CDA DELIVERS IRAQ ELECTIONS DEMARCHE, DISCUSSES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000076

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV YM PARMS DEMARCHE COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: CDA DELIVERS IRAQ ELECTIONS DEMARCHE, DISCUSSES
SA/LW PROBLEM

REF: A. STATE 275109


B. SANAA 9

C. 03SANAA 2790

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.5 b and d.


1. (C) Summary. CDA delivered ref A demarche to Principle
Deputy Foreign Minister al-Dhabbi on January 8. In addition
to the Iraqi elections, discussions focused on relations
between the ROYG and its opposition in Parliament and media,
the al-Khaiwani case, proliferation of small arms and light
weapons (SA/LWs) and ROYG failure to release visiting General
Abizaid's communications equipment from the airport on
January 3. End Summary.

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Iraqi Elections
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2. (C) CDA delivered ref A demarche points to Prime Deputy
Foreign Minister Dhabbi on January 8, emphasizing the need
for ROYG support for the political process in Iraq. Dhabbi
listened to the message without comment, but affirmed that
the ROYG plans to send election observers. (Comment:
President Saleh advised visiting General Abizaid that the
elections should be postponed pending greater dialogue with
Sunni elements to ensure their participation in the
elections, ref B. While a public statement of support for
the January 30 date is not likely, MFA officials affirm ROYG
policy is to support the political process in Iraq, saying
that the alternative would be disastrous for the entire
region. End Comment).

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ROYG - Opposition Relations are "Boiling..."
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3. (C) Dhabbi told CDA that that the government's relations
with opposition elements are extremely tense. He attributed
tensions to ROYG efforts to push through tough but necessary
economic reforms and said the opposition is taking advantage
of public apprehension about the cost of reforms by "playing
a very negative role." Our relations with the opposition are
"boiling," Dhabbi complained, "and at the same we are trying
to fight terrorism and arrest terrorist suspects." Implying
that the ROYG takes considerable heat from the opposition for
its partnership with the U.S. in the GWOT, Dhabbi raised the
reason he had asked for this meeting: "When diplomats and
foreigners talk frequently to opposition leaders and
journalists, he told CDA, "you give them the impression that
they have your support." CDA responded that the Embassy
maintains relationships and has routine contact with members
of the opposition and the press as a matter of course, and
that we would continue to do so. Dhabbi replied that he
understood, but complained that when U.S. diplomats meet
with, for example, the press syndicate and discuss the case
of jailed journalist Khaiwani (ref C),"they take this to
mean you support them against the government."

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Khaiwani Prosecuted According to the Law
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4. (C) Dhabbi confided to CDA that he personally, along with
others in the ROYG, did not agree with the jailing of
Khaiwani, however, the as-Shura editor was tried and
imprisoned according to the law. The DFM said that the ROYG
was working on amendments to the Press Law, including banning
the arrest of journalists for expression, but said it would
take some time for a new law to be drafted and approved. CDA
responded that the Embassy's position on Khaiwani's continued
imprisonment was clear -- "it's a bad idea. Those calling
for Khaiwani's release do have our moral support even if we
have so far refrained from making a public comment on the
issue." CDA told Dhabbi that the U.S. remains concerned
about the Khaiwani case, as well as the arrest, detention and
intimidation of other journalists. He told Dhabbi that these
events represent a government crackdown on the media dating
back to the al-Houthi insurgency last summer. It is damaging
to Yemen's reputation in the international community, advised
CDA, and may affect qualification for the MCA and other
international development assistance programs.

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SA/LWs
--------------


5. (S) CDA raised U.S. concerns about SA/LWs proliferation in
Yemen, pointing out that despite Saleh's repeated pledges,
arms dealers continue to pursue weapons deals on behalf of
the ROYG that far exceed the needs of the Yemeni Armed
Forces. Dhabbi said that following A/S Bloomfield's meeting
with Saleh last September, the President declared it illegal
for dealers to buy weapons from eastern European or FSU
countries. Nevertheless, pressed CDA, this practice is
occurring as we speak, and the only reason to bring in excess
arms into Yemen is to sell them on the regional black market.
These weapons end up in terrorist hands, said CDA, and the
USG remains prepared to help Yemen close this revolving door
and get control of its weapons smuggling problem. Dhabbi
agreed the issue must be tackled. "Those people," he said,
"are making fortunes regardless of the damage to Yemen."

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Abizaid's Luggage/Communications Equipment
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6. (C) CDA told Dhabbi that although the General's meetings
with President Saleh and ROYG military officials went quite
well, the visit was in many ways dominated by the refusal of
the Yemeni authorities to clear the party's communications
equipment. CDA characterized the incident as disturbing,
demonstrating the level of the ROYG's mistrust for the U.S.
Dhabbi said he had heard about the incident after General
Abizaid had departed, and that there seems to have been some
confusion over the unusual amount of equipment accompanying
Abizaid. CDA said that it was not unusual at all for General
Abizaid to have his personal communications equipment when
overnighting off base. CDA added that General Abizaid will
be reluctant to make another overnight visit to Yemen in the
near future.


7. (C) Dhabbi disputed that the luggage fiasco was intended
as a political message from the highest levels of the ROYG,
it was, he insisted the unfortunate result of the Yemeni
bureaucratic "mentality." We are not accustomed to anyone
but the President traveling with such equipment, he said.
Dhabbi suggested that next time the Embassy work face-to-face
with the MFA, in addition to submitting all the necessary
paperwork to customs authorities. CDA responded that we
would do so, however, we do interpret the decision to hold
the luggage and equipment as emanating from the highest
levels of the ROYG, and that it was not taken well here or in
Washington and may well have unfortunate repercussions.


8. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Noman, a western-leaning
reformer, agreed it was an appalling incident. In a January
9 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief he reported that both FM Qirbi
and Presidential Advisor Iryani were in the room with
President Saleh when he gave the green light to release all
of Abizaid party's luggage and equipment. Noman said that
according to Iryani, Saleh's words were, "let it all in, just
make sure that it all leaves with him." Noman said it was
possible, however, that the President said this only to
appease Qirbi and Iryani, or that someone else later
convinced him to reverse his decision. Noman agreed with
Dhabbi's assessment that it is ultimately a problem of
"mentality."


9. (C) Comment. Post has become accustomed to occasional
injunctions against meeting with the opposition, injunctions
which reflect increased sensitivity on behalf of the ROYG to
the activism of the opposition and the impact of this
activism on Yemen's international image. ROYG's acting out
against the opposition by trying to intimidate the media, and
letting their suspicions of the USG get the better of them by
holding up a VIP's personal luggage and equipment is self
defeating and harms both their image and interests in the
international community. End Comment.
KHOURY