Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA580
2005-03-14 11:43:00
SECRET
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SALEH WISHES TO CONVEY HIS COMMITMENT ON SA/LW

Tags:  PINR PREL PTER YE COUNTER TERRORISM 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000580 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARPI
NSC FOR FTOWNSEND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2010
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER YE COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SALEH WISHES TO CONVEY HIS COMMITMENT ON SA/LW
DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT BUSH

REF: SANAA 00564

Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 (d)

--------------------------
Summary and Action Request:
---------------------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000580

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARPI
NSC FOR FTOWNSEND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2010
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER YE COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SALEH WISHES TO CONVEY HIS COMMITMENT ON SA/LW
DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT BUSH

REF: SANAA 00564

Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 (d)

--------------
Summary and Action Request:
--------------


1. (S) Following up on his 3/10 meeting with Ambassador and
DCM, during which he made a pledge to ban once and for all
the importation of weapons by independent arms dealers,
President Saleh has requested a phone conversation with
President Bush in order to personally convey to him his
commitment on SA/LW and the GWOT. Post promised to pass the
message to Washington, making no promises, but recommending
that Saleh use the opportunity to make a very clear and
specific commitment to President Bush, if the call actually
takes place. Saleh has provided us with a copy of a letter he
sent to his Minister of Defense, immediately following our
3/10 meeting with him, in which he instructs MOD to consider
null and void all End User Certificates (EUCs) previously
issued to arms dealers and to desist henceforth from issuing
same to any arms dealer. Post recommends a ten minute phone
call be arranged with President Bush in order to put the
highest pressure possible on Saleh to keep his commitment on
stopping the flow of illegal weapons in and out of Yemen.
End summary and action request.

--------------
Quick Follow-up:
--------------


2. (S) Following closely on the heels of his meeting with
Ambassador and DCM, President Saleh asked his counselor for
media and public affairs, Abdo al-Burji, to meet with DCM to
convey Saleh's seriousness, when he pledged to the Ambassador
that he would take action on the illegal flow of SA/LW into
and out of Yemen. Bourji, told DCM, 3/13, that President
Saleh took very seriously the evidence we provided on MOD
purchased weapons ending up in the hands of terrorists.
Saleh, said Bourji, wanted to let us know that he has already
issued instructions to MOD and MOI to cancel all previously
issued certificates to all arms dealers and to only buy
weapons through official procurement channels from this day
on. Bourji then advised DCM that Saleh would like to convey
his commitment personally to President Bush in order to

eliminate any doubts about him in Washington. Saleh, said
Bourji, would also take that opportunity to reconfirm his
commitment to U.S.-Yemeni partnership in the GWOT.


3. (S) DCM applauded the President's sentiments and, without
making any commitments, said the Embassy would convey Saleh's
request to the White House and would get back to the
President on approval and timing of the call. DCM quickly
added, however, that should the phone call take place, Saleh
should be very clear and very specific in his commitment to
President Bush. Saleh had asked the Ambassador on 3/13, to
see if Washington would ask the Saudis for money to help the
ROYG buy back SA/LW from Yemeni souks. DCM said that such a
request should be put in the context of a comprehensive
strategy that would:

A. Stop the flow of weapons into Yemen through arms dealers
that routinely kept at least 50% of their purchases for sale
on the private market.

B. Implement a modern inventory and procurement system
(something we had offered to help MOD with on previous
occasions) and to have, therefore, a control system in place
that would easily show how each imported weapon had been
disposed of.

C. A buy-back initiative would then make sense, coupled with
the first two steps and followed by a complete ban on arms
bazaars in Yemen.

Bourji took careful notes and promised to share them with
Saleh and to so advise him in the matter.

--------------
Dulqum, Mo'ayad and Zindani:
--------------


4. (S) On the way out of the meeting with Counselor Bourji,
President Saleh, strolling out of his gazebo with one of his
bodyguards, called to DCM and asked how the meeting had gone.
On finding out that it was only a verbal briefing, he
immediately sent for a copy of his instructions to MOD and
gave it to DCM. "I want you to let Washington know," said
Saleh," exactly what I told my ministers. There will no
longer be any dealings with weapons merchants." Saleh went on
to ask that we jointly find a way out of "the Hadi Dulqum
predicament." "Please tell Washington," said Saleh, that if I
thought this man was dangerous, I'd never let him go. Quite
frankly, I find Abdelmajid Zindani (the rector of al-Iman
University and listed by the UN as a financier of terrorism),
more dangerous and would rather have him under arrest than
have Dulqum." DCM replied that we would have to work that one
closely and see if Yemen's Attorney General could use our
intel on Dulqum to try him under Yemeni law. As a parting
shot, Saleh said that he did not think Sheikh al-Mo'ayad
deserved the conviction he received in the U.S. "because all
you have on him is support for Hamas and, all Yemenis
support Hamas!" Nonetheless, Saleh reassured us, the
conviction is not likely to cause any adverse public reaction
in Yemen.

--------------
Action Request:
--------------


5. (S) Post requests approval for 5-10 minutes on the
President's schedule, preferably in the next week-to-ten
days, to take a call from President Saleh. We will urge Saleh
to make the points in par.3. Saleh also wanted to
congratulate President Bush on his election to a second term
in office. Saleh may always ad-lib and use the call ask for
financial assistance in buying out the weapons souks in his
country. We recommend the president reiterate to Saleh that
any buy-back project must be contingent on the first two
steps (cutting the flow and introducing new stock controls)
being accomplished. End action request.
Krajeski