GENERAL ABIZAID'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SALEH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000036

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER MASS IZ YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: GENERAL ABIZAID'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SALEH

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.5 b and d.


1. (C) Summary. USCENTCOM Commander General Abizaid met with
President Saleh on January 4. Discussions centered on Iraqi
elections, regional security, and U.S.-Yemen cooperation in
the GWOT. Both agreed that U.S.-Yemen joint security efforts
should continue and increase in the new year, with Abizaid
pressing for enhanced information sharing, particularly on
fighting al-Qa'ida. Discussions with Ministry of Defense and
Yemeni Coast Guard officials were useful in specifying areas
for bilateral military cooperation. Failure to clear the
General's communications equipment through airport security,
however, pointed to continuing opaqueness of the ROYG's
Political Security Organization (PSO). End Summary.

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Iraqi Elections: Engage the Ba'thists
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2. (C) Getting right to the point, President Saleh advised
General Abizaid that the Iraqi elections be postponed,
warning that holding elections now guarantees a Shia-heavy
government and, therefore, he said, a divided society. "It
is no shame, advised Saleh, to talk with the Sunni Ba'thist
opposition." He proposed that the U.S. engage in dialogue
with Iraqi Ba'thists and other Sunni supporters of the
insurgency with to goal of holding "a more balanced election
in the future." By isolating the Iraqi Ba'thists Saleh
continued, "you force them into the Zarqawi camp." General
Abizaid responded that the U.S. is willing to talk to anyone
in Iraq with the exception of al Qa'ida, Zarqawi and other
terrorists. To postpone the elections, however, would be a
victory for terrorism. Saleh reiterated the need to bring
the Iraqi Sunnis and Ba'thists inside the tent and suggested
that the USG employ Syrian Ba'athists to facilitate such a
dialogue. Saleh also offered his own good offices to
establish such contacts, suggesting that his Iraqi ex-
Ba'thist military advisors could serve as conduits to
Ba'thists inside Iraq."think about it," he said, "and let me
know if I can help." Despite his view that elections should
be postponed, Saleh confirmed that the ROYG would be sending
Yemeni election observers to Iraq for the January 30
elections in coordination with the Canadian government.

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CT Cooperation
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3. (S) Abizaid told Saleh he had just had a useful meeting
with Minister of Defense Alaiwa and Chief of Staff Qassemi in
which he expressed his support for continued and increased
security and counter-terrorism cooperation in 2005. Saleh
agreed, saying that he hoped U.S.-Yemen joint efforts in the
GWOT as well as economic and military cooperation would
expand. Abizaid referred to earlier ROYG requests for
intelligence sharing, saying that the U.S. remained ready to
provide such assistance. (Note: Saleh had requested U.S.
military aircraft reconnaissance flights over the areas of
the al-Houthi rebellion. After interagency agreement,
however, the ROYG declined the assistance saying the
insurgency had already been put down. End Note). Emphasizing
the importance of ROYG intel-sharing to our joint security
interests, Abizaid assured President Saleh that the U.S.
would continue to be forthcoming. General Abizaid
complimented the ROYG (and the MOI in particular) on recent
CT related arrests and pressed for full information sharing
and coordination with the USG Embassy on those arrests.

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Did you pack all that luggage yourself?
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4. (S) Belying the friendly and useful discussions General
Abizaid had with ROYG officials at MOD, YCG (details septel)
and President Saleh, was a standoff at Sanaa airport between
the General's staff and airport officials over the clearance
of the General's luggage and communications equipment through
customs. Embassy high level contacts managed to get the
traveling party's personal luggage released, but not the
communications gear. Airport officials insisted that they
needed a letter from President Saleh personally to allow the
equipment in - a permission which is not routinely required
and which was impossible to obtain on such short notice.
(Comment: The Deputy Director of the President's office told
CDA that he personally appealed to General Gamesh, the crusty
old guard Director of the Political Security Organization
(PSO) in this matter. That Gamesh did not authorize the
release of the equipment is not surprising, given the lack of
transparency and trust we regularly experience in our
dealings with this organization. More troubling, is the
possibility that Saleh himself may have been informed of this
situation and failed to give his instructions to resolve it.
End comment).

KHOURY