Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA3470
2005-12-13 13:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

RESTORING ESF FUNDS IS A PRIORITY FOR THE GWOT IN

Tags:  PREL PTER EAID MASS YM COUNTER TERRORISM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 003470 

SIPDIS

FOR NEA A/S WELCH AND DAS CHENEY FROM AMBASSADOR KRAJESKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID MASS YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: RESTORING ESF FUNDS IS A PRIORITY FOR THE GWOT IN
YEMEN

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 003470

SIPDIS

FOR NEA A/S WELCH AND DAS CHENEY FROM AMBASSADOR KRAJESKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID MASS YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: RESTORING ESF FUNDS IS A PRIORITY FOR THE GWOT IN
YEMEN

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: If current budget allocations hold, Yemen
will lose all but its military assistance funding for FY06.
Economic Support Funds (ESF) have been reduced to zero, and
Yemen's participation in the Millenium Challenge Account
(MCA) Threshold Program was suspended. In addition, Yemen
will likely not receive USDA monetized food assistance this
fiscal year. While several of these funding cuts -- such as
MCA and USDA -- are consequences of the Yemenis' own poor
governance, the removal of ESF funds is due to our own budget
difficulties. As tight as USG funds may be, we believe that
eliminating ESF support at this crucial time for Yemen could
seriously threaten security, and could increase the chances
that we will need to make a much larger investment in the
near future to stabilize what could become a failed state.
In that context, post strongly recommends that Department
consider restoring Yemen's ESF funds to at least their FY05
levels. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Since 1999, when the USG made the strategic decision
to re-start its development relationship with Yemen, the
primary focus of our programming has been fighting terrorism.
We began by devising a strategy to invest our resources in
five underserved governorates where the central government's
writ is weak, and where support for al-Qaida was strongest.
Since then, USAID has spent more than USD 36 million in ESF
funding alone in the five governorates, improving access to
education and health care, and strengthening income
generating agricultural activities. The results of our
efforts have been both highly visible and effective. As one
Marib sheikh told Ambassador in late 2004, "You promised that
if we gave up kidnappings and supporting terrorism, you would
build us hospitals. We upheld our end of the bargain and so
did you."


3. (C) ESF support has been complemented by robust funding
from USDA food assistance programs valued at more than USD
100 million since 1999. Embassy has used these funds, in

coordination with the Yemeni Government, to build hospitals,
health clinics, rural access roads, and more. Due to
questions about the ROYG's handling of some of these funds,
USDA programs for Yemen, valued at approximately USD 10
million, were not funded in FY05, and FY06 funds may be in
jeopardy, pending the outcome of a working visit by a USDA
compliance team.


4. (C) Yemeni reformers had hoped that their plans to
re-structure the judiciary would receive a boost of up to USD
30 million this year through the MCA Threshold Program, but
Yemen's participation in that initiative was suspended due to
the ROYG's poor performance on a range of indicators. We
are, with some success, using the suspension as leverage to
push President Saleh into taking bold and aggressive steps to
deal with some of Yemen's overriding problems, first and
foremost of which is corruption, but Yemen cannot be
reinstated and MCA funds made available until late 2006 at
best.


5. (C) The primary reason why we have that leverage right
now is due to President Saleh's productive meetings in
Washington in early November. During his visit, Saleh heard
from President Bush, the Secretary, and other senior
officials about the critical importance of reducing
corruption in Yemen and improving Yemen's poor governance
indicators with the support and cooperation of the United
States. Saleh appears to have taken the message to heart.
Upon his return from Washington, he ordered his cabinet to
develop a comprehensive reform plan, and directed the ruling
party to formulate a reform platform in time for its December
congress. While political will can go a long way toward
pressuring Saleh to match his words with actions, many of
these programs will need our financial resources to make them
a sustainable reality.


6. (C) If only half of NEA's un-earmarked FY06 ESF funds are
allocated to Yemen, as has been suggested, this will
represent a 50 percent cut in USAID funding compared to FY05.
Considering Yemen's economic crisis and the fact that 2006
is a presidential election year, we would allocate as many of
those resources as possible to our core programs in
democracy/governance and economic growth, to the detriment of
health and education projects. Even with such austerity
measures, if no new funding is found by June 2006, contracts
will need to be terminated, advisors demobilized, and
projects ended across the board, including the
democracy/governance dialogue. If that came to pass, the
Yemeni people and government officials, especially the many
reformers among them, would rightly think that we are walking
away from Yemen just when the country needs us most.


7. (C) Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East.
Political instability in this country, fueled by an economic
collapse, would create favorable conditions for the spread of
extremist ideology. In the face of these challenges, Yemen
is looking to make the right choices in a crucial period of
transition. If reformers can manage to carry the day and
implement necessary changes, Yemen has the potential to join
the family of economically viable democratic nations.
President Bush and senior Washington officials have opened a
rare window of opportunity with President Saleh, and we must
do all we can to take advantage of it.


8. (C) If the ROYG fails at or abandons its reform agenda,
Yemen risks becoming a failed state, endangering its
neighbors, fueling extremism, and attracting al-Qaida to make
camp once again in Yemen, its oft-declared "third
battleground." It is therefore important to U.S. national
security that we remain committed to funding USAID programs
through ESF funding at FY05 levels at the very least.
Considering the costs involved in stabilizing Yemen if it
becomes a failed state, the investments the USG is making in
this country and its people now will prove infinitely less
expensive in blood and treasure.
Krajeski