Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA602
2005-03-16 04:39:00
SECRET
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

TURNING SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES: YEMEN'S CHIEF OF

Tags:  PINR PREL PTER COUNTER TERRORISM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000602 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARPI AND PM

E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 03/15/2010
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: TURNING SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES: YEMEN'S CHIEF OF
STAFF RECEIVES HIS INSTRUCTIONS ON SA/LW

REF: A. A) SANAA 580

B. B) SANAA 564

C. C) STATE 39726

Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

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Summary:
--------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000602

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARPI AND PM

E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 03/15/2010
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: TURNING SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES: YEMEN'S CHIEF OF
STAFF RECEIVES HIS INSTRUCTIONS ON SA/LW

REF: A. A) SANAA 580

B. B) SANAA 564

C. C) STATE 39726

Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

--------------
Summary:
--------------


1. (S) During a 3/15 meeting with General Gassemi, Chief of
Staff of the armed forces of Yemen, DCM, DATT and OMC
presented Gassemi with recently released photos and serial
numbers of the weapons found on two of the Jedda Consulate
attackers in December. DCM briefed Gassemi on the
conversations the Ambassador and DCM had earlier in the week
with President Saleh on the urgency of stemming the flow of
illegal weapons in and out of Yemen. Gassemi confirmed to DCM
that he had received his instructions from President Saleh
and that he wanted to cooperate fully with us to end this
chapter of Yemen's history and open a new page of cooperation
with the USG in the GWOT. Gassemi asked for any copies of any
MOD End User Certificates (EUCs) so he could track recycled,
forged and new ones being issued (presumably without his
knowledge). We also talked to Gassemi about the inauguration
of a Civil Affairs project in Saada, the DATT's credentials
and the use of 05 FMF allocations. End Summary.

--------------
This practice cannot continue:
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2. DCM reiterated to General Gassemi what the Foreign
Minister and President Saleh have already heard: There is
concern at the highest levels in Washington that officially
ordered weapons (SA/LW) are ending up in the hands of
terrorists and that the U.S. is prepared to take unilateral
steps to stop this practice. DCM said that this concern is
not new, but is being reinforced with new information and a
new sense of urgency that Yemen could not be allowed to
continue being an arms bazaar for the region. "You have
always put us off in the past," said the DCM, "by asking for
information on specifics. We are now ready to share
intelligence with you to prove that our fears are well
founded." DCM also advised Qassemi of President Saleh's
suggestion to buy back and dispose of weapons from Yemeni
souks with American and Saudi help. "This idea can only
work," said the DCM, if it's part of a three-pronged approach
to cut off the inflow of weapons at the source, introduce new
controls on MOD stocks and finally outlaw weapons bazaars and

collect excess weapons from the streets."


3. Gassemi then looked at the photos of the two weapons from
the Jedda attack and their serial numbers and passed them to
an aid. He then called for a copy of the orders he had just
received from President Saleh. DCM viewed the instructions
and verified that they were indeed the same as the letter
Saleh had given us the day before. Gassemi then said that he
and his colleagues realize the damage this practice is doing
to the reputation of Yemen and the ever increasing risks of
acts of terrorism in the region and inside Yemen. "We are
convinced and we want to change this situation." Gassemi
asked about the arms dealers who are presenting these MOD
EUCs and shook his head in sarcasm when told it was mainly
Faris al-Manna' and two or three more arms dealers. He then
asked us for copies of any such documents that we can lay our
hands on so that he could track and find out what percentage
were recycled from old orders, how many were forgeries and
how many were still being issued without his knowledge. DCM
replied that we would do our best to supply him with the
information he needs. "As long as there is transparency
between us and an agreement on principles", said the DCM, "we
can work out the details and help one another stamp out this
practice and turn a new page in our relationship."

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Other items on the agenda:
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4. Other topics of conversation included the credentialing
of the DATT, which has thus far been held up by the ROYG on
the pretext of not having received our paper work. Upon
further probing, it turned out that MOD is smarting from a
perception that we had deliberately held up their previous
DATT in Washington for six months without proper
credentialing. DCM assured Gassemi that the visa problem of
last year would be avoided with their new DATT (yet to come
forward with a visa request) by ensuring that he received the
right visa from the beginning. On the Saada trip, we assured
Gassemi - who had balked at the high level delegation we
planned to send to inaugurate a military CA built school -
that the we intended the trip to symbolize a return to
normalcy in the north and to offer further assistance in
reconstruction efforts after last summer's fighting in that
region.


5. On use of FMF funds, we were able to clear up ongoing
confusion at MOD on previous year funds, orders for the use
of which have already been placed with DOD, and FY 05 money
($14.9) for which we needed ideas and priorities. The DATT
and OMC Chief agreed to set up a working level meeting in the
near future in which to detail, for the record, what has
already been requested with a projected timeline for
execution and to discuss how to implement the priorities of
MOD - to whit, equipping and training five new special forces
battalions and border patrols and forces.

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Comment:
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6. We sense a new found will at the highest levels of the
ROYG to change years of old and bad habits where it concerns
the arms trade. Even at MOD, where much of the corruption has
hitherto centered, there seems to be a realization that they
cannot continue with business as usual. Having witnessed
false starts before, we are not yet ready to cash in our
well-founded skepticism only to replace it with false
expectations. The challenge before Saleh and his MOD generals
is to bite the bullets),wean themselves and their supporters
away from what has thus far been a lucrative business and
quickly adapt to a new culture and a new way of doing this
when it comes to weapons procurement and weapon controls. We
are convinced that our willingness to stop the recent Serbian
sale has much to do with this new-found resolve in Yemen. We
should now follow-up with other European vendors and ask
their help in keeping Saleh honest. The pressure has to
remain if this new political will is to survive; a will that
is, after all supported by a liberal minority within the ROYG
on principle. Unfortunately, this minority has not so far
been able to press their point home to the real decision
makers in their government. Perhaps this situation can now
change, with a little help from their friends. End comment.
Krajeski