security measures in
line with those delineated in REFTEL B, to include a
restriction on non-essential travel and continued closure of
the Embassy to the public. Key offices and personnel
represented at the meeting included: DCM, DAT, FPD, IPC, MO,
LEGATT, POLE, RMAS, OMC, RSO, USAID. End Summary.


2. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed the EAC on his meeting with
the President of the Republic of Yemen's government (ROYG)
and noted the serious nature of fighting between ROYG forces
and supporters of an insurrection in the Saada region. The
Ambassador gave an overview of the security situation to the
EAC, noting the perception that terrorists had operatives in
Yemen on standby with others available to be brought in
country. Additionally, the Ambassador reminded the EAC that
the terror network was thought to be targeting the American
and Jewish community in Yemen as well as the ROYG. The
Ambassador noted the likelihood that terrorists want to make
Yemen a place that they can operate in again as in the past,
and stated that it was possible that terrorists perceive ROYG
as one of the most vulnerable Arab regimes.


3. (S/NF) EAC members noted that, to date, no intervention
had occured against the terrorist cell currently being
tracked by USG and ROYG agencies. RMAS advised EAC members
that information regarding the threat was of a very good
quality and new analysis of the threat indicates that attack
planning may not be as imminent as previously thought. After
a discussion lead by the DCM, EAC members decided that the

threat remained serious and unpredictable, with to little
known about the location, method, timing and targets of the
potential attack. Therefore, EAC members recommended the
following security steps:

- Send a Warden Message advising continued caution while
informing the community that the Embassy would remain closed
on Sunday, 10 April 2005.
- Restrict employee travel to essential personnel traveling
to the Embassy. (RSO Comment: The EAC decided that
mandating the use of armored vehicles for the movement of
personnel was not necessary and the MO stated that in his
opinion the Embassy did not have sufficient armored vehicles
in its inventory to support such a policy.)
- Conduct an expanded EAC meeting at 1400 hours on Sunday, 10
April 2005.
- Continue the suspension of programs at the Yemen American
Language Institute (YALI) in line with the Embassy's closings.
- Ensure adherence to restrictions on incoming personnel in
line with "Authorized Departure."
- Continue to monitor employee travel times and routes to and
from the Embassy.



4. (S/NF) The Ambassador lead the EAC in a review of:
Requirements under the newly implemented Authorized Departure
policy; Press Guidance; Consular Issues following cessation
of public services; The overload of incoming communications
impacting post operators and Post 1; The impact of closing
on YALI; Overall security for community members to include
an American Archeologist team involved in the excavation of
the Queen of Sheba Temple in Ma'rib as well as the passing of
threat information to Fulbright scholars throughout the
country. (RSO Comment: The Public Diplomacy Officer
informed the EAC that the archeological group conducting
excavation in Ma'rib pulled back to Sanaa to lower their
exposure, and the EAC agreed that Fulbright scholars would be
provided information, through PD, necessary to allow them to
make changes in their personal conduct to allow them to
protect themselves.)


5. (S/NF) RSO provided the EAC an overview of post's
security profile noting ongoing tensions in Saada, as well as
the fact that no additional incidents potentially related to
Saada had occured in Sanaa since the grenade attacks against
military targets as outlined in REFTELS. Additionally, the
RSO noted no indications of pre-attack planning by RSO
surveillance detection elements and discussed steps taken by
MOI to improve security on the street around Embassy
residences, at choke points between the American housing area
and the Embassy, as well as improvements in hotel security at
the Sheraton in Aden. The RSO informed the EAC that no
incidents were noted on the Embassy or YALI perimeters
related to their closing to the public. Finally, RSO noted
that passing new tearline information to the MOI regarding
the latest threat was still pending issuance of a tearline
from RMAS.


6. (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene on Sunday, 10 April
2005, to review ongoing security measures.
Krajeski