SALEH SAYS FROM NOW ON NO MORE WEAPONS DEALS USING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000564

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2015
TAGS: PREL ETTC PARM PHUM IZ SA SR YM DEMARCHE COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SALEH SAYS FROM NOW ON NO MORE WEAPONS DEALS USING
ARMS BROKERS

REF: STATE 39726

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (U) This is an action request for NEA/ARPI. See para. 12.


2. (S) Summary. Ambassador delivered reftel demarche to
President Saleh on March 10. In a classic Saleh move to put
his interlocutors on the defensive, the Yemeni President
opened with a theatrical tirade on the latest Human Rights
Report and U.S. hegemony and double standards in the region.
Starting with an offensive that the U.S. cannot stop
legitimate arms sales to Yemen, Saleh changed his tone in
mid-meeting. He conceded that the ROYG had had a fifty-fifty
deal with arms merchants before, but that he was ending this
practice. Having first said that the shipment of 10,000 M92s
was already on its way, upon hearing that we had stopped it,
Saleh switched gears, insisting he had issued an order to
stop it himself. Saleh ended with a promise, that from now
on it would be "official policy" that only the MOD may buy
weapon on behalf of Yemen. End Summary.


3. (S) Ambassador, DCM and PolEcon Chief (notetaker) met with
President Saleh on March 10 to deliver reftel demarche on the
cancellation of Yemen's purchase of 10,000 M92 automatic
rifles from SaM. In an attempt to preempt this unpleasant
message, Saleh, who had been given a heads-up regarding its
content, jumped in first. "You don't like our Serbian deal
and we don't like your human rights report." Saleh
complained that the U.S. hammers Yemen on its human rights
record, while demanding extra judicial treatment for Yemeni
detainees like Hadi Dulqum, and Jaber al-Banna.


4. (S) Saleh announced that on March 9, due to criticisms of
Yemen's human rights practices from the Department of State,
Congress, and international and local NGOs, he decided to
refer the cases of Hadi Dulqum, Jaber al-Banna, and Abu Assem
al-Makki to the Attorney General's office for prosecution.
"If there is a case, we will try them, if not, they must be
released." Ambassador told Saleh he looked forward to
discussing human rights issues with him at a future date, but
reminded the President that he had come to deliver a very
specific and serious message about Yemeni SA/LW purchases.
"Yes we buy weapons," Saleh retorted, "we are an independent
state and we need them."

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Preserving Our Partnership
--------------


5. (S) Ambassador told Saleh that the U.S. fully recognized
Yemen's legitimate defense needs, but that the weapons
procured on behalf of the ROYG by third party Yemeni arms
dealers far exceed such requirements and are ending up in the
hands of terrorists. The USG has grave concerns at the
highest levels, continued Ambassador, and urgent action is
needed in order to preserve the U.S.-Yemeni partnership.


6. (S) Ambassador informed Saleh that the USG has been able
to trace two M92s automatic rifles used in the December
attack on our Jeddah Consulate to Yemeni MOD procurement
orders. Raising the SaM deal for 10,000 M92s, Ambassador
told Saleh that Yemen's defense and security forces could not
possibly need so many of this specialized weapon -- one
highly favored by terrorists for its light weight, small
size, and high fire power.

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You Can't Do That
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador reminded Saleh that early last year he had
promised to cancel all end-user certificates (EUC) and
transfer licensing authority to the MFA. Yet, continued
Ambassador, there is no evidence of a change in ROYG policy
regarding third-party procurement. In an effort to
demonstrate how seriously the U.S. takes this matter,
Ambassador told Saleh, the U.S. has asked the Government of
Serbia and Montenegro to cancel the sale of 10,000 M92s to
Yemen. "You can't do that," retorted Saleh, "the guns are
already on their way!"

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...Yes, Mr. President, We Can
--------------


8. (S) "Mr. President, we can and indeed we have," said
Ambassador, adding that along with the U.S., weapons
producing Eastern European countries are losing confidence in
the legitimacy of Yemeni EUCs. Grasping perhaps for the
first time the seriousness of the message, Saleh asked which
broker had negotiated the M92 deal with SaM, and agreed that
the M92 had a "dangerous shot" favored by terrorists. Saleh
suddenly announced, "When I heard of this deal yesterday, I
gave the order myself to cancel it!"

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...Loud and Clear
--------------


9. (S) Switching gears, Saleh conceded that "in the past" he
had allowed arms dealers to keep 50 percent of weapons
purchases for the ROYG, with the other 50 percent going to
the armed forces. "But no more," Saleh declared. Likely
concerned which deals might be next stopped, he hastened to
inform Ambassador that he personally had just signed a Czech
deal for 10,000 pistols and 5,000 'ordinary' AKs for use by
his regular forces. "All other deals negotiated by arms
dealers are null and void --This is an official decision,"
Saleh said. Turning to his aide he instructed, "Write that
down!"

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Tell Prince Nayef to Help Buy Out Our Souks
--------------


10. (S) "We do not give arms to terrorists," Saleh said to
Ambassador, admitting that arms of all kinds are available in
Yemen's weapons souks and "anyone can buy them." Saleh said
that arms dealers will sell to anyone, "just like Hadi
Dulqum," adding that "if you and the Saudis are so worried"
help me clean out the souks. Saleh told us that Saudi
Interior Minister Prince Nayef was due in Sanaa on March 11
to sign a new border security fence protocol with Yemen on
March 12. He suggested that the U.S. and KSA work together
to determine the right sum of money, "perhaps 200-300 million
dollars," and agree to "buy out all the arms bazaars in
Yemen."


11. (S) Ambassador and DCM both pressed Saleh to tread
carefully on Hadi Dulqum -- not an ordinary arms merchant but
dealer to AQ -- and give us more time to find a legal
solution to his case. While the U.S.-Saudi buyback idea can
be explored, Ambassador reiterated to Saleh that the flow of
illegal weapons must be shut off for any internal arms
control measures to be effective.


12. (S) Comment and Action Request. At his acrobatic best,
Saleh started of aggressively but ended up admitting to
"mistakes" and promising to make a break with past practices.
Prince Nayef's visit may be an occasion to put more pressure
on Saleh by promising U.S.-Saudi efforts to help him keep his
word. If the SAG is willing, we might jointly press Saleh to
follow through on canceling pending arms deals in Eastern
Europe, sever his ties with his favorite arms dealers, and
accept our help in putting in place a modern inventory
control system to help him (and us) account for all weapons
purchased by MOD henceforth. A buyback plan, in this
context, might be worth the cost. Begin Action Request:
Post requests comment on feasibility of asking KSA at such
short notice to use Nayef's visit March 11 visit to join us
in a trilateral exploration of this idea. End Comment and
Action Request.
Krajeski