SANAA EAC MEETING 04/07/2005

S E C R E T SANAA 000882

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/07/2005

REF: A. SANAA 876


B. SANAA 875

C. SANAA 863

D. SANAA 860

E. SANAA 836

Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: The Charge d' Affaires (CDA) convened a
core EAC meeting at 1200 noon, on April 07, 2005, to review
the current threat conditions at post. Following core EAC
review, CDA decided to call an expanded EAC to decide upon
further steps necessary to inform and protect the community.
The EAC decided to restrict non-essential travel, share
pre-cautions via a warden message with the community,
continue focus on preventing non-essential TDY visits in
country and recommended requesting "Authorized Departure" for
eligible personnel. Key offices and personnel represented at
the meeting included: CDA, CONS, DAO, FBI, FPD, IPC, MO, OMC,
POLE, RSO, RMAS, USAID


2. (S/NF) RMAS informed the EAC that to date no
intervention had occured against the terrorist cell currently
being tracked by USG and ROYG agencies. Based on information
reviewed, EAC members were told that attack planning was in
progress, the threat remained serious and unpredictable and
little was known about the location, method and target of
attack. Furthermore, the latest information points to a
higher possibility of imminent attacks. Therefore, EAC
members determined that the threat warranted the following
security steps in an attempt to shield the community from
violence:

- Send a Warden Message to the community advising avoidance
of any non-essential travel or movement in Sanaa and other
major cities.
- Restrict employee travel to essential personnel traveling
to the Embassy in armored vehicles on sporadic schedules.
- Close the Embassy for the first work day, Saturday, with
reassessment to determine the necessity for closing the
Embassy additional days.
- Suspend programs at Yemen American Language Institute
(YALI) in line with Embassy closings.
- Recommend additional security measures to the Sanaa
International School.
- Request (SEPTEL) Department approval for "Authorized
Departure" of eligible personnel.
- Continue focus on sending home early or denying country
clearance of TDY personnel not seen as critical for the
enhancement of life-safety.
- Continue to monitor dramatic changes in employee travel
times and routes to and from the Embassy.
- Activate the phone tree emergency notification system and
remind the community to monitor the Emergency and Evacuation
(E&E) radio network.


3. (SBU) RSO recommended and Charge accepted re-locating
himself to the Ambassador's residence on the Embassy compound
to reduce protective service requirements to an from work and
lower his profile by staying on the Embassy compound except
for essential liaison with the ROYG.


4. (C/NF) The Charge advised the EAC that he met with the
Minister of Interior who assured him that extra measures
would be taken per RSO's previous request to protect the
Sheraton Hotel, Embassy compound, residences of the American
Embassy as well as streets and avenues of approach between
the Embassy and residential areas.


5. (S/NF) RSO revisited security at YALI with the MOI the
morning of 7 April 2005. Additionally, RSO is working with
RMAS to develop a tear line to share with MOI providing names
and additional details regarding the threat.


6. (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene a core EAC meeting on
Friday, 8 April 2005, to look into security updates and
decide if more measures are needed or if an expanded EAC
needs to be convened.
Khoury