Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA2945
2005-10-11 14:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

FM QIRBI SAYS SALEH MAY "CHANGE HIS MIND" ABOUT

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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002945 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM YE DOMESTIC POLITICS DEMOCRATIC REFORM
SUBJECT: FM QIRBI SAYS SALEH MAY "CHANGE HIS MIND" ABOUT
NOT RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT; VOICES CONCERN OVER AMBASSADOR'S
COMMENTS ON PRESS FREEDOM ABUSES

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002945

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM YE DOMESTIC POLITICS DEMOCRATIC REFORM
SUBJECT: FM QIRBI SAYS SALEH MAY "CHANGE HIS MIND" ABOUT
NOT RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT; VOICES CONCERN OVER AMBASSADOR'S
COMMENTS ON PRESS FREEDOM ABUSES

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During an October 10 meeting to review
logistical arrangements for President Saleh's November visit
to Washington, FonMin Abu Bakr al-Qirbi told Ambassador that
Saleh was "nervous" about how a reversal of his announcement
that he would not run for re-election in 2006 would be
perceived in Washington. Ambassador advised that some Yemen
observers may criticize a bid by Saleh to stay in power, but
that ulimately there would not be a great deal of surprise.
Qirbi also criticized Ambassador for an interview with the
local press in which he questioned the ROYG's commitment to
democracy in light of recent press freedom abuses. Qirbi
asserted that political groups were using the comments for
"political gain." Ambassador said he would not stop
defending press freedom, but assured Qirbi his role would not
become a polarizing issue as the presidential campaign gets
underway. END SUMMARY

--------------
SALEH VISIT LOGISTICS
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador reviewed with Qirbi the preparations for
President Saleh's upcoming visit, noting that it was not USG
practice during a head-of-state visit to sign the sort of
broad Memorandum of Intentions that the ROYG had proposed.
Signing ceremonies are normally only held when the two
leaders have a specific issue on which they wish to conclude
an agreement. For example, if Yemen's Millenium Challenge
Account Threshold Program proposal is approved by the
Millenium Challenge Corporation board, it may be possible for
the two presidents to hold a public signing or announcement
of the agreement. Ambassador also suggested that an exchange
of letters on specific topics between ROYG ministers and U.S.
secretaries may be a posssibility.

SIPDIS


3. (C) With regard to press opportunities, Ambassador noted
that White House planners had not yet decided whether Saleh
and POTUS would make a joint appearance before the press
without an opportunity for questions, or if they would only

issue joint press statements. In the event joint statements
are issued, he said, the USG would make an effort to
incorporate many of the points suggested in the ROYG's draft
Memorandum of Intentions.


4. (C) Ambassador informed the Minister that requests had
been made for President Saleh to call on the Vice President,
the Secretary, SecDef, National Security Advisor, FBI
Director, CIA Director, and National Intelligence Director
John Negroponte. He said the Yemeni Embassy in Washington
advised that Saleh would arrive on November 8 from Japan, but
that meetings should not begin until the following day. The
meeting with POTUS would occur on November 10, followed by
lunch, at which time the Yemeni Embassy advised that the
"official agenda would end." Ambassador also asked Qirbi for
further details on several outstanding questions, including
the composition of the Yemeni delegation and whether FonMin
Qirbi will want to request separate meetings with the
Secretary and others.

SIPDIS


5. (C) Qirbi said he hoped the details of press statements
and/or letter exchanges could be finalized quickly in order
to avoid the "last-minute squeeze" that plagued Saleh's 2001
visit. The FonMin noted that the ROYG wants this visit to be
"different from 2001" and to "establish a clear strategic
relationship on the issues alluded to in the draft Memorandum
of Intentions."


6. (C) Ambassador reminded Qirbi that final decisions on
all arrangments would be made at the White House, but
promised to keep the FonMin informed as logistical plans
become more firm. On the substance, he said a discussion of
the U.S.-Yemeni relationship over the medium to long term
would certainly be part of Saleh's discussions with U.S.
policymakers, but he cautioned the minister not to expect a
great number of "deliverables" from the U.S. side. He
pointed out that, for the USG, the visit itself is a major
"deliverable" to the ROYG. Many world leaders are rarely, if
ever, invited to meet POTUS, and this will be Saleh's third
meeting with President Bush.

--------------
WHAT IF SALEH RUNS AGAIN?
--------------


7. (C) After asking the Ambassador's and his own notetakers
to leave the room, Qirbi then queried Ambassador on what the
reaction in Washington had been to Saleh's surprise
announcement in July that he would not run for president
again in 2006. Saleh is "nervous about how it would be
perceived if he changed his mind." Ambassador replied that
there was a range of reactions within the USG and elsewhere
to Saleh's announcement. There were those who believed that
Saleh would no doubt "reluctantly" accept his party's
nomination to run again for the "sake of the nation," that he
would win the election, and that this was probably not a bad
thing for Yemen's overall stability given the alternatives.
There were others who took Saleh at his word, but would not
be surprised if he ran again, and still others who believed
Saleh and would be surprised and critical if he ran again.


8. (C) Qirbi said that next year was "just too soon" for
Saleh to step down, because there is "no one to take his
place." Saleh's son Ahmed Ali Saleh is "not ready" to assume
the presidency and "does not have his father's qualities in
relating to tribes and unifying the country." The President
has "not prepared his succession" and there is currently "no
one out there" who can lead Yemen as successfully as Saleh.
Ambassador said that, no matter what Saleh decides in the
coming weeks, he should be prepared for U.S. officials and
members of the press to ask if he remains committed to his
announcement.

--------------
CONCERN OVER PRESS FREEDOM COMMENTS
--------------


9. (C) The FonMin then turned to the subject of Ambassador's
comments made during an interview with the local Al-Ayyam
newspaper, which Yemeni and other Arab news outlets had
characterized as asserting that democratic progress in Yemen
had "stopped." Ambassador explained that his comments had
been quoted out of order by the newspaper, but the substance
was essentially correct. There have been disturbing
developments over the past several months involving
unidentified government agents harassing, beating, and
imprisoning journalists, all of which had led to questions in
Washington about the ROYG's commitment to press freedom.
Inasmuch as press freedom is an essential pillar for the
development of democracy, Ambassador continued, it was fair
to express concerns that Yemen's democratic progress had
"stalled," which he pointed out was the word he used, not
"stopped."


10. (C) Qirbi noted that it was unfortunate that the press
had translated the word "stalled" as "tawaqf," which means
"stopped," because the impression Yemenis were taking away
from the Ambassador's comments were that the USG believes
that there is no longer any democracy in Yemen. Qirbi
cautioned that such statements "provide fuel" for groups to
agitate against the USG and that political groups were
seeking to use the Ambassador's comments to score points.
Local media outlets were carrying various reactions to the
interview, and it had even become the subject of a 30-minute
al-Jazeera talk show on October 9 (septel). Yemen is gripped
by "election fever," and for the next year, he said, "every
little statement" made by the USG will "take on more
importance" because of the high level of political activity
in the run-up to the elections.


11. (C) Ambassador reassured Qirbi that he was aware of the
weight comments by USG officials carried in Yemen, and was
sensitive to the fact that, while USG policies will no doubt
be an issue of great debate during the campaign season, the
U.S. Ambassador should not himself become an election issue.
That said, the USG will not stop defending press freedoms in
Yemen. The Secretary had made clear that supporting
democratic reform is in the strategic interests of the United
States, and that it will be USG policy to point out when a
country is doing well in this regard, and when there is
backsliding. We have lauded Yemen's stated commitments to
press freedom, and will continue to hold the ROYG to those
commitments.


12. (C) COMMENT: Qirbi's concerns about Ambassador's
comments on press freedom were expected, although it is worth
noting that this is the first time the FonMin has not seized
the opportunity to defend ROYG policies with regard to the
press. Post shares Qirbi's assessment of Ahmed Ali Saleh's
shortcomings and the likelihood that Saleh will ultimately
run for another term next year. The fact that we are hearing
this for the first time from a cabinet-level official is
probably a strong indicator that Saleh is moving closer to
formally stepping back from his July announcement.
Krajeski