SANAA EAC MEETING - 03 APRIL 2005

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000863

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS,
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/OPO/FPD, CENTCOM FOR
POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2015
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 03 APRIL 2005

REF: (A) 8386-05 (TEARLINE)

Classified By: RSO Tim Laas for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: AMB convened an EAC on 03 April, 2005
to discuss recent security threats. RMAS briefed EAC on
threat information of a sensitive nature involving an
unidentified arab male in Sana,a who is apparently in the
final stages of attack planning against " American leaders"
in Yemen. AMB emphasized the sensitivity of the threat
information to the EAC. Security posture of embassy
employees was discussed and the decision was made to cancel
visa services at the consular section for a period of 48
hours, with a core EAC to be held Tuesday, 05 April, 2005 for
reassessment of the security situation. AMB directed EAC
members to have section chiefs immediately evaluate all
current and future TDY personnel in their respective
sections, as to the necessity of their presence at the
embassy. AMB directed EAC to have all mission employees
heighten awareness and significantly increase the variance of
arrival/departure times to the embassy. EAC personnel
represented at the meeting included: DCM, LEGATT, RMAS,
POLE, OMC, FPD, MO, RMO, PD, USAID, DAO, CONS, MSG, IPC and
RSO. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) RMAS briefed EAC on an arab male named Kan'an
who was reported to be in Sana,a. He is reported to have
had contact with various terrorists in Iraq and has a team of
ten personnel with him in Sana,a. The team is reported to
have already finished surveillance and attack planning of "
American leaders " and is only waiting for funding,
equipment, and orders to commence operations. RMAS stressed
that the ROYG has been working on the issue and that there is
no information to date that the team has received funding for
the operations. DCM stated that this issue, though currently
the main threat facing the American community in Yemen, had
to be put in the context of other recent security incidents,
to include the hijacking of Yemeni USAID contractors outside
of Sana,a, the Bab-al-Yemen shopping district grenade
incident, thwarted grenade attack on AMB in DEC 04, general
threats against the Aden Sheraton, and several angry Yemeni
fathers whose sons had been allegedly killed or captured
fighting coalition forces in Iraq. RSO also noted a FEB RMAS
report of an unidentified male with a Saudi accent asking
about future clustering of Americans or westerners at the
Sheraton Hotel, Aden, and Tourist City. DCM stated that,
given all the threat reports, we had to seriously consider
our profile/footprint in Yemen.


3. (S/NF) AMB stated to EAC that the embassy community
must reduce their presence and profile in Sana,a. AMB
directed all section chiefs to analyze their current TDY
staff and determine how essential each member is to the
mission. In addition, section chiefs must make a
determination on all future TDY personnel as to whether or
not it is essential to have them come to Yemen. AMB stated
the default should be to deny TDY personnel entry unless the
section chief feels they can convince the chain of command
that they are absolutely necessary to the mission. Each
section chief is responsible for screening their incoming TDY
personnel and developing a mechanism by which the chain of
command can screen personnel as well. AMB directed the EAC
to look at embassy employees' work habits and develop
individual plans, allowing for maximum variance of
arrival/work times and varying vehicular routes.


4. (S/NF) MO brought up the issue as to whether or not
the FSN community should be included in varying arrival times
and work schedules. The EAC determined no specific mention
of threats against the FSN community. RSO provided copies of
post tripwires to EAC and noted the situations listed that
would cover potential for drawdown, authorized departure, and
ordered departure. Three situations listed for potential
drawdown had been met regarding tripwires. EAC concurred
with assessment but did not believe post met the criteria for
"Authorized Departure" given the current environment. The
EAC decided that the appropriate response to the current
threat should include reducing TDY personnel in- country,
significantly reducing TDY visits to Yemen, issuing warden
messages and public safety announcements.

5. (S/NF) RSO advised the EAC that he passed a sensitive
tear line regarding the newest threat to senior MOI officials
during a 3 April, 2005 meeting. In that meeting the RSO
asked ROYG to povide enhanced coverage of frequently used
routes from the Embassy housing area to the Embassy, focusing
on choke points, suspicious persons, packages or vehicles
with an eye for improvised explosive devices similar to those
used in Iraq against insurgent targets. Additionally, RSO
informed the EAC that he requested special coverage by marked
police cars or gun trucks at the front of Embassy residences
or coverage by more frequent roving patrols, and added
perimeter and internal security at the Sheraton Hotel in
Aden. Finally, RSO thanked MOI for the ongoing coverage of
the Sheraton Hotel in Sana'a but asked that MOI review best
practice at the Sheraton Sana'a as well as at the checkpoint
on the Embassy perimeter where employees and guests enter the
Embassy's first security cordon. MOI did a walk around with
the RSO on the Embassy perimeter observing where sentries
fighting positions could be bolstered.


6. (S/NF) RSO also briefed EAC members about the current
condition of the LGF radio network. RSO informed the EAC
that the radio network is on a banned VHF frequency that has
little ability to send and receive messages between key posts
due to the lack of transmitters and mountainous terrain in
Sana'a. Additionally, RSO noted that the LGF radio equipment
is deteriorating rapidly. However, RSO advised the EAC that
117K USD of UHF equipment has been provided through DS
funding and is in shipment. Noting the inability of post to
obtain new frequencies, the EAC discussed the viability of
placing LGF communications temporarily on the only existing
frequency that is also the E&E network. RSO recommended this
solution due to the fact that the Embassy has tried for years
to purchase an additional frequency with no success. On the
subject of emergency communications, RSO also requested MO
and the EAC look at new software reported to be available for
mobile phones in Sana'a, which would allow the Embassy to
have a more responsive telephone tree programmed with all
community members mobile phone text messaging addresses that
will allow one emergency or warden message to be sent via
text message instantly to all community member/employees
whose mobile phones are programmed. EAC members showed
interest in this enhancement for sending urgent unclassified
text messages regarding breaking security alerts. MO noted
difficulties in dealing with ROYG contacts regarding the
placement of transmitters and acquiring of new frequencies.
The Ambassador concurred that improvements in emergency
communication need ongoing attention from applicable Embassy
offices to include IPC and RSO.


7. (S/NF) EAC concluded with the following decisions
being made: Effective immediately, and for the next 48
hours, the consular section would not be open for visa
applicants/services, a security advisory would be issued to
the embassy community regarding best security practices with
routes, travel, work schedules, and personal habits, and a
warden message would be issued, advising all Americans in
Yemen to defer in-country travel pending clarification of the
security situation. EAC considered issuing an advisory
restricting travel to and from home and the embassy but
decided that was not warranted at this time but would be
evaluated again at the core EAC meeting in 48 hours. DCM
instructed each section head to have their staff read this
EAC report to ensure clear understanding of the EAC security
guidance. AMB reiterated again that section heads must
commence TDY personnel reduction screening immediately.
Krajeski