PROGRESS REPORT ON YEMEN'S COUNTER-TERRORISM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002997

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM SA IZ YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: PROGRESS REPORT ON YEMEN'S COUNTER-TERRORISM
COOPERATION

REF: A. SANAA 2848

B. SANAA 2365

C. STATE 163140

D. SANAA 2806

E. SANAA 2822

F. SANAA 2945

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S) Summary. In July, Ambassador presented President
Saleh with a white paper assessing the Republic of Yemen
Government's (ROYG) level of counter-terrorism (CT)
cooperation. The Ambassador shared USG concerns that Yemen's
efforts to combat terrorism have been neither consistent nor
aggressive. The paper identified specific steps the ROYG
could take to strengthen cooperation ahead of Saleh's
November 2005 bi-lateral with President Bush and other
members of DOS, DOD, and the intelligence community. Since
delivering the assessment, the Ambassador has met frequently
with high-level Yemeni officials, encouraging them to
demonstrate the political will necessary to broaden and
deepen CT cooperation. Despite an overall increase in CT
cooperation at the beginning of the year, the ROYG has made
minimal progress on the desired action items. End Summary.

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Evaluation of Progress on Desired Action Items
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2. (S) The following is an evaluation of ROYG progress on
the specific steps identified in the white paper:

Access to Detainees/Information sharing


3. (S) Desired actions: Yemeni officials grant unrestricted
access to detainees to be connected to terrorist groups.
Yemeni officials to allow the U.S. full advance vetting of
potential Ramadan releases. Yemeni authorities should
provide fingerprints and photographs of all terrorist-related
detainees and render dual Yemen/U.S. citizen Jaber Elbaneh to
the United States for trial for terrorist-related crimes.


4. (S) ROYG Action: Provision of counter-terrorism
intelligence to U.S. officials markedly increased during the
first half of 2005. The Yemeni government, however, has not
provided sustained access to any detainees connected to
terrorist groups. Despite a formal request, Embassy has yet
to receive advance notice of Ramadan releases. On September
26, Saleh publicly announced he would pardon and release
imprisoned supporters of radical cleric Hussein Al-Houthi
(ref A). Supporters have not yet been released. Yemeni
authorities did not provide fingerprints and photographs of
all terrorist-related detainees. Dual Yemen/U.S. citizen
Jaber Elbaneh remains in Yemeni custody.


Stemming Flow from Yemen to Iraq


5. (S) Desired actions: The Yemeni government publicly
discourages Yemenis from traveling to Iraq, highlighting the
insurgency's continued killing of Iraqis, and criminalizes
participating in the insurgency. Yemeni government shares
with U.S. officials information (names/DPOBs, passport
number, etc.) on Yemenis attempting to travel to Iraq,
foreigners traveling through Yemen suspected of intending to
reach Iraq, and cooperation with regional governments to stem
the flow. Yemeni government invites the Saudi Mabahith to
station a representative in Sanaa to coordinate Yemen-Saudi
efforts to track and stem Iraq-bound extremists (this is a
key desired action).


6. (S) ROYG Action: Yemeni security services took a number
of steps to stem the flow of foreign fighters after
discovering in late 2004/early 2005 that returning foreign
fighters were plotting to attack ROYG officials and western
embassies. Security services have quietly started to monitor
and arrest local foreign fighter facilitators. The Yemeni
government, however, has yet to publicly discourage travel to
Iraq or provide increased information on travelers to U.S.
officials. Yemeni officials have informed Embassy that they
are cooperating closely with Saudi Arabia on CT issues, but
have not provided any specifics of that coordination.

Detention of Former Iraqi Regime Elements (FREs)


7. (S) Desired Actions: Based on an ORCA-developed list,
Yemeni government provides detailed information on efforts to
monitor, detain, or arrest FREs in country, as well as Yemeni
returnees from jihad in Iraq.


8. (S) ROYG Action: While not providing a comprehensive
review of FREs, Yemeni authorities did pass information on
the whereabouts of Umar Sabawi Ibrahim al-Tikriti. In
September, Embassy requested Yemen,s support for Sabawi,s
detention and extradition to Iraq. Yemeni authorities did
not detain Sabawi or coordinate with Iraqi services on his
extradition. No streamlined custodial transfers have been
established.


Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW)


9. (S) Desired actions: Yemeni government passes legislation
necessary to criminalize importing SA/LW except by the Yemeni
Ministry of Defense. Yemeni government enforces the
restrictions and reports violations (publicly and to U.S.
officials). Yemeni government takes steps to stem the flow
of weapons out of Yemen and into the Horn of Africa and Saudi
Arabia.


10. (S) ROYG Action: The Yemeni government has not passed
legislation necessary to criminalize importing SA/LW. In
September, Deputy Foreign Minister Mustafa Noman admitted
that the Yemeni government shipped 5,000 Kalashnikovs to
Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed in July following a personal request
from Yusuf to President Saleh during the June OIC conference
in Sanaa (ref B). Despite Saleh's March promise to suspend
all third-party End User Certificates (EUC),information
indicates Yemeni arms brokers are still negotiating the
purchase of SA/LW on behalf of the Ministry of Defense (ref
C).


Hamas/Palestinian Islamic Jihad



11. (S) Desired actions: Offices to be closed,
representatives deported or banned from conducting activities
on behalf of Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ),and
U.S. officials notified of Yemeni government actions. Second
best outcome: Representatives are placed under surveillance
and investigation and information collected by the Yemeni
government is shared with U.S. officials.


12. (S) ROYG Action: Hamas and PIJ offices have not been
closed and no representatives have been deported.
Information gathered through surveillance has not been
shared.


Sheikh Zindani


13. (S) Desired actions: Zindani,s assets frozen and his
passport revoked. Information from Zindani,s financial
flows shared with U.S. officials. Yemeni government takes a
strong public stance against terrorist financing.


14. (S) ROYG Action: Zindani,s assets have yet to be frozen
nor his passport revoked. No information on his assets has
been shared. In September, the Yemeni government requested
detailed evidence on Zindani's financial support to
terrorists groups (ref D). If proof could not be provided,
Yemen requested assistance removing his name from the UN
terrorist-financing list.


Yemen/Saudi border


15. (S) Desired actions: Yemeni and Saudi governments
explore additional measures to monitor and control the
border; Yemeni government dedicates additional resources to
arms smuggling interdiction on the Saudi border. Yemen
provides data required for the USG to move forward with an
update of the TIP/PISCES program in Yemen.


16. (S) ROYG Action: Yemeni officials have not informed the
Embassy of any joint measures with Saudi Arabia to monitor
and control the border. No additional resources have been
dedicated to arms smuggling interdiction. The Embassy has
received the data requested to move forward with the
TIP/PISCES program.


Cash Couriers


17. (S) Desired actions: Yemen adopts legal restrictions in
line with its Arabian Peninsula neighbors and the FATF
recommendations, begins aggressive enforcement, and
provides the USG with data on seized cash and couriers.
Consistent with FATF Special Recommendation IX, Yemen should
adopt measures to detect the physical cross-border
transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments,
including a declaration system or other disclosure
obligation. Yemen should ensure that it has competent
authorities who have the legal authority to stop or restrain
currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are suspected
to be related to terrorist financing or money laundering, or
that are falsely declared or disclosed. Moreover, Yemen
should ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive
sanctions are available to deal with persons who make false
declaration(s) or disclosure(s).


18. (S) ROYG Action: No action has been taken on cash
couriers.


Public Diplomacy/Hearts and Minds


19. (S) Desired actions: Yemeni government launches an
anti-extremism public awareness campaign, discouraging
support to the Iraqi insurgency, highlighting the
un-Islamic-ness of terrorist acts, and explaining the global
effort to combat terrorism.


20. (S) ROYG Action: The Yemeni government has not launched
an anti-extremism public awareness campaign.


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Comment: Why the Lack of Movement?
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21. (S) Despite receiving a clear message on the importance
of sustained progress on CT issues, including during a recent
visit by CT Advisor Fran Townsend, the ROYG continues to
delay implementing the desired actions. When discussing
Saleh's visit, ROYG officials tend to steer the conversation
towards possible USG deliverables, rather than discussing the
specifics of CT cooperation. While willing to publicly
declare support for the GWOT in a signed "Memorandum of
Intention" (ref E),the ROYG is less enthusiastic about
demonstrating support by granting access to detainees,
combating terrorist financing, or stopping the flow of SA/LW.


22. (S) Post 9/11, Saleh has played a delicate balancing act
between competing interests. He clearly recognizes the
threat terrorist elements pose to regime stability and is
appreciative of USG support to strengthen the security
forces. On the other hand, many powerful political players,
like Zindani and arms dealers, have a clear interest in
maintaining the status quo. Saleh maintains power through a
complex network of deals and alliances and is therefore
frequently unwilling to act unilaterally on CT issues. This
balancing act is becoming increasingly more important ahead
of the 2006 Presidential elections, especially considering
Saleh appears ready to rescind his pledge not to seek
re-election (ref F).
Krajeski