SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO YEMEN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 003231

SIPDIS

FOR GENERAL ABIZAID FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2025
TAGS: PTER PREL MASS MARR OVIP YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO YEMEN

Classified By: CDA NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Welcome back to Sanaa. Although Yemen remains an
important regional partner in the GWOT with a post-9/11
string of CT successes, cooperation on this front has not
been perfect -- a point that was made clear to President
Saleh during his visit to Washington last week. You will be
the first high-level U.S. official Saleh will meet after his
departure from the United States, and, although the tone of
his meetings with senior officials was generally positive, he
will likely express some disappointment that his visit did
not generate a coordinated effort to move the U.S.-Yemeni
relationship to the strategic level he would like. The
reality is, however, that the Republic of Yemen Government
(ROYG) will need to do more in many areas, particularly in CT
cooperation, in order to raise our relationship to a higher
level.


2. (C) Your visit comes against the backdrop of the
beginning of the campaign season for Yemen's presidential and
local council elections, which are scheduled to take place
next year. Saleh has announced that he will not seek a third
term, but most observers expect the ruling party to formally
nominate him at their general conference in December -- and
for Saleh to reluctantly accept. At that point, Saleh is
expected to name a caretaker cabinet until the elections, a
long overdue move that will alter the political landscape,
but will not likely have a major impact on the ROYG's
foreign, defense or CT policies.


3. (C) With regard to the U.S.-Yemeni security relationship,
there are several items we can list on the positive side of
the ledger. For example, the USG and the ROYG have succeeded
in creating out of whole cloth Yemen's two premier CT forces
since 2001: the Central Security Forces - Counter Terrorism
Unit (CSF-CTU) and the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG) within the
Ministry of Interior (MOI). With USG training and equipment,
CSF-CTU and YCG have become capable and professional forces
that have already logged notable successes in a short period
of time. The ROYG has stepped up its own efforts against
terrorist cells, leading to significant arrests over the past
few months.


4. (C) Spurred on by MOI's successes, the Ministry of
Defense (MOD) has recently moved to expand and normalize its
cooperation with Embassy military offices. Despite a slow
start as they learned the intricacies of the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) program, MOD is beginning to use FMF funds
more effectively to purchase spare parts, training, and other
items. We are encouraged by the MOD's recent submission of a
3-5 year CT and Border Security Plan, and the establishment
of an MOD Working Group, to help focus FMF resources on
shared areas of interest.


5. (C) Despite continuing difficulties in obtaining access
to the Yemeni Special Operations Forces (YSOF),there have
been improvements in cooperation between YSOF and CSF-CTU.
CJTF-HOA's Special Operations Forces Liaison Element - Yemen
(SOFLE-Y) coordinated joint YSOF and CSF-CTU platoon/squad
training, and two YSOF observers accompanied the CSF-CTU
fly-away training mission to Djibouti in August.


6. (C) Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Operations, conducted by
CJTF HOA elements, have also increased sharply over the past
year. Only one project had been implemented as of February
2005, but as of today four projects have been completed, six
are underway, and many more are planned for 2006.


7. (S) The ROYG has also taken measures to stem the flow of
fighters to Iraq. These include stopping at the airport
young, single men who are bound for Saudi Arabia, Syria or
the UAE, and interviewing them. Many of those stopped for
questioning are ultimately barred from leaving the country.


8. (C) Despite these positive developments, there remain
several obstacles to building a stronger CT partnership.
Chief among these is the proliferation of Small Arms/Light
Weapons (SA/LW),which remains an important and growing
threat to regional security that Saleh is reluctant to
address. The President has yet to follow through on a
private promise in April -- made public just before his visit
to Washington -- that only ROYG procurement officials would
be authorized to purchase weapons abroad and that the private
importation of arms would be criminalized.


9. (C) Saleh told Washington officials last week that an
upcoming weapons purchase from Ukraine is the last transfer
through private brokers in the pipeline, and that after the
conclusion of this deal, he would implement Yemen's new
policy. At our insistence, Saleh has made his commitment on
the arms trade public. There is still no evidence, however,
that the arms dealers have received the message. Despite
persistent high-level offers of assistance, Saleh has failed
thus far to create a weapons inventory system -- ulltimately
the best way to verify how imported weapons are being used.


10. (C) A major underlying factor complicating our CT
cooperation is the delicate balancing act that Saleh has been
performing between competing interests for decades. He
clearly recognizes the threat terrorist elements pose to
regime stability and is appreciative of USG support to
strengthen the security forces. At the same time, he is
careful not to provoke arms dealers, tribal leaders,
islamists and others who oppose closer ties to the United
States. Saleh maintains power through a complex network of
deals and alliances, and has been less than enthusiastic
about engaging in more comprehensive and consistent bilateral
cooperation that could threaten that precarious network.


11. (C) Saleh's primary method of influence over the other
power centers in Yemen -- the tribes and the military -- is a
system of opaque, off-the-books financial patronage. Decades
of this practice have fostered a culture of corruption at all
levels of the ROYG, and is itself beginning to pose a threat
to stability. International donors' efforts in most areas
have been hampered by corruption, leaving most Yemenis in the
same grinding poverty that has always plagued the country.
Yemen is facing a looming social crisis, as the country
continues to suffer from one of the highest birth rates in
the world, and more than 47 percent of its population is
currently under the age of 15.


12. (C) Ordinary Yemenis are having increasing difficulty
coping with the economic suffering brought on by high
inflation and reductions in government subsidies. At the
same time, grand corruption, diminishing oil reserves, and
meager outside investment have severely limited the ROYG's
ability to respond to these hardships and Yemenis have
resorted to violence to express their frustrations. The
second al-Houthi rebellion in Saada earlier this year --
which was eventually put down by CSF-CTU and other forces --
and riots in which dozens died, sparked by the reduction of
fuel subsidies in August, portend an uncertain future for
Yemen's internal social stability absent the undertaking of a
major reform program.


13. (C) Despite nearly 30 years in power and a certain
amount of tolerance for democratic dissent not seen in other
countries in the region, Saleh has yet to demonstrate a
long-term vision for addressing Yemen's economic woes. This
is particularly concerning at a time when the Yemeni state is
on the brink of failure -- a sobering prospect with serious
implications for regional stability and the GWOT. If Saleh's
greatest achievement -- the stability and unity of the
country -- is to survive beyond his rule, he must take bold
steps to strengthen and reform Yemen's military, democratic,
and financial institutions. One important step in this
direction is a closer CT partnership with the United States
that is characterized by routine access and cooperation at
all levels.


14. (C) Your meeting with the President will offer an
important opportunity to firmly reinforce the message he
heard in Washington about the need for better cooperation on
CT efforts to safeguard Yemen's stability. Previous
U.S.-Yemeni CT cooperation offers a good foundation, and
Saleh will argue that the record shows that he has responded
to every request the USG has made of him. What he does not
yet seem to understand is that true partners do not wait to
be asked or cajoled. It is critical that Yemen make the
transition from ad hoc cooperation to a fully developed
partnership. In the past, Saleh has done enough, relative to
his neighbors, to remain in our good graces. With Yemen
facing a looming economic and social crisis, however, words
and occasional progress will no longer suffice. If Yemen
continues to merely tread water, it will drown -- with
serious consequences for regional and international security.


15. (S) Suggested talking points for your meeting with the
President:

-- Congratulations on your recent successful visits to the
United States, Japan and France. I am visiting Yemen to
review our impressive achievements together and to ask your
views on ways we can attain an even higher level of strategic
engagement.

-- As we continue to fight hand-in-hand against terrorists
who want to bring harm to Yemen, we must also recognize the
threat posed by the proliferation of Small Arms and Light
Weapons. For your country's interests and ours, the arms
trade in Yemen must end.

-- As you know, weapons of Yemeni origin have found their
way into the hands of terrorists. Your public and private
assurances that only government officials will be allowed to
buy weapons abroad are encouraging.

-- Without a viable weapons inventory system, however, it
will be difficult to assess the impact of your new policy.
CENTCOM stands ready to assist you in creating an inventory
system so that we can both be sure that weapons are being put
in the right hands.

-- Equally dangerous for both of our countries is the
problem of foreign fighters in Iraq. I commend you for the
measures you have taken to help stem the flow of young
Yemenis to Iraq, but I strongly urge you to redouble your
efforts.

-- Those fighters who are not killed in Iraq may return to
Yemen with greater ability to harm the Yemeni people and your
government. CENTCOM is ready to help you in addressing this
problem, because it is as threatening for U.S. national
security as it is for yours.

-- As we move forward on our cooperation, we can point to
many successes. One example is the Yemeni Coast Guard. With
our assistance and your determination, you now have a force
capable of protecting your key ports.

-- We look forward to helping to expand their operations and
provide protection for the Safer Oil Terminal and the
terminal in al-Sahir. I urge you to make it a top priority
to support the Coast Guard in this endeavor to protect all of
Yemen's shores.

-- We look forward to building a close relationship with MOD
forces, as well. MOD's 3-5 year plan provides an important
blueprint and MOD Working Group meetings help us to focus our
assistance, and we hope that this will lead to direct
engagement between our military trainers and MOD personnel,
particularly the Special Operations Forces.
Khoury