SANAA EAC MEETING 04/05/2005

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000875

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2015
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/05/2005

REF: SANAA 0863

Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (S/NF) Ambassador Thomas Krajeski convened an EAC
meeting on April 5, 2005, to discuss the possible threat and
review security measures taken by the Embassy and community.
The RSO briefed the EAC about another grenade attack in
central Sanaa (see paragraph 5),earlier in the day, against
a military truck, near the Ministry of Defense. The
Ambassador followed the EAC with a Town Hall Meeting for the
community reported SEPTEL. Key offices and personnel
represented at the meeting included: DCM, DAT, LEGATT, POLE,
RMAS, OMC, and RSO. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) RMAS informed the EAC that no new information
had been received regarding the threat noted in EAC report
REFTEL. No other attendee had further information regarding
the threat.


3. (S/NF) EAC members reviewed on going security measures
and the Ambassador noted good compliance among Embassy
sections in varying arrival times to work. Additionally, the
EAC discussed the fact that several TDY visits seen as
&non-essential8 had been delayed pending better
understanding of the threat. EAC review of Emergency Action
Plans determined that tripwires remained constant and had not
escalated beyond the category identified by the EAC in
REFTEL. The EAC noted that one tripwire did apply from the
&Authorized Departure8 category as follows: &Credible,
specific, and non-counterable information of a terrorist
threat or planned attack against Americans or other western
citizens or interests, to include international schools.8


4. (S/NF) The RSO advised EAC members that the following
actions had been taken to ensure best security practices were
applied in light of the threat:

- RSO met with Sanaa International School,s Director. SIS
according to the review has 8 American children in attendance
(none from the U.S. Embassy) and approximately 40 other
western nationalities among a student body of about 140
students. RSO advised the EAC that he found campus security
well run, with a ram-resistant drop bar and armed sentries on
the perimeter. SIS,s Director briefed RSO that he would
implement a &move safe8 plan for students arriving to
school in coming days. RSO also reviewed architectural plans
with the School Director for an upcoming Phase II
Soft-Target, upgrade designed to prevent intruders as well as
to provide vehicular standoff and a public access center for
screening staff and visitors.

- SD residential coverage was adjusted to cover Embassy
&leadership8 positions as well as the Embassy Employee
Shuttle, while continuing spot coverage of other employee
residences and the route from the Sheraton to the Embassy.
Persons currently covered included the DCM, USAID Director,
COS, DATT, FPD, and an OMC staff officer.

- RSO advised the EAC of a review of the Yemen American
Language Institute perimeter security and access control.
RSO informed the EAC that YALI has a good public screening
activity with the newly upgraded Public Access Center, but
the perimeter security is lacking. (RSO COMMENT: ROYG
officials have prevented finalization of perimeter upgrades
due to an ongoing land dispute between the YALI owner and a
property across the street.) RSO recommended consideration
by the EAC that YALI operations be suspended until ROYG
allows placement of ram-resistant barriers and drop-bars to
prevent a vehicle from forcing itself on YALI. The EAC took
no action on the proposal.

- RSO informed the EAC that he had received a call from the
Sheraton Hotel manager in Aden, who informed him that they
had received a dramatic increase in perimeter security
improvements from the Minister of Interior who placed
ram-resistant barriers and sentries on the approaches to the
hotel. Additionally, the EAC was advised the hotel manager
informed the RSO that a 20-meter standoff would be
implemented on the hotels perimeter. RSO noted guests'
independent observations that perimeter control had improved
dramatically with use of drop bars and vehicle inspections.
(RSO COMMENT: One ARSO is in Aden as of this report to
review security with the hotel owner and manager.)
- EAC members were informed that the RSO reviewed the
Ambassador,s close protection detail and ordered the
increased use of &ghost motorcades8, suspension of
non-essential COM travel, and a dramatic change in routes
completely avoiding usual choke-points and rush hours.

- The EAC was advised of a house-by-house review by MOI on 4
April 2004, in response to RSO request for marked police
units or gun trucks on the streets line of sight of Embassy
residences either in a roving or fixed fashion. EAC was
informed that a high-level delegation of MOI officers
conducting the review promised to increase surveillance of
routes to and from the Embassy and in front of residences and
increased the number of sentries to the residential perimeter
from two to six.

- EAC was informed that Embassy Employee Shuttle schedules
were being reviewed and where necessary modified to ensure
change in travel times and routes.



5. (S/NF) EAC discussed conflicting information regarding
the attack against a military vehicle near Babal Yemen, on 29
March 2005. The DCM advised the EAC that the MOI had
informed him that it was an internal military dispute that
lead to the attack; however other sources have reported a
connection with the fighting going on in Saada. The RSO
informed the EAC about another similar grenade incident that
occurred earlier in the day near downtown Sanaa at about 1200
noon, 5 April 2005, near the Ministry of Defense. RSO
sources reported that a man dressed in clothing typical of
the Believing Youth Movement was seen throwing a grenade
through the open window of a military pick-up on a street
named Al-Qaida. The grenade was said to have been thrown
back out of the window by the intended victims, who then gave
chase to the attacker. During the chase the assailant threw
another grenade that destroyed a truck and may have killed
one pursuer. The chase ended when the man described as
having five grenades on his person, threatened to throw a
third grenade, which broke off the chase.


6. (U) The meeting ended with no further recommendations.
Khoury